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EDITORIAL
It is a great honour to introduce Volume 28(2) of the Nottingham Law Journal, con-
tinuing the long tradition of serving the academic community for over four decades. 
It has remains a peer reviewed and indexed publication, enabling scholars with a 
broad range of perspectives and disciplines to present their work to an international 
audience. 
The edition reflects the eclectic nature of the journal and the broad range of con-
tributors, of which we are justly proud. It is an organ to present some of the research 
activities of Nottingham Law School, both in terms of its own staff, and also in rela-
tion to academics who have attended conferences, symposia and seminars hosted by 
the School and its centres; but it is also a general interest journal which welcomes 
submissions from external and internal authors alike. We remain committed to robust 
academic standards, but endeavour nonetheless to be inclusive in relation to topics 
welcomed. 
All of the above is amply demonstrated in the contents of the current edition. We have 
a consideration by Sohail Wahedi on the “Religious Modification of Infants’ Genitalia: On 
the (un)lawfulness of ritual male and female circumcision.” This remains a highly topical 
debate, and any potential routes out of the legal and political quagmire are important 
subjects for consideration. A further religiously related contribution comes from Elijah 
Granet: “Reynolds Revisited: Minority Religions and the Belief/Action Dichotomy.” 
This time the author explores how the seminal Reynolds case in the nineteenth century 
United States shaped future judicial approaches in dealing with minority religious 
practice, and asks some pressing question for and about our own era, on both sides of 
the Atlantic. 
Moving into different, but not unrelated territory, we also present two papers from 
a Symposium on Syria held in autumn 2018, a context which reminds us all too clearly 
of the stakes in finding constructive and peaceful means to reconcile conflicting world-
views. We have Helen O’Nions paper on “Crisis Framing and the Syrian Displacement: 
the threat to European values” a theme which, tragically, has lost not of its urgency. 
Its accompanying piece by Nigel White examines “Peace- making in Syria: Why the 
Security Council Fails”. Here, the title speaks for itself in terms of the fundamental 
theme, and nobody could question the importance of the question, which is insightfully 
explored. 
Finally, Kay Wheat offers “An examination of the disparity between judicial activity in 
developing the law in the context of non- statutory terms in employment contracts and in the 
interpretation of statutory terms” in a learned discussion which analyses issue of justice in 
the field of labour law. We also have some further public and private law matters explored 
in a book review of Yuko Suda’s “The Politics of Data Transfer: Transatlantic Conflict 
and Cooperation Over Data Privacy” offered by Qian Li, and a Case Note on the Regency 
Villas Case (Regency Villas Title Ltd and others (Respondents/ Cross- Appellants( v 
Dimond Resorts (Europe) Ltd and others (Appellants/ Cross- Respondents) [2018] 
UKSC 57) authored by Dorota Galeza.
I am of course indebted to all of these contributors, and enormously grateful to the 
editorial team, Daniel Gough as Deputy Editor and Linda Mururu as Postgraduate 
Associate Editor. In addition the help of our administrative assistant Kerri Gilbert 
has, as always, been invaluable. I am also grateful for the advice and support offered 
by previous editors who remain as colleagues, Janice Denicourt, Helen O’Nions and 
Tom Lewis.
THE REV’D DR HELEN HALL
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RELIGIOUS MODIFICATION OF INFANTS’ GENITALIA ON THE (UN)
LAWFULNESS OF RITUAL MALE AND FEMALE CIRCUMCISION
SOHAIL WAHEDI*†
ABSTRACT
This article engages in the debate that questions the justification grounds for the differ-
ent approaches to ritual circumcisions in law and politics. In this regard, it reflects on the 
implications, the rise of female circumcision on religious grounds outside Africa and the 
decrease of toleration for infant male circumcision across Western liberal democracies, 
have for the legal assessment frameworks of both types of circumcision. Thus, it raises 
more concretely the question as to whether incision and piercing that modify female 
genitalia less significantly than ritual male circumcision, could be accepted as exemp-
tions in law, like male circumcision and cosmetic surgery. To address the criticism of 
applying “double standards” in the legal assessment of ritual circumcisions, this article 
develops a normative framework of liberal rights and analyses how circumcisions affect 
the security, vulnerability and status of human beings. This liberal perspective rejects 
convincingly exemptions for female circumcision and accepts ritual male circumcision 
conditionally and temporarily. This article develops two pragmatic arguments that 
explain the “double standards” regime. These arguments reject exemptions for female 
circumcision and accept ritual male circumcision as an exemption in law, for reasons 
that look beyond the sectarian justification of this practice.
Keywords: female circumcision, female genital mutilation, male circumcision, law and 
religion
*Assistant Professor, Erasmus School of Law.
†This article has appeared (in whole or in parts) in the following publications: Sohail Wahedi, Female Circumcision as 
an African Problem: Double Standards or Harsh Reality?, in M. Christian Green, T. Jeremy Gunn & Mark Hill (Eds.), 
Religion, Law And Security in Africa 385 (2018); Sohail Wahedi, The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions, 
22 Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 209 (2019); Sohail Wahedi, Freedom of Religion and Living Together, 49 California 
Western International Law Journal 213 (2018–2019). This article was prepared for presentation and discussion at confer-
ences in Bologna (2019); Nottingham (2017); Rabat (2017) and Rotterdam (2017). Many thanks to all who have commented 
on this article, especially to Yaron Catane; Frank Ravitch, Wibren van der Burg and Jeroen Temperman. Errors remain 
mine.
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INTRODUCTION
The arrest and detention of some members of the Dawoodi Bohra sect (part of the Shia 
Ismaili community that is predominantly present in India) in Detroit, in April and 
June 2017, caused a broad wave of public indignation over the performance of female 
circumcision (hereafter “FC”) in the United States (hereafter “US)”. In this first federal 
landmark trial for FC in the US, the defendants have been accused of performing this 
practice and assisting the circumciser. The most striking charge has been the one against 
the emergency room physician, Juamana Nagarwala.1 She has been charged for the 
circumcision of two minors from Minnesota. In addition, the public prosecutor has 
accused her of having circumcised a larger number of other girls from across the US 
over the past twelve years. The defence team has disputed the unlawfulness of what 
it has called a harmless “benign religious procedure” that consisted of separating the 
mucous membrane from the genitalia.2 As such, the defence team has questioned the 
applicability of the term “genital mutilation”, which suggests a priori the unlawfulness 
of any medically unnecessary modification of female genitals.3 However, recently, this 
case has taken a very interesting turn. 
Judge Bernard Friedman of the Eastern District of Michigan ruled that the Federal 
ban on female circumcision is unconstitutional, because the congress had no authority 
to enact a ban on this issue on Federal level, since, among others, local laws should be in 
charge of eliminating criminal activities. The Court, citing United States v. Lopez, held 
that Federal authorities have no “plenary police power”.4 More specifically, the District 
Court rejected the authorities’ argument that the Federal ban on FC followed from the 
obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter 
“ICCPR”). In this respect, the authorities referred to Articles three (non- discrimination 
provision) and 24 (child protection provision). Judge Friedman rejected these arguments 
on two grounds. First, the he held that the non- discrimination provision under ICCPR 
does not provide a solid base to justify the federal ban on FC, since this provision is 
meant to ensure and promote gender equality. Second, Judge Friedman held that neither 
the child protection provision could help the federal government to justify the federal 
ban on FC. The Court said that “even assuming the treaty and the FGM statute are 
rationally related, federalism concerns deprive Congress of the power to enact this 
statute. In adopting the ICCPR, each member state obligated itself to” fulfill the treaty 
obligation in accordance with its own constitutional tradition, meaning that the Federal 
government had no authority to enact a federal ban on FC. This should have happened 
on state level.5 
Nevertheless, parallel to the public outrage in the US and abroad about infant FC 
for seemingly religious purposes in metro Detroit, some have criticised the impunity 
of ritual male infant circumcision (hereafter “MC”). The protesters have raised the 
question why young boys who are at risk of being circumcised for non- medical reasons 
are not protected against this practice.6 Similarly, in the public discourse some have 
implicitly pointed to the problem of favouritism. The question is whether authorities 
1 M Cuevas, ‘Michigan doctors charged in first federal genital mutilation case in US’ CNN (25 April 2017).
2 R Snell, ‘Judge keeps doctor jailed in mutilation case’ The Detroit News (19 July 2017). 
3 In the United States, FC has explicitly been prohibited since 1997. See: US Code Title 18, Part I, Chapter 7, § 116, which 
prohibits the medicinally unnecessary circumcision, excision or infibulation of any part of the genitalia of girls under 
the age of 18.
4 United States v. Nagarwala, 350 F.Supp.3d 613 (E.D.Mich., 2018).
5 Ibid.
6 T Baldas, ‘Protesters in Detroit say male circumcision should also be outlawed’ Detroit Free Press (17 April 2017).
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could make a distinction between comparable religious practices.7 The distinction in 
legal approaches implies here allowing some obviously religious manifestations, such 
as MC, while outlawing other rites because these are contrary to the norms of civilised 
societies, like FC, even the variants that are comparable to, or even less drastic than 
MC.8 
The 2017 Detroit criminal case of “horrifying acts of brutality” (hereafter “the 
Detroit case”) fits in two ways the most recent developments the research area of 
FC faces.9 Firstly, the prevalence of this “over there” problem in the US and other 
countries around the globe fits the growing criticism on considering this practice a 
major concern of Africa. Secondly, the application of seemingly different legal regimes 
regarding ritual circumcisions fits the criticism of applying “double standards” in the 
legal assessment of comparable practices.10 The close link between religion and the rise 
of FC around the globe challenges us to reflect on and question the legal assessment 
framework of this practice. This challenge draws on the question as to whether FC, at 
least the variants that are comparable to, or less drastic than MC, could be accepted 
as religious exemptions in law.11 Thus, the need to compare ritual circumcisions in 
this context justifies the choice to speak in terms of FC instead of genital mutilation.12 
Circumcision excludes any prejudice concerning the (un)lawfulness of this practice and 
eases as such a mutual comparison between ritual circumcisions and the legal assessment 
frameworks.13
The main aim of this article is to engage in the current debate that questions the 
justification grounds for the different approaches to ritual circumcisions in law and 
politics.14 In this regard, it reflects on the implications that the rise of FC on religious 
grounds outside Africa and the decrease of toleration for MC in liberal democracies 
have for the legal assessment frameworks of ritual circumcisions. To this end, part 
II gives a description of FC and MC. Part III discusses the criticism of “double 
standards” from a liberal perspective and presents two pragmatic reasons that could 
explain this regime. This article claims in part IV that the rise and prevalence of the 
relatively lighter versions of FC outside Africa for religious reasons and the decrease 
of support for tolerating MC across liberal democracies call upon us to rethink the 
legal assessment frameworks of ritual circumcisions. Reflecting hereon results in the 
conclusion that the religious dimension of ritual circumcisions, as such, does not 
count as an argument to grant exemptions for medically unnecessary interventions 
that modify human bodies irreversibly. Any liberal justification for exemptions that 
allow these kinds of interventions in law should rest on ecumenical grounds that 
are accessible to a broad public regardless of their background in religion, culture 
or ideology. 
 7 E Volokh, ‘Religious exemptions and the Detroit female genital mutilation prosecution’ The Washington Post (23 May 
2017). 
 8 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36.
 9 J Fortin, ‘Michigan Doctor Is Accused of Genital Cutting of 2 Girls’ The New York Times (13 April 2017) 
10 M Dustin,‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Women’s Studies 7, 12.
11 E Volokh, ‘Religious exemptions and the Detroit female genital mutilation prosecution’ The Washington Post (23 May 
2017). 
12 This article does not aim to breach the broad consensus that the modification of female genitalia without any medical 
need is a problematic practice.
13 Cf. also Obiajulu Nnamuchi, ‘Hands off My Pudendum: A Critique of the Human Rights Approach to Female Genital 
Ritual’, (2011) 15 Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 243, 253.
14 Comp. M Fox and M Thomson ‘Short Changed? The Law and Ethics of Male Circumcision’ (2005) 13 The International 
Journal of Children’s Rights 161.
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RITUAL CIRCUMCISIONS
Female circumcision 
Scope
The World Health Organisation (hereafter “WHO”) has estimated that on a global level, 
approximately 200 million young girls and women have undergone one of the variants 
of FC, varying from very serious to relatively light. Moreover, this leading source on 
the scope of FC has estimated that three million girls are annually at the risk of FC.15 
Over the last decade, in most of the practicing countries, girls and women have been 
circumcised before the age of five. Research reveals that in some of these countries up 
to 90% and in some other places even close to 100% of the girls and women have been 
circumcised. This list of countries in which a large number of girls and women in the age 
category 15 to 49 years have already undergone one of the variants of FC, has been led 
by African countries, such as Somalia (98%), Guinea (97%), Djibouti (93%) and Sierra 
Leone (90%). In other practicing countries, about half of the girls have been circumcised 
in the period immediately after the birth, but before the age of 15. As such in Gambia 
(56%), Mauritania (54%), Indonesia (49%) and Guinea (46%) approximately half of the 
female population has undergone circumcision.16
Prevalence 
International organisations, such as the WHO, initially considered FC a concern of the 
African continent.17 Therefore, the measures were designed to help mainly the African 
countries to combat this practice.18 Today, the international community uses an entirely 
different language to discuss this practice. It considers FC “a global concern”.19 That 
is not entirely a false alarm. Girls and women have been circumcised in Iran, Iraqi 
Kurdistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia.20 Furthermore, due to migration from Africa to 
the United States,21 Europe,22 and Australia,23 also these regions have been confronted 
with this practice. Hence, the quantitative scale in which FC occurs in a particular 
area does not say so much about the broader prevalence of FC. Thus, FC is no longer 
a unique problem of Africa. Indeed, it is no longer an “over there concern”. Rather, 
it is an omnipresent phenomenon that is practiced from North America to Europe, 
Asia and Oceania. Hence, the Detroit case is a recent proof of the “global presence” 
of FC.
15 WHO, ‘WHO guidelines on the management of health complications from female genital mutilation’ (WHO, 2016) 
<http://who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/206437/1/9789241549646_eng.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
16 UNICEF, ‘Female genital mutilation/cutting: a global concern’ (UNICEF, 2016). <https://www.unicef.org/media/files/
FGMC_2016_brochure_final_UNICEF_SPREAD.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
17 Comp. the first WHO publication on programmes meant to combat FC: WHO, ‘Female genital mutilation: programmes 
to date’ (WHO, 1999) <http://who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/65857/1/WHO_CHS_WMH_99.5.pdf/> accessed 28 May 
2019.
18 Comp. N Berkovitch and K Bradley, ‘The Globalization of Women’s Status: Consensus/Dissensus in the World Polity’ 
(1999) 42 Sociological Perspectives 481, 490. 
19 UNICEF, ‘Female genital mutilation/cutting: a global concern’ (UNICEF, 2016). <https://www.unicef.org/media/files/
FGMC_2016_brochure_final_UNICEF_SPREAD.pdf> accessed 28 May 2019.
20 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36.
21 H Goldberg et al., ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the United States: Updated Estimates of Women and Girls 
at Risk, 2012’ (2016) 131 Public Health Reports 340.
22 S Johnsdotter and RM Mestre i Mestre, ‘Female Genital Mutilation in Europe: An analysis of court cases’ (2015) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender- equality/files/documents/160205_fgm_europe_enege_report_en.pdf/> accessed 28 
May 2019.
23 JB Rogers, ‘The First Case Addressing Female Genital Mutilation in Australia’ (2016) 41 Alternative Law Journal 235.
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Variants
FC, or genital mutilation, concerns any non- medical intervention on female genitalia. 
The literature on this practice categorises FC, in accordance with the classification made 
by the WHO, into four types: clitoridectomy (Type I), excision (Type II), infibulation 
(Type III) and a rest category (Type IV). The WHO defines “Type I” as the removal of 
the clitoris, either partly or completely. It also makes a distinction between the removal 
of the clitoral hood, which has been called circumcision and the removal of the clitoris 
and the clitoral hood, which has been defined as clitoridectomy. Type II stands for the 
removal of the clitoris and the labia minora, either partly or completely and either in 
combination with or independently of excising the labia majora. The WHO distinguishes 
type II in three specific interventions. First, the complete removal of the labia minora. 
Second, the removal of the clitoris in combination with the labia minora, either partly 
or completely. Third, the removal of the clitoris, the labia minora and majora, either 
partly or completely.24 Type III is the most severe intervention on female genitalia, as it 
almost closes the vaginal opening and creates subsequently “a covering seal by cutting 
and appositioning the labia minora and/or the labia majora, with or without excision 
of the clitoris”.25 The rest category of FC covers a wide range of interventions, varying 
from pricking and piercing to incision and cauterization.26 The Detroit case provides 
probably another appropriate example of Type IV circumcision. 
According to estimates that WHO refers to, the vast majority of circumcised girls and 
women have undergone one of the variants of Type I, II and IV. Only ten percent of 
circumcision cases concerns Type III.27 However, in some countries, such as Somalia,28 
and previously Djibouti and Sudan,29 a large number of girls and women has undergone 
the most severe circumcision type: infibulation (Type III). The same is true for particular 
ethnic groups in Eritrea that circumcise girls: almost all circumcision cases within those 
groups include sewn closure of the vaginal opening.30 However, in a 2013 report, the 
UNICEF has indicated that infibulation becomes less common among groups that 
practiced this type of circumcision.31 Outside the FC hotspot, e.g. in Iran, Indonesia 
and Malaysia, girls and women are subjected to the relatively lighter variants of FC, 
such as Types I and IV. However, in Iraqi Kurdistan both, the relatively lighter and the 
more severe variants prevail.32
Justification grounds
There is no one specific ground people rely on to justify practicing FC. Therefore, there 
is no clear explanation for why girls and women still undergo circumcision. Rather 
a mixture of arguments are mentioned as justifications for the continuation of FC. 
24 WHO, ‘WHO guidelines on the management of health complications from female genital mutilation’1–4 (WHO, 2016) 
<http://who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/206437/1/9789241549646_eng.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
25 Ibid, 4.
26 Ibid.
27 WHO, ‘Eliminating female genital mutilation: an interagency statement’ (WHO, 2008). <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/ 
daw/csw/csw52/statements_missions/Interagency_Statement_on_Eliminating_FGM.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
28 UNICEF, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting’ (UNICEF, 2013) 47 <http://unicef.org/media/files/UNICEF_FGM_
report_July_2013_Hi_res.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
29 WHO, ‘Female Genital Mutilation. An overview’ (WHO, 1998) 8 <http://who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/42042/1/9241561912_
eng.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
30 UNICEF, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting’ (UNICEF, 2013) 48 <http://unicef.org/media/files/UNICEF_FGM_
report_July_2013_Hi_res.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
31 Ibid, 114.
32 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36.
6 Nottingham Law Journal
The common factor is that circumcision of girls and women is meant to emphasize 
femininity, chastity, the transition to adulthood and other cultural expectations about 
the role and identity of the women in society. Against this backdrop, some have argued 
that FC concerns a “gendered practice” that occurs within certain traditions because 
of the female gender. Besides, FC has been practiced on religious grounds within 
particular Islamic, Jewish and Christian groups. As such, recent studies reveal that 
in Iran, Malaysia, Indonesia and Iraqi Kurdistan circumcision is mainly justified on 
religious grounds. However, the high- ranked Islamic Al- Azhar University has repeat-
edly explained that the relationship between Islam and FC is very complicated. More 
specifically, in 2016 the Azhar declared that neither the Koran, nor the Hadith sup-
port the “violent” practice of FC, despite the fact that some girls and women undergo 
circumcision within particular Islamic traditions. Jewish and Christian scholars have 
adopted the same critical approach towards the religious narratives of this practice.33
The legal response
Today, FC is considered a serious concern of human rights. However, this human rights 
perspective on FC has been adopted relatively recently. After all, FC in all its variants 
is considered a violation of human rights since 1994,34 despite earlier international calls 
to combat all practices that are harmful to women. As such, the Economic and Social 
Council urged back in 1952, in Resolution 445 (XIV), all its member states to take neces-
sary steps against practices that violate the physical integrity of women. Also, in 1958 
it called upon the WHO to provide an overview of harmful practices girls around the 
globe face and how such acts could be eliminated. Given the sensitivity over traditional 
practices, like FC, the WHO declined to carry out this research and argued that it lacks 
competence to map rituals that have a cultural nature, and not a medical one.35 Thus, 
for a long time, it was not self- evident to consider FC a human rights issue. However, 
in the aftermath of the 1994 international recognition of FC as a serious violation of 
fundamental rights, a quick shift was visible towards the adoption of concrete measures 
to eliminate this practice.36
Today, many countries around the globe, including African states,37 have developed 
specific laws that explicitly prohibit circumcision of girls and women for non- medical 
reasons. Moreover, some countries, such as Belgium, have even criminalised circumci-
sion of adults who are able to give their consent about interventions upon their genitals 
for cultural reasons. This approach has been criticised as applying “double standards”, 
since cosmetic surgeries and other medically non- necessary interventions are not 
criminalised equally.38 Countries that have not adopted specific criminal law provisions 
to combat FC, for instance many European countries, rely on general criminal law 
33 Ibid.
34 Economic and Social Council, ‘Plan of action for the Elimination of Harmful Traditional Practices affecting the Health 
of Women and Children’ (E/CN.4/Sub.2/1994/10/Add.1 1994).
35 N Berkovitch and K Bradley, ‘The Globalization of Women’s Status: Consensus/Dissensus in the World Polity’ (1999) 
42 Sociological Perspectives 481, 489. 
36 RSB Kool and S Wahedi, ‘European Models of Citizenship and the Fight against Female Genital Mutilation’, in SN 
Romaniuk and M Marlin (eds), Development and the Politics of Human Rights (Boca Raton: CRC Press 2015, 205–221).
37 B Shell- Duncan et al, ‘Legislating Change? Responses to Criminalizing Female Genital Cutting in Senegal’ (2013) 47 
Law & Society Review 803, 806.
38 M Dustin, ‘Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in the UK’ (2010) 17 European Journal of Women’s Studies 7, 12. See 
also Ruth Farrugia, ‘Parental Responsibility and State Intervention’, (2000) 31 California Western International Law 
Journal 127, 132; Hope Lewis & Isabelle R. Gunning, ‘Cleaning Our Own House: Exotic and Familial Human Rights 
Violations’, (1992) 4 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 123, 132; Isabelle R. Gunning, ‘Arrogant Perception, World- 
Travelling and Multicultural Feminism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries’, (1992) 23 Columbia Human Rights Law 
Review 189, 213. 
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provisions that ban serious assault and mistreatment.39 Despite the firm international 
condemnations of FC and legislation designed accordingly to eliminate and combat 
this practice, there is some serious concern about the enforcement of laws against FC.4 0 
The complexity to enforce criminal law successfully in the fight against FC is caused, 
amongst others, by a lack of coherence in the criminal law approach towards this prac-
tice. In countries that face the consequences of FC on a large scale, such as the African 
states that have criminalised this practice, the anti- FC laws are not effective enough to 
eliminate FC.41 
For example, in Mauritania that has criminalised FC, it is not forbidden by law to 
circumcise girls and women at certified healthcare institutions. In South Africa, FC 
is not explicitly criminalised in relation to adults.42 Another factor that complicates 
the legal attempts to fight this practice is the large support for circumcision within the 
practicing groups and the risk of making circumcision an “underground” intervention. 
Therefore, some argue that criminalising a practice that is so widely supported is not 
only ineffective, but also problematic as it practically implies criminal liability for the 
whole nation.43 
To date, France is the only country around the globe that has enforced criminal law 
on a relatively large scale in the fight against FC. There are different factors that explain 
the “French success” in this regard. First, the French republican model of citizenship 
that is strongly intertwined with national assimilation policies towards ethnic minorities 
and “newcomers”. These ethnocentric policies provide hardly any room for minority 
groups’ practices that are considered contrary to the majoritarian culture. Second, the 
systematic medical control of children under the age of six years, which also included a 
control of the genitalia, have brought cases of circumcision before the criminal court.4 4 
Ritual male infant circumcision 
Scope
The WHO has estimated that one in three males around the globe has been subjected 
to MC.45 Estimates of the WHO shows that a little less than 70% of all males who have 
been circumcised, are Muslim. Thus, they are by far the largest group who (still) practice 
MC. As such, over 90% of boys are circumcised in countries with a Muslim majority 
39 European Institute for Gender Equality, ‘Female genital mutilation in the European Union and Croatia’ (European 
Institute for Gender Equality, 2013) <http://eige.europa.eu/rdc/eige- publications/female- genital- mutilation- european- 
union- report/> accessed 28 May 2019.
40 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36. 
41 Therefore, some have argued that law is not an appropriate instrument to eliminate FC Governments need to support 
non- profit organisations in order to bring the concerns about FC under the attention of a broader public. See L Muzima, 
‘Towards a Sensitive Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Africa’ (2016) 3 SOAS Law Journal 73, 
92.
42 M Couzens, ‘The Prosecution of Female Genital Mutilation: A Discussion of Its Implications for South Africa in the Light 
of a Recent Australian Case’ (2017) 134 South African Law Journal 116. See also Johan D. Van der Vyver, ‘International 
Standards for the Promotion and Protection of Children’s Rights: American and South African Dimensions’, (2009) 
15 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 81, 105–106 (discussing Children’s Act of South Africa and how this law bans 
traditional practices that violate human rights, such as ritual circumcisions and proving the virginity. This Act does 
not ban religious male circumcision, it however prohibits cultural male circumcision for boys under the age of 16).
43 L Muzima, ‘Towards a Sensitive Approach to Ending Female Genital Mutilation/Cutting in Africa’ (2016) 3 SOAS Law 
Journal 73, 91.
44 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36. 
45 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 25 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
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of the population, like Turkey, the states in the Gulf region and North Africa.46 Like 
Muslims, Jews form another group, who practice MC on a global level. A 2007 study 
of the WHO indicates that in Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States, up to 
99% of Jewish babies have been circumcised.47 
Prevalence
Circumcision of boys has been performed in among others North America; Europe; 
the Middle East; Central and Southeast Asia and major parts of Africa.48 In some 
countries, boys have been circumcised by “traditional circumcisers”, such as the mohel 
in Israel, the motaher in the Middle East and the sunnatji in Turkey.49 In other states, 
like Saudi Arabia, physicians, or at least medically skilled personnel are generally in 
charge of MC.50 The age at which a boy is circumcised varies by region. For example, 
in Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States,51 practically all male babies of 
Jewish parents are circumcised shortly after birth.52 Similarly, in some parts of West 
Africa and the Gulf region male babies are circumcised soon after birth. However, in 
North Africa and the Middle East,53 and parts of Asia, MC has not been carried out 
at a particular age. 
Variants
MC concerns the (partial) removal of the foreskin.54 The literature on MC categorises 
this practice into four types. The first most common variant is the (partial) removal 
of the foreskin.55 Sub- incision, the second variant of MC, which has been practiced 
among Bedouins and aborigines, combines simple circumcision with “slitting of the 
penis to expose the glans”.56 The third variant concerns “salkh”, which “[flays the skin] 
from just below the navel to the upper thigh”.57 Super- incision that has been practiced 
in Polynesia,58 is the fourth variant of MC and it concerns “longitudinally cutting the 
preputium from the upper surface and extending the cut to the pubic region”.59 
Jews generally circumcise in a traditional celebratory setting. During the ceremony, 
the mohel uses instruments that are sterilised to insert the boy’s foreskin into a metal 
shield in order to protect the glans.60 Hereafter, “[a] scalpel is run across the face of 
the shield, removing the foreskin. The remaining inner foreskin is subsequently pulled 
46 Ibid, 8.
47 WHO, ‘Male circumcision: global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety and acceptability’ (WHO, 2007) 3 
<http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2007/jc1360_male_circumcision_en.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
48 Ibid, 2–7.
49 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 22 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumci-
sion/neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
50 Ibid, 5.
51 See: The American Academy of Pediatrics, ‘Male Circumcision’ (2012) 130 Pediatrics 756, 757.
52 WHO, ‘Male circumcision: global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety and acceptability’ (WHO, 2007) 3 
<http://data.unaids.org/pub/report/2007/jc1360_male_circumcision_en.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019.
53 With the exception of the Jewish community in Israel and Iran.
54 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 22 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumci-
sion/neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
55 AJ Chessler, ‘Justifying the Unjustifiable: Rite v. Wrong’ (1997) 45 Buffalo Law Review 555, 564. 
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 See also WE Brigman, ‘Circumcision as Child Abuse: The Legal and Constitutional Issues’ (1984–85) 23 Journal of 
Family Law 337.
59 Ibid.
60 Comp. also C. Eric Funston, ‘Made Out of Whole Cloth: A Constitutional Analysis of the Clergy Malpractice Concept’, 
(1983) 19 California Western Law Review 507, 513–514 (arguing that within the context of U.S. civil law, a mohel who 
would cause damages because of not carrying out the circumcision in a proper way, would not be protected on the basis 
of religious freedom).
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back away from the glans and excised with small scissors, and the wound is bandaged 
without the use of stitches”.61 (Some) Orthodox Jews perform directly after the circum-
cision ceremony, metzitzah b’peh, which implies that the mohel (immediately) absorbs 
through oral suction the blood that is released after circumcision.62 This practice is 
quite controversial as it might cause serious diseases, like herpes.63 In New York, the 
lawfulness of metzitzah b’peh was challenged, after the city had decided to regulate 
this practice.6 4 
Different from the Jewish tradition of circumcision by the mohel, Muslims, who 
form the largest group practicing MC, choose for both the traditional circumciser and 
medically skilled professionals.65 The latter often use the so- called Plastibell to control 
bleeding after circumcision. The WHO writes that by the use of the Plastibell, bleeding 
is controlled by using a ligature which acts as a tourniquet, interrupting the blood supply 
to the foreskin causing it to separate over time. Wound healing is usually complete 
within a week. A disadvantage of the Plastibell is that the ring and ligature must stay 
in place for several days before the skin separates. During this time complications can 
occur related to the retained ring.66
Justification grounds
For Jews the practice of MC has a twofold meaning: a religious and a cultural one. In 
line with the text of Genesis 17, verse ten, according to which Abraham was requested 
to remove his foreskin,67 Jews circumcise (brit milah in Hebrew) a boy on the eighth 
day after birth.68 MC has also a cultural dimension for many Jews. It marks their 
identity and enables the circumcised boy to integrate within the Jewish communi-
ty.69 Unlike Judaism, the practice of MC is not explicitly mentioned in the Quran. 
Circumcision confirms within the Islamic faith the existence of believers’ relationship 
with God. Circumcision, which is called tahera in Arabic, occurs in accordance with 
the instructions the Muslims’ prophet received to continue the Abrahamic tradition 
and way of life, which among others involve the practice of MC.70 Only Shafi’i Sunnis 
consider MC as wajib: a religious commitment that must be obeyed. Other Islamic 
schools of jurisprudence strongly recommend this practice as a prophetic tradition 
(Sunna).71 
Although most of the circumcisions that take place have a religious ground in 
common,72 it appears from various studies that non- religious arguments also play an 
important role in the continuation of MC. As such, MC is considered a cultural practice 
61 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 25 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
62 Ibid.
63 H Ben- Yami, ‘Circumcision: What should be done?’ (2013) 39 Journal of Medical Ethics 459. 
64 Central Rabbinical Congress v. New York City Department of Health & Mental Hygiene [2014] 13-107-cv 
65 A Ahmad, ‘Do Motives Matter in Male Circumcision?’ (2014) 28 Bioethics 67, 68. 
66 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 13 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
67 Holy Bible Genesis 17:10: ‘This is my covenant, which ye shall keep, between me and you and thy seed after thee: every 
male among you shall be circumcised’.
68 There are some exceptions: illness or the presence of other immediate health risks. 
69 Y Bilu, ‘From Milah (Circumcision) to Milah (Word): Male Identity and Rituals of Childhood in the Jewish 
Ultraorthodox Community’ (2003) 31 Ethos 172.
70 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 7 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
71 WHO, ‘Male circumcision: global trends and determinants of prevalence, safety and acceptability’ (WHO, 2007) 3. 
72 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 28 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
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justified for ethnic reasons,73 as a rite de passage and a sign of adulthood.74 Also, 
medical reasons are mentioned to practice MC. It is reported that circumcision of boys 
reduces the risks to get prostate cancer or be infected with the HIV- virus.75 However, 
recently some authors have suggested that further research is necessary to indicate 
the risks and benefits of this practice in the United States, since most of the results 
concerning the benefits of this practice are based on studies that are carried out outside 
North- America.76 
The legal response
In an unprecedented step, Denmark has recently recognized MC as a human right: 
the right of the parents to circumcise their child as a manifestation of their religious 
beliefs.77 Other states and regions, such as South Africa,78 Sweden,79 Germany,80 and 
some states in the United States, such as California,81 have specific laws concerning the 
lawfulness of MC.82 The case law on MC is a bit more diffuse. In recent years, litigation 
in courts across Europe and the United States have led to judgments that shed light 
on the criteria that are decisive for the (un)lawfulness of MC in liberal democracies.83 
These litigations involve mainly cases of civil lawsuits (tort actions) and criminal lia-
bility.84 Next, some cases are born out of the disagreement between parents concerning 
the circumcision question.85 What is apparent from these judgements is that up to date 
MC, as such, has not been forbidden completely.86 Although the Dutch Supreme Court 
was challenged in 2014 to form an opinion about the (un)lawfulness of MC, the judges 
denied to rule on this matter in general.87 Against this backdrop, we can say that MC 
is not completely outlawed by Courts. Neither are parents or those who are in charge 
73 EW Gerharz and C Haarmann, ‘The first cut is the deepest? Medicolegal aspects of MC’ (2000) 86 BJU International 
332, 332.
74 WHO, ‘Neonatal and child male circumcision: a global review’ (WHO, 2010) 7 <http://who.int/hiv/pub/malecircumcision/ 
neonatal_child_MC_UNAIDS.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. 
75 BJ Morris et al, ‘CDC’s Male Circumcision Recommendations Represent a Key Public Health Measure’ (2017) 5 Global 
Health: Science and Practice 15.
76 Comp. JA Bossio et al., ‘A Review of the Current State of the Male Circumcision Literature’ (2014) 11 The Journal of 
Sexual Medicine 2847. 
77 V Carlström, ‘Denmark defends circumcision as a human right – even though 75% are against it’, Nordic Business Insider 
(16 June 2016). 
78 J Sloth- Nielsen, ‘A Foreskin Too Far: Religious, Medical and Customary Circumcision and the Children’s Act 38 of 
2005 in the Context of HIV/Aids’ (2012) 16 Law, Democracy and Development 69, 75.
79 KA Greenfield, ‘Cutting Away Religious Freedom: The Global and National Debate Surrounding Male Circumcision’, 
15 Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion 353, 362.
80 SR Munzer, ‘Secularization, Anti- Minority Sentiment, and Cultural Norms in the German Circumcision Controversy’ 
(2015) 37 University of Pennsylvania Journal of International Law 503, 545.
81 E Rassbach, ‘Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Religious Male Circumcision’ (2016) 2016 University of Illinois Law 
Review 1347.
82 See also Tasmania Law Reform Institute, ‘Non- Therapeutic Male Circumcision’ (Tasmania Law Reform Institute, 
2012) <http://utas.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0006/302829/Non- Therapuetic- Circ_Final- Report- August- 2012.pdf/> 
accessed 28 May 2019.
83 Critical of these criteria: E Rassbach, ‘Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Religious Male Circumcision’ (2016) 2016 
University of Illinois Law Review 1347.
84 E Rassbach, ‘Coming Soon to a Court Near You: Religious Male Circumcision’ (2016) 2016 University of Illinois Law 
Review 1347.
85 S Wahedi, ‘Het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijdenis [The assessment framework of ritual male circumci-
sion]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid [The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 59.
86 However, Iceland has designed bill to outlaw ritual male circumcision. See Harriet Sherwood, Iceland Law to Outlaw 
Male Circumcision Sparks Row Over Religious Freedom, The Guardian, <www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/18/
iceland- ban- male- circumcision- first- european- country> accessed 28 May 2019.
87 S Wahedi, ‘Het beoordelingskader van rituele jongensbesnijdenis [The assessment framework of ritual male circumci-
sion]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid [The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 59. The court held 
that the presence or absence of a proper permission for circumcision is the decisive factor to prove serious assault in 
court.
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of the custody enjoined from practicing MC, until an age at which the child can decide 
himself upon the status of his foreskin.88 
Hence, the existing legal rulings clarify the circumstances under which MC could be 
carried out legally. These circumstances fit the human rights framework, as embraced 
by the United Nations and the Council of Europe, which considers properly practiced 
MC with permission from the parents a legitimate religious manifestation. However, 
there are also some (overruled) legal rulings that form an exception on this approach.89 
These “exceptional judgements” fit the growing public calls across Western countries 
to stop MC. These critical calls, supported by a growing number of people from the 
medical field, consider the current legal approach to MC as contrary to the best interests 
of the child. The argument is that given the high health risks of this practice, the non- 
therapeutic ritual circumcision of boys should be postponed until an age that the child 
can give his consent for MC.9 0 The most outspoken court ruling that has embraced this 
line of reasoning is the 2012 German Cologne Landgericht ruling.91 A similar decision 
was reached a few years before in Finland.92 
RETHINKING THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
What does the current state of art tell us about the lawfulness of ritual circumcisions? 
International human rights law is clear about the unlawfulness of FC. It condemns all 
the variants of this “harmful and violent” practice. Furthermore, it requires states as 
a matter of positive obligation to eliminate this practice. Thus, it is not permitted to 
practice FC for traditional or religious reasons. Although the lawfulness of MC has been 
challenged within many jurisdictions, this practice is not banned completely. Instead, 
courts have clarified under which circumstances parents are allowed to practice MC. 
Some have criticised the different legal approaches to male and female circumcision as 
using “double standards” without presenting convincing arguments why MC should 
receive another treatment than FC.93 This part claims that this criticism of “double 
standards” arises from the equality ideal that is prominent in liberal democracies.94 
To address this fundamental criticism on the current legal regime of ritual circumci-
sions, this part develops a theoretical framework that reassesses the legal admissibility 
of ritual circumcisions in light of religious freedom, consent and respect for bodily 
integrity.95 The theoretical focus will be on the assessment of the (un)lawfulness of 
ritual circumcisions in light of a normative framework of basic liberties. We rely on 
this framework to reflect, in a broader sense, on what implications amending the legal 
88 Ibid. Judges have used the specific circumstances of the case, such as disputes between parents with different cul-
tural backgrounds; no view of return to the parental home where ritual circumcision is a tradition, to rule that the 
circumcision decision should be postponed for the best interests of the child, given the irreversible nature of the practice. 
89 Recently, the regional court of Rotterdam ruled that the seriousness of MC appears from the irreversible nature of 
this practice, despite the religious justification of MC. Therefore, the presence of proper consent is necessary. See: Rb 
Rotterdam [Regional Court of Rotterdam] 21 September 2016, ECLI:NL:RBROT:2016:7437.
90 PW Adler, ‘Is Circumcision Legal’ (2013) 16 Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 439.
91 The court ruled that parents’ right to religious freedom – in general – do not justify an irreversible practice, like MC, if 
the intervention is not medically required. The child should have the opportunity to decide himself in freedom upon the 
status of his foreskin and the religion he wants to adhere. See for a detailed discussion of this ruling: B Fateh- Moghadam, 
‘Criminalizing Male Circumcision’ (2012) 13 German Law Journal 1131.
92 The Tampere District Court held that religious freedom does not justify the violation of bodily integrity. The court 
referred to the ban on FC and argued that toleration of MC would result in discrimination. See: H Askola ‘Cut- Off 
Point? Regulating Male Circumcision in Finland’ (2011) 25 International Journal of Law, Policy and the Family 100.
93 Comp. PW Adler, ‘Is Circumcision Legal’ (2013) 16 Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 439.
94 Comp. in this regard B Boyce, ‘Equality and the Free Exercise of Religion’ 57 Cleveland State Law Review 493, 520.
95 Comp. also PW Adler, ‘Is Circumcision Legal’ (2013) 16 Richmond Journal of Law and the Public Interest 439, 483.
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status quo of ritual circumcisions would have internally (within Western societies) and 
externally (outward). This is an appropriate method to develop some pragmatic argu-
ments that could explain the current legal regime of “double standards”.
The question we need to answer is whether exemptions for ritual modification of 
genitals qua ritual or religious could be accepted in law. In other words, could the 
justification grounds people rely on, to circumcise, justify granting exemptions in law? 
Do religion, culture and possibly conscience justify the creation of exemptions for ritual 
circumcisions? Considering the limited space we have, we will only focus on the relation-
ship between religion and ritual circumcisions.96 Also because some legal regimes have 
singled out religious male circumcision for a favoured treatment in law qua religious.97 
The question is: does the religious dimension of ritual circumcisions require special 
legal solicitude within liberal democracies? To answer this question we need to find 
out whether religion qua religion deserves special legal solicitude within the paradigm 
of liberal political philosophy.98 For the answer to this question, we need to focus on 
liberal theories of religious freedom. 
Liberal theories of religious freedom have one important characteristic in common: 
abstraction from the religious dimension. Abstraction stems for two reasons from the 
nature of a liberal perspective on religious freedom. First, because of its focus on an 
egalitarian approach to theistic and non- theistic beliefs, practices and choices of life. 
Second, due to its emphasis on neutrality towards a particular worldview.99 Abstraction 
consists of three main elements. First, it opposes the justification of religious freedom 
with an appeal to values that are considered religious. This non- sectarian approach 
to religious freedom rejects religious toleration qua religious. Second, and in line with 
the previous element, free exercise is justified in light of a more general framework of 
values that are not theistic of nature. The third element of abstraction implies that a 
liberal justification for religious exemptions needs to be ecumenical of nature. Not in 
the religious meaning of this word, but rather in the sense of being widely accessible 
to public. Not because of the quality of the beliefs people have, but because of the fact 
that they are human beings. Thus, the exemption we make for religious people who do 
not eat pork, should be similarly granted to vegetarians. Granting such exemptions is 
not justified because of the quality of certain beliefs, e.g. theism versus vegetarianism; 
it is granted because of the liberal commitment to respect human conscience equally.10 0 
What does the theory of abstraction mean for ritual circumcisions and does it help us 
to solve the “double standards” problem? 
Abstraction clarifies the use of a religion- empty language to discuss extant religious 
manifestations as it opposes to discuss religious exemptions on sectarian grounds. 
Therefore, the question is whether we could identify liberal grounds that could justify 
granting exemptions for ritual circumcisions. We start with FC. Through abstraction, 
meaning thinking about FC in a religion- empty way, two aspects of FC emerge that 
suggest strongly why justifying exemptions for ritual FC is a problematic case within 
liberal democracies. First, there is a problem of consent if the intervention takes places 
on the body of young girls. Second, clitoridectomy, excision and infibulation cause 
 96 See for a liberal discussion of ritual circumcisions from a cultural perspective: M Nussbaum, The New Religious 
Intolerance (Cambridge etc.: The belknap Press of Harvard University Press 2012) 125.
 97 See more on this argument: Sohail Wahedi, ‘The Health Law Implications of Ritual Circumcisions’, (2019) 22 
Quinnipiac Health Law Journal 209.
 98 S Wahedi, ‘Abstraction from the religious dimension’, (2017–2018) 24 Buffalo Human Rights Law Review 1.
 99 C Laborde, ‘Liberal Neutrality, Religion, and the Good?’ in JL Cohen and C Laborde (eds), Religion, Secularism, and 
Constitutional Democracy (New York: Columbia University Press 2016) 249.
10 0 Comp. J Maclure and Ch. Taylor, Secularism and freedom of conscience (Cambridge etc.: Harvard University Press 
2011) 77.
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serious health problems varying from psychological problems to problems regarding the 
urination, menstruation and reproduction.101 Therefore, the immediate and long- term 
health risks, in combination with the lack of proper consent in cases of infant FC,102 
do not justify religious exemptions for these types of FC.103 This conclusion gives rise 
to two questions. 
The first question is, can we justify the ban on genital modifications in cases that 
women themselves want to adjust the status of their body, as is the case with regard to 
cosmetic surgeries?10 4 Liberal theories of religious freedom oppose strongly any prefer-
ence or dislike of the way people want to live their lives, as long as people’s choices do 
not violate the rights of others.105 Therefore, it is possible to argue that all women should 
have equal access to the genital modification services that are provided by the beauty 
and cosmetic industry.10 6 No misunderstanding: this argument does not advocate the 
acceptance of infibulation and other harmful variants of FC if proper consent is present. 
The second question is how to deal with the lightest variants of FC, such as incision 
or the slight cut in the clitoris?107 Indeed, if it is right that the Dawoodi Bohra only 
separates the membrane, then it is very hard to prove that such a minor intervention 
would harm gender equality (what about male circumcision?), the right to reproduction 
(what about cosmetic surgeries?) and the women’s capability of sexual pleasure. We 
will answer these questions related to the “double standards” critique in light of the 
implications abstraction has for the (un)lawfulness of MC. 
Liberal democracies allow MC as a medical treatment if certain criteria are met.108 
This religion- empty understanding of MC fits the framework of abstraction and accept-
ing MC as a medical practice has some serious implications for the legal admissibility 
of this practice on a long- term. In theory, it is possible that an influential organisation, 
such as the WHO, concludes that MC has no significant health benefits.109 This would 
result in the conclusion that MC is a harmful intervention that lacks proper permission 
and medical need. The attention will be shifted from the presence of parental permission 
and sterilized conditions for the circumcision to the possibility the child should get to 
decide upon his foreskin. This conditional and religion- empty acceptance of MC has 
implications for the “double standards” criticism. As such, it suggests why it is justified 
to keep on banning the most severe types of ritual FC: the immediate risk of harm and 
the lack of the permission. It also provides an important argument to oppose the lighter 
101 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36. 
102 The European Court of Human Rights considers female circumcision an inhumane act, the lack or presence of consent 
in this respect, would not lead to another conclusion. See: RSB Kool and S Wahedi, ‘European Models of Citizenship 
and the Fight against Female Genital Mutilation’, in SN Romaniuk and M Marlin (eds), Development and the Politics 
of Human Rights (Boca Raton: CRC Press 2015) 205–221.
103 See for a liberal rejection of the serious types of FC: M Nussbaum ‘Women’s Bodies: Violence, Security, Capabilities’ 
(2005) 6 Journal of Human Development 167.
10 4 Legislation in Belgium and the United Kingdom even prohibit FC of women who are able to give their consent, see: 
S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36.
105 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Religion Without God (Harvard University Press 2013) 130.
10 6 S Wahedi and RSB Kool, ‘De Strafrechtelijke aanpak van meisjesbesnijdenis in een rechtsvergelijkende context [The 
criminal law approach towards FC: a comparative law perspective]’ (2016) 7 Tijdschrift voor Religie, Recht en Beleid 
[The Journal for Religion, Law and Policy] 36.
107 Comp. also M Nussbaum, The New Religious Intolerance (Cambridge etc.: The belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press 2012) 125. 
108 See section II.
109 The WHO rejected in the past to study the health implications of FC, today it is the most prominent champion in the 
rejection of this practice. Thus, a same approach could be adopted towards MC.
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versions of FC: no medical advantage to bring a slight cut on the clitoris and the lack 
of proper permission in case of infant FC.
The liberal framework we have developed rejects convincingly exemptions for FC. It 
lacks medical need. It is harmful and if practiced on young girls it lacks proper consent. 
Thus, to protect girls and women, as a vulnerable group and for reasons of security, 
there is no justification to allow FC. The situation is different regarding MC. Our liberal 
framework accepts this practice conditionally and probably temporarily. Conditionally, 
as its allowance depends on the fulfilment of certain criteria (parental consent and 
sterilized circumcision circumstances). Temporarily, as our framework does not exclude 
the option to ban this practice, if the medical benefits of this practice would disap-
pear completely. This conclusion gives an unsatisfactory feeling as the ban hangs like a 
Damocles sword above MC. To address the “Damocles sword” criticism on the liberal 
approach to the legal admissibility of MC, we need to develop argumentation patterns 
that are much closer to reality. That is to say: argumentation patterns that could explain 
the “double standards” regime. This requires the development of arguments that look 
beyond the sectarian and liberal justifications of ritual circumcisions and suggest why 
we should refrain from the acceptance of FC in law, and why we should restrain from 
the creation of further restrictions upon MC. 
How can we develop argumentation patterns that would fit a broad sense of justice 
when we talk about the legal admissibility of ritual circumcisions? Reflecting on the 
implications, a potential ban on MC would internally and externally help us to develop 
the sort of arguments we need to explain the “double standards” regime. Regarding the 
internal effect, we can say that a total ban on this practice would give Jews and Muslims 
the impression that they are not anymore full citizens because of their problematic 
traditions. Liberal democracies must encourage mutual understanding between dif-
ferent groups of citizens. This “anti- alienation” argument helps to maintain the legal 
status quo of MC, not because of its sectarian nature, rather because a total ban on 
this practice would potentially (further) alienate (marginalised) minorities that attach 
great importance to continue MC.110 
Next to the anti- alienation argument, we can also think about the external effects of 
a ban on MC. The question is: what implications does a ban on MC have for the foreign 
relation policy of liberal democracies. Such policies are among others concerned with 
the protection of the rights of non- believers, atheists, proselytes and critics of religion 
in general in countries that lack fundamental rights such as the freedom of speech, 
conscience and association.111 Not to mention in this regard the absence of religious 
freedom that within the human rights discourse is understood as the right to belief, not 
to belief, change from religion and be able to criticise religion. Therefore, a complete 
ban on MC, which has also been practiced in countries that do not have a strong 
human rights record, would further complicate and narrow down our possibilities to 
ask attention for the rights of vulnerable groups around the globe. 
This “wrong signal” argument accepts that within liberal democracies, religious 
freedom has no intrinsic liberal value. It understands this freedom as a religion- empty 
concept that provides protection to a wide range of beliefs and practices, without making 
110 Comp. ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion and belief on his mission to Denmark’ <http://
documents- dds- ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G16/442/36/PDF/G1644236.pdf/> accessed 28 May 2019. See on the 
anti- alienation argument also Yaser Ali, ‘Shariah and Citizenship—How Islamophobia is Creating a Second- Class 
Citizenry in America’ (2012) 100 California Law Review 1027.
111 The European Union has even a Special Envoy, Ján Figel, former Slovak diplomat, who promotes religious freedom as 
part of the European Union’s foreign policy, see: <https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/node/117118_es/> accessed 28 May 
2019. See also Ján Figel, ‘The European Union and Freedom of Religion or Belief: A New Momentum’, [2017] BYU 
Law Review 895.
15Law, religion and ritual circumcisions
a distinction between theistic and non- theistic beliefs people may have. However, and in 
line with the liberal political commitment to ask attention for the human rights situation 
of vulnerable groups, e.g. atheists, adherents to new religions and critics of religion, in 
countries that do not recognize religious freedom, we need freedom of religion to discuss 
the human rights situation of atheists, non- believers, proselytes and adherents to new 
religion. These groups face serious danger in countries that do not recognize the right 
to religious freedom. Therefore, any serious restriction, i.e. a total ban, on important 
religious practices, such as MC that is so relevant to Muslims and Jews, regardless 
of where they live, brings the foreign policies of liberal democracies in a complicated 
situation.112 
The anti- alienation and the wrong signal arguments are pragmatic arguments that 
could at least explain the “double standards” regime. The use of these arguments reveals 
that acceptance of FC would call for resistance internally and externally. After all, 
local, national and international efforts are focused on the elimination of this practice. 
Concerning the legal admissibility of MC, these pragmatic arguments warn us for the 
implications of a ban internally and externally. As such, they help us to face properly 
the “Damocles sword” criticism on the dominant liberal approach to MC. Thus, for 
pragmatic reasons, we could explain the current state of arts: the “double standards” 
regime. The pragmatic arguments we have developed help us to refrain from the creation 
of legal exemptions for FC and they impose concrete restraints on a further restriction 
regime of MC. 
CONCLUSION
The rise of FC outside Africa and the decrease of toleration for MC challenge us to 
reflect on the legal assessment framework of both types of ritual circumcisions. In this 
regard, the main challenge is to address properly the liberal criticism of “double stand-
ards”. This article has developed a normative framework of liberal rights to address 
this criticism. This liberal perspective rejects convincingly exemptions for FC and it 
accepts MC conditionally and temporarily. This conclusion gives an unsatisfactory 
feeling as the ban on MC hangs like a Damocles sword above this ancient practice. To 
face the “Damocles sword” criticism and to develop argumentation patterns that would 
fit a broader sense of justice about the legal admissibility of ritual circumcisions, this 
article has introduced two pragmatic arguments that help us to explain convincingly 
the “double standards” regime. 
112 Comp. Ravi Mahalingam, ‘Women’s Rights and the War on Terror: Why the United States Should View the Ratification 
of CEDAW as an Important Step in the Conflict with Militant Islamic Fundamentalism’, (2004) 34 California Western 
International Law Journal 171, 208 (arguing that the U.S. should pay attention to the vulnerable situation in which 
many).
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REYNOLDS REVISITED: MINORITY RELIGIONS AND THE BELIEF/
ACTION DICHOTOMY
ELIJAH ZACHARY GRANET*
INTRODUCTION
Freedom of religion is a polysemic and difficult concept, because it depends on one’s 
understanding of both freedom and religion. One approach—taken by, inter alia, the 
European Court of Human Rights—is to draw a line between belief (or the forum 
internum) and action (or the forum externum), with the former entitled to absolute pro-
tection, while the latter is subject to state regulation. This distinction, between private 
and public religion has led to intense controversy, such as in the ECtHR’s ruling in 
Dahab v. Switzerland, which held that a teacher could not wear an Islamic headscarf 
in the classroom.1 On the one hand, the belief/action dichotomy, with its powerful for 
an inviolable realm for private matters of conscience, has had a major influence on 
international human rights norms. Peter G Danchin goes so far as to argue that this 
distinction “underlies the international human right to religious freedom”, even while 
acknowledging that there is great debate as to “the universality of this assumption”.2 
Yet, the conception of religion as a private matter of conscience necessitated by this 
stark dichotomy is so alien to some religions that Jonatas EM Machado has declared 
that “[t]he legal protection of religious freedom is incompatible with the dichotomy 
between belief and action”, because “[s]ometimes an action required from a congrega-
tion is so intertwined with convictions that it must be seen as part of the essential nucleus 
(kernbereich) of the right of religious freedom”.3 
The controversy, in other words, is one over the very legitimacy of the notion of 
religious freedom in contemporary human rights law. Yet, despite the weightiness of 
this issue, it is often hard to separate contemporary jurisprudence on the belief- action 
distinction from many other intersecting political issues. The aforementioned Dahlab 
case, for example, touched at the heart of political controversies over the place of Islam 
in Europe, making it often difficult to separate enduring universal legal principle from 
the politics of immigration. The ECtHR, in Dahlab and similar cases, has had to deter-
mine if the public manifestation of Islam could be understood to pose a threat to state 
secularism, religious freedom, and public order. 4
For this reason, an examination of a historic case of the belief- action dichotomy can 
be helpful, particularly when the issues of controversy in said case have no contempo-
rary political relevance. In 1878, the landmark United States Supreme Court case of 
Reynolds v. United States held that religious freedom did not preclude the conviction 
of a polygamist who had claimed a religious imperative to take multiple wives. This 
case (which still forms the basis of current American constitutional law) provides an 
instructive focus of study, precisely because the background of the case (polygamy and 
*GDL Candidate at City, University of London. BA (summa cum laude, Phi Beta Kappa) 2017, Columbia University; BA 
(summa cum laude) 2017, The Jewish Theological Seminary; MPhil 2018, University of Cambridge.
1 Saba Mahmood and Peter G Danchin, ‘Immunity or Regulation?: Antinomies of Religious Freedom’ (2014) 113 The 
South Atlantic Quarterly 129, 146.
2 Peter G Danchin, ‘Of Prophets and Proselytes: Freedom of Religion and the Conflict of Rights in International Law’ 
(2008) 49 Harvard International Law Journal 249, 263–264.
3 Jonatas EM Machado, ‘Freedom of Religion: A View From Europe’ (2005) 10 Roger Williams University Law Review 
451, 485.
4 Mahmood and Danchin (n 1) 152.
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the persecution of Mormons in 19t h century America) has lost all political connota-
tion, even as the principles at hand (the belief/action dichotomy as the basis for the 
jurisprudence of religious freedom) continue to be extremely relevant. 
In Reynolds, the US Supreme Court reasoned that the law protected religious beliefs 
while offering no protection for religious actions, particularly if such action risked 
harms to women’s freedom, and even civilisation itself. Yet, this seemingly noble state-
ment of civilisational defence is, in fact, as a close analysis of the case demonstrates, 
far from a statement of virtuous liberal principle. Instead, Reynolds demonstrates, with 
the clarity of historical hindsight, that the belief/action dichotomy is a reification of a 
particular Protestant view of religion and its use in jurisprudence serves only to privilege 
majority norms over the rights of followers of minority religions. 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
In 1830, in upstate New York, Joseph Smith Jr. organised a church5 around the recently 
published Book of Mormon (which Smith purported to have translated from divinely 
revealed golden plates), claiming for himself the titles of Prophet and president.6 The 
church rapidly won many converts from a variety of backgrounds, who were eager to 
take part both in the purportedly restored covenant of the early Church, as well as the 
new covenant formed by “continuing revelation” given to Smith.7 In the context of a 
time of great American religious upheaval known as the Second Great Awakening, 
Smith was just one prophet among many; indeed, his new faith shared characteristics 
(such as temperance, restorationism, and millennialism) with many other emergent 
religious movements of the time.8 The faith’s distinctiveness instead derived from 
the intensity of the violence directed at it; “as fast as converts were made, so were 
enemies”.9 The early faith was fast moving, as it encountered intense resistance virtually 
everywhere it settled; this violence was frequently state- sanctioned. One of the most 
infamous cases occurred in Missouri, in 1838, where Governor Lilburn Boggs issued 
an executive order authorising the extermination of all Mormons within the state’s 
borders.10 The federal government of the time, then relatively weak compared to today, 
declined to intervene against even this explicit state- sanctioned prosecution, out of a 
combination of jurisdictional uncertainty and “the political undesirability of siding with 
the Mormons”.11 
The aetiology of this anti- Mormon violence is complex, but one practice drew 
particularly intense ire: polygamy, or as Smith various termed it, “celestial marriage” 
and “plural marriage”. Smith’s first known revelations on marriage occurred in 1843, 
 5 Then formally called the Church of Christ, today known as the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter- Day Saints, and here 
referred to as the Mormon Church to distinguish it from the many other branches of the broader Latter- Day Saint 
movement which bear quite similar names.
 6 Sarah Barringer Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth- Century America 
(The University of North Carolina Press 2002) 19.
 7 Steven C Harper, ‘Infallible Proofs, Both Human and Divine: The Persuasiveness of Mormonism for Early Converts’ 
(2000) 10 Religion and American Culture: A Journal of Interpretation 99.
 8 Daniel Walker Howe, ‘Emergent Mormonism in Context’ in Terry L Givens and Philip L Barlow (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Mormonism (Oxford University Press 2015).
 9 Marie H Nelson, ‘Anti- Mormon Mob Violence and the Rhetoric of Law and Order in Early Mormon History’ (1997) 
21 Legal Studies Forum 353, 358.
10 Grant Underwood, ‘Milennialism, Persecution, and Violence: The Mormons’ in Catherine Wessinger (ed), Milennialism, 
Persecution, and Violence: HIstorical Cases (Syracuse University Press 2000) 46.
11 Edwin B Firmage, ‘Religion & the Law: The Mormon Experience in the Nineteenth Century’ (1991) 12 Cardozo Law 
Review 765, 770.
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though he claimed to have actually received the vision in the 1830s, having supposedly 
hidden it because he was aware of just how controversial this would prove.12 Polygamy 
was not an optional extra; Smith’s revelation on the topic makes it explicitly clear that 
anyone who rejected celestial marriage would face damnation. Mormon soteriology 
was inextricably tied to entrance into this covenant.13 Although the Church tried to 
keep the practice secret, rumours of it spread, contributing to Smith’s murder in 1844 
in Illinois. It must be emphasised, that , as Sarah Barringer Gordon puts it, polygamy 
was “neither unprecedented nor un- Christian” for the time and place;14 indeed, she 
goes so far as to argue that “sexual innovation” was a characteristic feature of new 
religious movements in early nineteenth- century America.15 However, the sheer scale of 
the Mormon Church, combined with its aspiration to a separate legal order (Mormons 
settlers in the early Church invariably formed their own distinct communities) meant 
that its practices inspired especial revulsion throughout America.16 
After Smith’s assassination, Mormons, now under the leadership of the charismatic 
Brigham Young, fled west to Utah, where they attempted to establish a theocratic state-
let called Deseret (though Young would have preferred to call it “theodemocratic”).17 
Secure in their new home, the Mormons felt confident enough to publicise to the world 
the revelations Smith and Young had received on polygamy in 1852.18 
It did not take long for American discourse to pair anti- polygamy with the other 
great social issue of the age: slavery. By the 1850s, abolitionists had come to make a 
connection between slavery and sexual exploitation, and, before long, they saw both 
slavery and polygamy as paradigmatic of the effects of a male libido run rampant. In 
1856, the Republican party platform proclaimed that slavery and polygamy were “the 
twin relics of barbarism”. The famed abolitionist Harriet Beecher Stowe (the author of 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin) claimed that the “cruel slavery” of polygamy “debases and degrades 
womanhood, motherhood, and family”; a contemporary politician went so far as to 
say that polygamy was a crueller form of slavery than that found in the South.19 These 
paired discourses demanded moral action in place of legal restriction. While Southern 
Democrats were wary of the expansion of federal power, and its potential to check 
slavery, the Republicans said that the law of God himself precluded such barbarism. 
As one anti- polygamist at the time wrote, the “insult” that polygamy did to “our own 
wives and our own daughters, and the wives and daughters of our constituents} had to 
be avenged”.20 
This rush to protect the women of Utah can seem strange. The National Women’s 
Suffrage Association declined to condemn polygamy, on the basis that all forms of mar-
riage were equally patriarchal. Conversely, the very politicians condemning polygamy 
as patriarchal vehemently opposed women’s suffrage and defended the “traditional 
family” perhaps the most archetypically patriarchal of institutions. Despite this, the 
12 M Guy Bishop, ‘Eternal Marriage in Early Mormon Marital Beliefs’ (1990) 53 The Historian 76, 81–82.
13 Bruce Baum, ‘Feminism, Liberalism and Cultural Pluralism: J. S. Mill on Mormon Polygyny’ (1997) 5 Journal of 
Political Philosophy 230, 236.
14 Sarah Barringer Gordon, ‘The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth- Century 
America’ (2008) 28 Journal of Supreme Court History 14, 19.
15 Sarah Barringer Gordon, ‘A War of Words: Revelation and Storytelling in the Campaign against Mormon Polygamy’ 
(2003) 78 Chicago- Kent Law Review 739, 746.
16 Gordon, ‘The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth- Century America’ 15–20.
17 Patrick Q Mason, ‘God and the People: Theodemocracy in Nineteenth- Century Mormonism’ (2011) 53 Journal of 
Church and State 349.
18 Charles A Cannon, ‘The Awesome Power of Sex: The Polemical Campaign against Mormon Polygamy’ (2012) 43 Pacific 
Historical Review 61.
19 Ibid 76.
20 Gordon, The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth- Century America 14–25.
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rhetoric of anti- polygamy was firmly identified grounded in women’s rights. Gordon 
argues that the anti- polygamy discourse “gave legislators a convenient out” by providing 
a locus of comparison that made the stifling structures of American patriarchy look 
decidedly liberal.21 Marriage, to the anti- polygamy reformers, was a form of restriction 
on the power of men, who otherwise would be free to follow their baser instincts in 
subjugating women. 
In a twisted way, this is the logical conclusion that follows from the first premise which 
holds that women are powerless against the advances of men. The anti- polygamists 
saw themselves as defending the welfare of women, rather than the rights of women, 
because the discourse of rights requires one to see women as having agency. In their 
view, a civilised society limited the harm done to women by men, instead of lifting 
the legal disabilities on women. Thus, we arrive at a consistent if reprehensible legal 
philosophy that can simultaneously condemn women’s suffrage and polygamy. This 
also allows us to see why the discourse of anti- polygamy was so intimately connected 
to the discourse of antislavery. The campaigners leading the charge against slavery and 
polygamy sincerely believed that both institutions were morally wrong, but it does not 
follow that they believed that people of colour and women were their equals. Working 
within a patriarchal and racist establishment, the anti- polygamy campaigners sought 
to tweak this patriarchal and racist system rather than to overthrow it. This attitude is 
quite well encapsulated by an anti- polygamy editorial in the (non- Mormon, Utahn) Salt 
Lake Tribune in 1885, which postulated that before Christianity, “woman was a slave 
and beast of burden”, but civilisation had exalted women into a revered state as “the 
most sacred figure in the household”.22
It is within this complicated social and religious context that, in 1862, Congress 
passed the Morrill Anti- Bigamy Act, which outlawed bigamy in Federal territories 
(which Utah was at the time). However, Utah had no civil registry of marriages, and, 
even if it had, there was not a Mormon jury that would convict a man for polygamy.23 
In other circumstances, the federal government might have forcibly imposed its will 
on Utah by force, but fortunately for the Mormons, the American Civil War kept the 
military otherwise occupied. After the war, with the antislavery discourse now merci-
fully no longer needed, it took a single woman’s public activism to return polygamy to 
the spotlight. Ann Eliza Young, the so- called “Rebel of the Harem” had divorced her 
husband, Brigham, renounced Mormonism, and embarked on a barnstorming lecture 
tour, decrying polygamy as oppressive and perverted. Republicans took up her cause 
with gusto, and in 1874, passed the Poland Act (named after a senator, rather than 
the country) which was designed to facilitate prosecutions of polygamists. It helped 
that the anti- polygamy discourse was now paired with a new popular discourse: the 
anti- Catholic discourse. As Noah Feldman observes, many republicans saw the anti- 
polygamy actions as a test case for “the principle of federal control over local practices 
that offended their moral sensibility”. Indeed, two years after the Poland Act, the House 
of Representatives passed the Blaine Amendment, which attempted to amend the con-
stitution to prevent state aid to parochial schools (the amendment ultimately failed in 
the Senate).24 
21 Ibid 53–54.
22 Steve Estes, ‘Mormon Manhood and Its Critics: Polygamy and the Construction of Hegemonic Masculinity in the 
United States’ in Pablo Dominguez Andersen and Simon Wendt (eds), Masculinities and the Nation in the Modern World 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 49–50.
23 Sarah Song, ‘Polygamy in Nineteenth- Century America’ in Janet Bennion and Lisa Fishbayn Joffe (eds), The Polygamy 
Question (Utah State University Press 2016) 26.
24 Noah Feldman, Divided by God: America’s Church- State Problem— and What We Should Do About It (Farrar, Straus 
& Giroux 2005) 100–105.
20 Nottingham Law Journal
The Mormon reaction to the actions of the federal government was, surprisingly, to 
put their trust in the federal government by agreeing to a test case. This optimism was 
based on the First Amendment to the Constitution’s protection of the free exercise of 
religion. This protection, however, was purely theoretical, because as late as 1874, no 
free exercise case had ever been litigated before the Supreme Court. The Mormon’s legal 
reasoning was strengthened by religious conviction which viewed the US constitution as 
a divinely inspired document would protect their right to their unique way of life. It was 
ultimately agreed that a man named George Reynolds would be charged. Reynolds, who 
was a British- born convert, was convicted of violating the Morrill Act, and sentenced 
to two years’ hard labour (later reduced to two years’ mere imprisonment, of which he 
served nineteen months). After a series of protracted appeals, the case was eventually 
heard at the Supreme Court, which in 1879 issued the decision (upholding the law and 
Reynolds’s conviction) that is the focus of this article.25 
THE REYNOLDS CASE
Chief Justice Morrison R Waite, a Yale educated jurist who had been a noted antislavery 
campaigner, wrote the court’s decision. On the one hand, the dispute was simple as a 
matter of law. The Morrill Anti- Bigamy Act barred even the purely religious (i.e. neither 
civil nor registered) bigamy practiced by Reynolds and his co- religionists. Congress 
had passed a law, and Reynolds had broken it. On the other hand, Reynolds sincerely 
believed that the “Law of the Lord” had compelled him to engage in polygamy to 
“escape condemnation”.26 To our modern and multicultural ears, this sort of dilemma 
is prosaic and common; it arises every time there is a conflict between religion and the 
law. But in 1879, the still young republic had never considered these kinds of questions. 
The First Amendment provided for the “free exercise” of religion, but what did that 
mean? What was religion and how did one exercise it? In his decision in Reynolds27—
which, incidentally, is still guiding constitutional precedent, and was invoked by the 
US Supreme Court as recently as 1990 in Employment Division v Smith—Chief Justice 
Waite was answering these important questions for the first time.
In the trial, Reynolds had attempted to argue that he did not have a mens rea, since 
fulfilling a religious obligation by definition could not reflect evil intent. Waite wrote 
that the question before him was “whether religious belief can be accepted as a justi-
fication of an overt act made criminal by the law of the land”. As always in American 
politics, there was no dispute per se of the fact of freedom of religion; Waite wrote that 
“religious freedom is guaranteed everywhere throughout the United States”. Instead, 
the question is, what does religious freedom mean? Or, as Waite put it: “the precise 
point of the inquiry is, what is the religious freedom which has been guaranteed?”28
The first question Waite asked is one which has bedevilled everyone studying religion: 
what is religion? Waite quoted Thomas Jefferson, who wrote that religion was “a matter 
which lies solely between man and his God”. Following this, Waite concluded that the 
constitution left Congress could legislate on “mere opinion”, but did have the power to 
prohibit “actions which were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order”.29 
The question, then, was: did polygamy fall into this category?
25 Firmage (n 11) 772–776. 
26 Elizabeth Harmer- Dionne, ‘Once a Peculiar People: Cognitive Dissonance and the Suppression of Mormon Polygamy 
As a Case Study Negating the Belief- Action Distinction’ (1998) 50 Stanford Law Review 1295, 1325.
27 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878). 
28 Ibid 162.
29 Ibid 164.
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To answer this, Waite turned to a German political theorist called Francis Lieber, who 
had argued, on the basis of a racist understanding of the world, that polygamy was the 
mark of patriarchal despotism (typified by supposed Oriental harems), in contrast to the 
republican institutions of America. Waite eagerly then claimed that there was a causal 
relationship between marriage and the form of government, because marriage was the 
bedrock of the social order.30 If marriage, as the basic unit of society, was so powerful as 
to change the government, then surely the government could regulate it. Noah Feldman 
writes that “[t]he thrust of this argument was that the normal marriage practices of 
the citizens of nonsectarian Christian America were connected to the republican form 
of government that they enjoyed”.31 Waite was unable to conceive of a liberty that is 
not bound to his own social and cultural background; this leads him to seemingly 
bizarre causal inferences. Once again, the result is a patriarch’s twisted feminism. In a 
natural development from the rhetoric epitomised by the notion of the “twin relics of 
barbarism”, Waite arrived at the idea that men are so powerful, and women so easily 
victimised, that there needs to be a paternalistic state to prevent men from dragging 
women into sexual depravity, and hence tyranny.
Moving from this dubious conclusion, Waite then wrote, “This being so, the only 
question which remains is, whether those who make polygamy a part of their religion 
are excepted from the operation of the statute”.32 This is the key point of the argument: 
Waite wrote that “Laws are made for the government of actions”. And, his argument 
here, at least facially, seems very reasonable. Few people would disagree with the notion 
should have the power to prevent religiously motivated human sacrifices, for example; 
there is clearly a limit which must be set by the government. If the limit were decided by 
the individual believer, Waite argued that that would “permit every citizen to become a 
law unto himself”.33 Thus, to prevent anarchy, Waite held that Reynolds was unjustified 
to violate the law, and upheld his conviction. 
THE BELIEF/ACTION DICHOTOMY: A FALSE CHOICE
Waite’s line in the sand puts belief on one side of the law, and action on the other. 
This reasoning (as opposed to Waite’s flawed premises) might not immediately seem 
problematic; stripped of its racist and sexist assumptions, it might even seem to be 
a quite liberal conclusion. It bears more than a little resemblance to JS Mill’s famed 
harm principle, in which he argued that state intervention occurs to prevent harm to 
others. Regardless of the actual societal harm of polygamy, the basic reasoning here 
might appear to be a great liberal compromise that accords faith unlimited liberty, but 
restricts so- called “freedom of action”.
This, however, is not liberalism, and it is certainly not Mill’s harm principle. We can 
be certain of this because Mill was a contemporary of Waite’s, and happened to write 
directly on this topic in On Liberty. Mill, who was, of course, an avowed feminist (albeit 
avant la lettre), made it very clear that he disapproved of polygamy, but added, “I am not 
aware that any community has a right to force another to be civilised”.34 Bruce Baum, 
writing in one of the few analyses of Mill’s view on this issue, notes that Mill would 
30 Ibid.
31 Feldman (n 24) 106.
32 Reynolds v. United States (n 27) 166.
33 Ibid 167.
34 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays (John Gray ed, Oxford University Press 1991) 102.
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agree with Waite that polygamy was a threat to a free society, as well as oppressive to 
women, but would disagree on the fundamental point that one could extrapolate from 
the harm caused to the believers to nebulous societal harms.35 So long as the harm was 
contained within the Mormon community, there was no justification for intervention. In 
other words, liberalism is not about protected beliefs but protected actions. Voluntary 
actions ought to be protected, and especially those driven by conscience. As much as 
it pained Mill to admit it, the women were voluntarily entering into this action, even 
if he found it repugnant and believed that it harmed them. Baum further claims that 
Mill took a sophisticated view of the voluntariness of the decision of Mormon women 
to engage in polygamy, by arguing that Mill agreed with Waite (and Eliza Young) that 
the oppressive power of religion meant that the “choice” to engage in polygamy was not 
wholly voluntary.36 However, Mill diverged from Waite in his conclusion that no choice 
in a liberal society will ever approach the ideal of a truly voluntary choice made by a 
fully free actor; we are all subject to the dictates of our background and culture, whose 
influence is often inescapable. Stanley Fish refers to these as “structures of constraint” 
and argues that it is incorrect to see actions as occurring along a continuum of con-
straint and freedom, because all actions are fundamentally constrained.37 
It is these structural constraints which explain much of Waite’s reasoning. Inexorably 
(though not necessarily consciously) influenced by the background of mainline 
American culture, Waite saw polygamy, but not monogamy, as patriarchal; similarly, 
when Waite ruled that belief, but not action, constitutes religion, he was constrained 
by Protestantism.
This influence is made all the more evident by the fact that the First Amendment to the 
US Constitution, unlike say, the ECHR, has no discussion of conscience, or freedom of 
belief; the operative word here is the free exercise of religion. This wording, on the face of 
it, suggests that religion is not merely an internal state, but rather something which one 
actively exercises. However, Waite was so constrained by America’s Protestant cultural 
hegemony that he was unable to see religion as anything other than a matter of internal 
belief, mediated solely by the individual believer. This is in many ways unsurprising. 
Even in today’s America, “there is a Protestant hegemony that continues to dominate 
public debate”, with the result being that “[i]n the courts we see a consistent pattern of 
preservation of the religious mainstream”.38 It is also apparent from Waite’s reliance on 
Jefferson for a definition of religion; even the non- Protestant Jefferson could conceive of 
religion only as a matter of individual belief and conscience. Nor is this problem at all 
limited to America; rather, it affects all attempts to construe religion a single and stable 
analytic category, which inherently ignore the complexity and plurality of religion.39 
The very act of attempting to delineate a licit sphere of religion axiomatically involves 
a reductive process, which will inevitably be shaped by “majoritarian presuppositions, 
ignorance, and indifference”.4 0
This definitional problem takes in the entire history of religion as a discrete legal 
category. The very idea of “religion” as a restricted and isolatable element of law, as 
35 Baum (n 13) 244–247.
36 Ibid 239–244.
37 Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary & Legal Studies 
(Duke University Press 1990) 459.
38 Lori G Beaman, ‘The Myth of Pluralism, Diversity, and Vigor: The Constitutional Privilege of Protestantism in the 
United States and Canada’ (2003) 42 Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 311, 318.
39 Elizabeth Shakman Hurd, Beyond Religious Freedom: The New Global Politics of Religion (Princeton University Press 
2017) 6–7.
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opposed to a dimension of all aspects of human life, is itself a concept steeped in 
Protestantism. Helge Årsheim writes that “only with the rise of religion as a generic 
category following the Protestant Reformation could religion become legally recognized 
[sic] as a standalone, generic category”; this accommodated Protestantism easily, but 
colonial governments had to redefine local traditions in order to “fit the template”. 41 This 
framework of colonialism is particularly helpful in the case of the Mormons, because 
despite the very American nature of the faith and its believers, wider American society 
was determined to see them as foreign and uncivilised. Not only did popular rhetoric 
reduce the Mormons to barbarians, but many went so far as to refer to Mormons as 
“white Indians”, implying that the group needed to be subjected to the same supposedly 
civilising processes used to destroy the culture and religion of America’s actual indig-
enous peoples.42 As noted earlier, polygamy was an essential and inseparable aspect of 
being a member of the Mormon Church; those who did not practice it were rejecting 
the new covenant and dooming themselves to damnation. The action/belief distinction 
that worked so well for Protestants simply did not work in the case of Mormonism 
(nor would it in the case of many other religions); Waite’s attempt to force Mormonism 
to fit into this template resulted in sending a man to prison for following his religious 
beliefs.
In other words, the very idea of a codified legal approach to religion is an expression 
of a narrow and hegemonic view of faith. This is why it took until 1874 and the rise of 
the Mormons for there to even be an American case on Free Exercise. A “neutral” legal 
approach to religion is meaningless when the law and religion are both emanating from 
a view of religion that perfectly fits the dominant culture. Waite’s facially neutral reason-
ing resulted in a legal framework—still extant in America—that was heavily favourable 
to Protestants, and highly unfavourable to minority religions and new religious groups. 
The true test of a system’s tolerance is how it handles a large and vocal minority that 
did not build the system in the first place. This also lets us see intersection of sexism and 
religious discrimination: Waite needed to save the women from the barbaric practices of 
the men, which were barbaric because they are not like his. Reynolds was not protected 
by the First Amendment because his religious obligation was not like Waite’s religious 
obligation. 
THE CONTINUED RELEVANCE OF REYNOLDS
This can all seem moot today, not least because now “Mormons are widely regarded as 
quintessentially, even hyper, American”.43 Yet, it is precisely because of this historical 
distance that Reynolds is so useful. The very dangerous discourse that led first to the 
passing of the Morrill Anti Bigamy Act, and then the upholding of its constitutionality, 
is hard to identify in the present, because it so insidiously plays off our own cultural 
assumptions; it is far easier to identify the hidden structures of constraint binding those 
in the past than it is to find, much less question our own problematic assumptions. The 
anti- polygamy campaigners did sincerely believe what they believed: that they were 
helping the women of Utah; Waite probably did genuinely think he was upholding 
41 Helge Årsheim, ‘Legal Secularism?—Differing Notions of Religion in International and Norwegian Law’ in Trygve E 
Wyller, Rosemarie Van Den Breemer and Jose Casanova (eds), Secular and Sacred? The Scandinavian Case of Religion 
in Human Rights, Law and Public Space (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2014) 124–125.
42 W Paul Reeve, Religion of a Different Color: Race and the Mormon Struggle for Whiteness (Oxford University Press 
2015) 75–77.
43 Underwood (n 10) 60.
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religious freedom and protecting civilisation. The mainstreaming, de- otherising, and 
whitening of Mormons means that now, it is other religious minorities who face the 
brunt of the law’s Protestant bias. When the Supreme Court upheld Reynolds in 1990, 
in Employment Division v Smith, the minority in question was members of the Native 
American Church, who used the otherwise controlled substance peyote in their religious 
rituals.4 4 Once again, the court upheld the belief- action dichotomy, ignoring the fact 
that for many religions, “to act is to believe”.45 In that case, Justice Antonin Scalia’s 
opinion not only cited Reynolds approvingly, but enthusiastically restated its principles, 
arguing that “[t]here being no contention that Oregon’s drug law represents an attempt 
to regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the raising of 
one’s children in those beliefs, the rule to which we have adhered ever since Reynolds 
plainly controls”.46 Just as in Reynolds, the court attempted to separate religion into the 
neat lines that worked so well with Protestantism, with the result being that followers of 
a minority religion faced a constraint on their free exercise not placed on followers of 
majority ones. (Subsequent legislation curtailed the impact of the Smith decision, but 
as such legislation could be repealed in the future, from an American constitutional 
perspective, the case is still binding precedent.)
It is certainly true that the question of how the law should deal with religious prac-
tice is complex, and defies easy answers. I do not dispute that society requires some 
legal limit on action, and that sometimes such limits conflict with religious belief and 
practice. Yet, the hyperbolic claim that legal accommodations for religious practice 
should be avoided because of the risk that it would lead to legal anarchy, with each 
believer defining their own law, is without merit. This is precisely the same frightened 
exaggeration that led many to (sincerely) believe that Mormon polygamy could destroy 
Western civilisation. It is grounded in a privileging of majority norms and cultures, and 
an otherising of minorities. The implication of the claim that, for example, allowing 
polygamy would lead to the collapse of civilisation, or smoking peyote would preclude 
a functioning society, is that the non- Western, non- white societies where polygamy is 
practiced, or peyote is traditionally used, are inherently uncivilised and unstable. This 
is the causal link made by those today who claim that Islamic immigration to Europe 
would lead to barbarism or that Sikhs carrying the kirpan would lead to violence; at 
its core is the implication, whether conscious or not, that minority religions are so 
uncivilised and savage that absent the strong presence of the law, public order would 
collapse. This fear, in turn, is used to justify the vivisection of minority religions into 
discrete applicable legal categories.
This is especially apparent in Europe, where the European Court of Human Rights 
has attempted to draw a clear line between possession of religious beliefs and acting on 
them, particularly when manifestations of belief fall outside more familiar European 
practices.47 The ECtHR’s decisions are the inevitable result of the ECHR itself, which 
(in Article 9) accords the forum internum absolute protection, while allowing for mani-
festations of religion to be restricted by law.48 
The problematics of the ECHR and the ECtHR arise not from the notion that con-
science is deserving of absolute protection, while actions, which have the potential to 
44 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
45 Harmer- Dionne (n 26) 1346.
46 Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith 882.
47 Daniel Barton, ‘Is the French Burka Ban Compatible with International Human Rights Law Standards ?’ (2012) 9 Essex 
Human Rights Review 1.
48 M Todd Parker, ‘The Freedom to Manifest Religious Belief: An Analysis of the Necessity Clauses of the ICCPR and 
the ECHR’ (2006) 17 Duke Journal of Comparative & International Law 91.
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cause interference in public life, must necessarily be subject to governing. It is easy 
to see that, reductio ad absurdum, the absence of any governance of religious actions 
could lead to the breakdown of the legal system— Waite’s spectre of “every man a law 
unto himself”. Some distinction, therefore, is necessary between belief and praxis, and 
there is nothing inherently bad about such a distinction. The problem is instead that 
the implementation of this dichotomy into law is too often done in such a way as to 
have discriminatory effect, because it is too tied to the structures of constraint which 
see religion from a Protestant perspective. 
This can be plainly seen from Silvio Ferrari’s quantitative analysis of ECtHR Article 9 
violation cases, which demonstrated that the Court has never once issued a declaration 
of violation with regards to a Protestant majority country. This leads the author to 
speculate that this is in part due to “the theological and philosophical presuppositions 
on which the decisions of the ECtHR are founded”.49 The Strasbourg court “seems to 
rely on a so- called post reformation, almost ‘pietistic’ understanding of religion”, which 
“gives some indication of why . . .  for a long time and freedom of religion .and belief 
was not the focus of high- profile legal cases”.50 
The parallels to Reynolds are readily evident. A court seeks to apply a principle 
which is reasonable and neutral in the abstract, yet, in its implementation, directed by 
Fish’s structures of constraint, reifies a notion of religion that works well for Protestants 
and poorly for others. Even when the Court believes it is acting in a neutral manner, 
it encounters “problems in understanding the conceptions of religion which stress the 
elements of identity and practice over those of a freely chosen belief”. 51 A belief/action 
dichotomy may work well as a principle for how the law deals with religion. Where it 
fails utterly is as a principle for how the law conceives of religion. If the law is to preserve 
religion or belief as an analytical category (and there seems little alternative to it doing 
so), it must make active effort to avoid constructing a notion of religion (and public 
life) that sees the “typical” religion as identical to the hegemonic religion. If the a priori 
assumptions of any juridical body are discriminatory, it is not at all surprising that the 
results will be discriminatory. It is entirely possible that, a hundred years from now, the 
decisions of the ECtHR will appear just as biased and unfair as Reynolds does today, 
because the court is working from the same tired reasoning.
Reynolds again proves instructive in analysing current European political discourse, 
because, due to the benefit of historic and geographic distance, it highlights the intersec-
tion between popular political rhetoric and legal reasoning. Without the well- intentioned 
and racist civilisational agitation of both politicians and scholars, Waite would have not 
been able to claim that the prohibition of polygamy was a (to use European terms) 
proportional response to the threat it posed to women’s rights. It raises the question: 
where have we (both in the sense of the demos generally and the scholarly community 
specifically) allowed otherwise virtuous reasoning to be shaped by our own cultural 
assumptions? Is it in the case of the burka, where we are told that veiling is an oppres-
sive patriarchal practice, from which women need to be saved? Or, more provocatively, 
Sarah Song has argued that the same co- opting of the language of women’s rights that 
occurred in Reynolds is occurring right now in the debates over arranged marriage; 
she terms this a “diversionary effect”, which serves to shield the majority culture from 
49 Silvio Ferrari, ‘The Strasbourg Court and Article 9 of the European Convention of Human Rights’ in Jeroen Temperman 
(ed), The Lautsi Papers: Multidisciplinary Reflections on Religious Symbols in the Public School Classroom (Martinus 
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51 Ferrari (n 49) 33. 
26 Nottingham Law Journal
criticism by diverting people’s very real and well- founded concern over, say, women’s 
rights, into the existing channels of power that marginalise minority groups.52 This 
diversionary effect is a mechanism by which neutral and virtuous concern can become 
discriminatory by structurally directing animus and focus at minorities while excus-
ing majorities , just as a neutral and virtuous legal principle such as the belief/action 
dichotomy can become discriminatory by structurally obstructing minority religions 
while aiding majority ones.
Elizabeth Hurd has written about how, especially in places with a Protestant 
cultural background, it is tempting to look “for normative closure, for a definitive 
metalanguage”.53 In the law and in discourse, it is essential that we resist this tempta-
tion to divide and shift religion, and especially religious freedom, into these purport-
edly discrete categories. The alternative to the Reynolds (and ECtHR) reasoning is not 
another dichotomy, but rather a holistic and flexible approach that takes into account 
the complexity and diversity of religion. Any attempt to arrive at a single jurisprudential 
definition of religion will run into the problem that the very idea of religion as a defin-
able category is inextricably tied to a discursive and Christian historical background.54 
If we are to hold on to any universal conception of human rights, or even a Western 
conception of human rights that accounts for religious pluralism, then we cannot have 
a conception of religion that only fits a homogenous post- Reformation Europe. 
None of this solves the weighty problem Waite was considering in Reynolds: how 
does one balance the state’s compelling interests with religious freedom. The problem 
is difficult and, to some extent, insoluble. Any attempt to move beyond the belief/
action dichotomy will inevitably result in a jumble of rulings that “may seem, at times, 
unprincipled and even contradictory”.55 Freedom is a complex balancing act, and there 
must necessarily be some restrictions on religious freedom to preserve other crucial state 
interests. Religious pluralism is axiomatically more complex than homogeneity, even 
without powerful structures of constraint disrupting seemingly neutral approaches. 
Reynolds, does, however, emphasise that religious policy in a pluralistic society cannot 
be achieved passively. Instead, at every stage, jurists and political actors must actively 
work to identify and overcome structures of constraint, and to account for the breadth 
and diversity of religion and religious obligation. This task is so enormous and trying 
that it may be impossible to create a legal system that can fairly and reliably deal with 
all the different permutations of religion, and its many intersections with public life. 
Nonetheless, if Europe wishes to have a legal system that provides protection to minori-
ties as well as majorities, it must try to do better. If it does not actively work to counter 
its jurisprudential bias with regards to religion, the ECtHR will fall into the same trap 
as the US Supreme Court, where Reynolds remains honoured precedent. 
52 Sarah Song, ‘Majority Norms, Multiculturalism, and Gender Equality’ (2005) 99 The American Political Science Review 
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CRISIS FRAMING AND THE SYRIAN DISpLACEMENT: THE 
‘THREAT’ TO EUROpEAN VALUES
HELEN O’NIONS*†
INTRODUCTION
The external displacement of more than six million Syrian nationals since the start of 
the civil war in 2011 is a humanitarian tragedy. The impact has been most keenly felt 
in neighbouring countries including Jordan, Iraq, Tukey and Lebanon where Syrian 
nationals now comprise an estimated one in five of the population. There is a consider-
able disparity in the global response to Syrian refugees with Europe receiving only 6% of 
those externally displaced by 2014.1 Although the number of arrivals in the EU increased 
significantly in 2015–16, the number of Syrian asylum seekers and refugees in the EU 
remains less than 0.2% of the European population.2 Nevertheless this ‘crisis’ has repeat-
edly been described as the biggest, most divisive issue facing the European Union today.3
This article examines the framing of Europe’s response to this humanitarian need and 
the impact of these frames on durable solutions that can protect those most in need. It is 
suggested, drawing on the successful re- framing of the gay marriage debate, that the way 
such an event is conceptualised can have a significant impact on political commitments 
and the response of host communities.4 It is argued that the framing of the Syrian 
displacement, through constant iteration in public discourse, as a migrant ‘crisis’ to be 
addressed through burden sharing, containment and compulsory quotas, has hindered 
durable solutions whilst confirming negative stereotypes that have prejudiced the ability 
of refugees to receive protection. 
The application of a crisis frame could not have come at a worse time for the European 
institutions as extremist political parties, that have been gaining ground over the last 
decade, use their own framing narrative to conceptualise the largely Muslim Syrian 
arrivals as threats to European culture and identity.5 Neo- conservative writers, such 
as Douglas Murray have attempted to give an academic rigour to the ‘Islamic threat’ 
perspective by constructing a conflict of values. Yet the nature of European culture 
and values in such narratives is rarely articulated.6 Rather, in a questionable inter-
pretation of European history, it is constructed as entirely oppositional (non- Muslim, 
non- immigrant). The European values articulated in the Treaty on the European Union 
(1992) are conspicuously absent:
The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, 
equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons 
*Associate Professor of Law, Nottingham Trent University.
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belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in 
which pluralism, non- discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail7
The oppositional narrative has served the new populist parties well as the European 
project is openly rejected in preference for national solidarity and minimal intergov-
ernmental cooperation. The authority of the European Union is further challenged 
as established political actors look inwards in an attempt to dilute the popularity 
of nationalist rhetoric. The ability of the European institutions to exert pressure on 
Governments that fail in their commitment to European values has been compromised 
by recent events. The UK’s decision to leave the EU has emboldened populist parties on 
the right and left. Populist MEP Nigel Farage became Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor 
Orban’s biggest defender before the European Parliament’s vote of censure. However, 
it is notable that British conservative MEPs were the only representatives of a ruling 
government in support for Orban, taking the opportunity to reject European interfer-
ence in domestic politics.8 
There is an international right to seek and enjoy asylum provided in Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.9 The right has to be exercised outside of the 
country of origin, thus movement is the first step to realising protection.10 Most Syrians 
arriving in Europe are irregular migrants in the sense that they do not have entry visas 
and are not beneficiaries of UNHCR resettlement programmes. Many will have credible 
claims for asylum or humanitarian protection once they access an asylum procedure, 
contradicting suggestions that most are criminals and terrorists.11 Indeed, statistics sug-
gest that 80% of Syrian asylum seekers will be granted some form of protection status in 
Europe12. However, their irregular status has meant convoluted and dangerous methods 
of travel, which has made it easier for them to be grouped together as a collective threat 
to European culture, security and the economy.
Having identified the framing of Europe’s response to the Syrian displacement, it will 
be argued that constructive, cooperative policy initiatives were stymied by the repeated 
confirmation of this frame through a public discourse that exploited public anxieties 
over security and crime. The ‘crisis’ frame and its associated metaphors resulted in 
emergency, reactive measures that effectively led to the abdication of human rights and 
humanitarian obligations. 
Furthermore, it is suggested that the crisis frame and its component security narra-
tive, has paradoxically made Europe less secure as many millions of Syrian nationals, 
who have credible protection claims, are now left in limbo – unable to return home or 
build a new life in Europe. The EU- Turkey deal has resulted in more than three million 
Syrians residing in Turkey13; some are accommodated in government camps, but the 
vast majority are living precariously in urban areas. Although they now receive a cash 
allowance from EU funding that covers accommodation and food, none are able to 
 7 Article 2, Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union OJ C326, 26.10.2012, 13–390.
 8 Nigel Farage in the European Parliament ‘Thank God for Viktor Orban’ 12th Sept 2018. Full speech available on 
Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BxJdYNEcMmc [Last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
 9 UN General Assembly Resolution 217 A, 10th December 1948.
10 A refugee is defined by Article 1A of the Refugee Convention 1951 as being, inter alia, outside his country of origin.
11 B Miltner ‘The Mediterranean Migration Crisis: A Clash Of The Titans’ Obligations?’ (2015) XXII Brown Journal of 
World Affairs 1, 213; Jeff Crisp ‘Refugees” The Trojan Horse Of Terrorism’ Open Democracy (June 5th 2017).
12 Eurostat figures compiled by Phillip Conor ‘After record migration, 80% of Syrian asylum applicants approved to stay 
in Europe’ (Pew Research Centre Oct 2nd 2017). The comparative figures from Aug 2017 are 68% for Eritrean nationals, 
38% for Somali nationals and 36% for Iraqi and Sudanese nationals.
13 European Council 18th March 2016, Available at : https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- releases/2016/03/18/
eu- turkey- statement/ (last accessed 20th February 2019).
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make a claim for refugee status in Turkey. Thousands more who arrived in Greece prior 
to the deal in March 2016, remain trapped in squalid camps awaiting family reunion or 
determination of their asylum case. A much smaller number have succeeded in gaining 
protection as part of the EU resettlement scheme or national schemes, such as the 
Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme in the UK or private sponsorship in Germany.
It will further be argued that despite a significant reduction in new arrivals, the 
crisis frame continues to dictate European asylum policy and crucially, the repeated 
affirmation of the frame has normalised policy responses that were previously rejected 
for their failure to respect human rights and protect the right to seek asylum.
In conclusion it will be argued that there is an urgent need to re- frame the demand for 
protection to accommodate an empathic focus centred on human rights, tolerance and 
global cooperation, grounded in international humanitarian obligations that promote 
peace and security for all. 
ANATOMY OF DISPLACEMENT
Since the start of the civil war in 2011 over six million Syrians have sought refuge outside 
the country. There have been suggestions that external displacement was a deliberate 
strategy of the Assad government and Iranian allies in an attempt to cleanse the country 
of critics and non- Sunni Muslims.14
The majority of those leaving are accommodated in the region of origin with consider-
able impact on host communities. The resources needed to support both refugees and 
host communities are far greater than the donations received. There are now over one 
million Syrian refugees living in Lebanon, three- quarters of whom are recognised as 
living in extreme poverty.15 Whilst the EU’s Regional MADAD fund has contributed 
550 million euros to various projects in Lebanon, the World Bank has estimated the cost 
at 1.6 billion euros per year.16 Jordan has received more than 660,000 Syrian refugees, 
over half of whom are children.17 This has doubled the size of the Syrian population 
in Jordan and the pressure on jobs and resources has caused considerable strain on 
community relations.18 Last year the UNHCR reported that 94% of required funding 
to assist the refugee population in Jordan had not been received.19
Who should offer protection?
Despite the hospitality of the immediate region, there has been criticism of wealthier 
Gulf states for failing to offer protection. In reply, the Saudi government argues that 
they have provided hospitality to some 2.5 million Syrian ’guests’ since the start of the 
14 Martin Chulov ‘Iran Repopulates Syria With Shia Muslims To Help Tighten Regime’s Control’ Guardian Online (14th 
Jan 2017).
15 The annual vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees reveals that 58 per cent of all households are now living in extreme 
poverty – on less than us $2.87 per person per day. this is some 5 per cent more than a year ago. 76 per cent of refugee 
households are living below this level. UNHCR ‘Vulnerability assessment of Syrian refugees in Lebanon’ (UNHCR 
Dec 2017). Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/details/61312#_ga=2.195784239.228949351.1537197420–
2021353763.1537197420 [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
16 World Bank estimate available at: Http://www.worldbank.org/en/news/press- release/2014/09/12/world- bank- run- trust- 
fund- targets- municipalities- to- offset- spillovers- of- syrian- crisis [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019]; Radka Havlova and 
Krystna Tamchynova ‘The Uncertain role of the EU countries in the Syrian refugee Crisis’ (2016) 18 Insight Turkey 
2, 85–106. For current projects operated under the EU Madad Programme see: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood- 
enlargement/sites/near/files/madad_fund_signed_contracts_20_april_2018.pdf. 
17 UNHCR Factsheet Feb 2018. Available at: https://data2.Unhcr.Org/en/documents/download/62241 [last accessed 22nd 
Feb 2019].
18 Havlova and Tamchynova supra n16. The Jordanian Minister for the Interior described this as equivalent to the United 
States absorbing the entire population of Canada in Norimitsu Onishi ‘As Syrian Refugees Develop Roots, Jordan 
Grows Wary’ New York Times (5th Oct 2013).
19 Onishi Ibid.,
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war.20 Other estimates put the figure at closer to 500,000 and it is evident that most 
will have temporary status either as workers or recipients of sponsorship.21 Further, 
the suggestion that hospitality can be a replacement for formal recognition of refugee 
status is worrying, particularly as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain and the UAE have 
not ratified the Refugee Convention. 
There are of course reasonable arguments for trying to keep refugees in neighbour-
ing countries, particular where those countries share a common language, religion 
and culture. It will be easier for arrivals to integrate and to establish a life in such 
circumstances. Yet this can only be argued to the extent that the number of arrivals is 
manageable and the financial support available from the international community is 
adequate. Where such support is not available the arrival of large numbers can have a 
damaging impact on stability as conflicts can quickly escalate to absorb neighbouring 
countries. 
A further argument for greater responsibility outside the region, is the nature of the 
conflict in Syria and the inability of the UN Security Council to protect civilians from 
the regime’s aggression.22 Indeed, with the direct involvement of countries outside the 
immediate region, including the US, France, Russia and the UK, the conflict in Syria 
has become a global conflict. It is argued that there are both moral and legal obligations 
arising from the foreseeable consequences of this intervention. 
Due diligence is a principle of customary international law that requires states 
to engage in reasonable efforts to prevent harm caused by other states or non- state 
actors.23 It is certainly arguable that principles applied in the context of transbound-
ary environmental damage could be used to suggest the emergence of a more general 
rule. The International Court of Justice has ruled that there is a requirement under 
international law to undertake an environmental impact assessment when there is a 
risk of a proposed activity having a ”significant adverse impact in a transboundary 
context”.24 This extends the application of an earlier case that applied the same principle 
to industrial activities, i.e. that where there is a risk of significant adverse impact from 
a proposed action there is an obligation to undertake a full impact assessment. It could 
therefore be suggested, applying the surrogacy principle of international refugee law and 
borrowing from other areas of international law, that all states have a general duty to 
refrain from actions which will foreseeably cause population displacement.25 
In the context of state action or inaction in situations of genocide, the ICJ’s decision 
in Bosnia v Serbia found that although the Serbia government were not directly respon-
sible for the massacre of Bosnian civilians at Srebrenica, they had responsibility for 
manifestly failing to take all measures within their power to prevent genocide.26 Whilst 
genocide is of course a particular heinous crime under international law, it is at least 
arguable that this position could be extended to population displacement exacerbated 
20 The Saudi Arabia Foreign Ministry: http://www.arab.news.com/featured/news/805236 [last accessed Dec 31st 2019].
21 Sari Hanafi ‘Gulf Response To The Syrian Refugee Crisis. Facts, Debates And Fatwas’ [2017] 5 Sociology Of Islam, 
112–137 
22 N. White, Peace-making in Syria: Why the Security Council Fails’ Nottingham Law Journal 28(1) 2019, 55.
23 As confirmed by the International Court of Justice in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay) (Merits) 
[2010] ICJ Rep 55–56, para 101. Antal Berkes ‘The Standard of ‘Due Diligence’ as a Result of Interchange between the 
Law of Armed Conflict and General International Law’ [2018] 23 Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 3, 433–46.
24 The Pulp Mills case [2010] is cited with approval by the ICJ in Costa Rica v Nicaragua [2018], para 104. Available at: 
https://www.icj- cij.org/files/case- related/150/150–20180202- JUD- 01- 00- EN.pdf ([last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
25 An example of an international obligation to prevent a violation of international law can be found in Article 100 of 
the International Convention on the Law of the Sea regarding an obligation to cooperate in the repression of piracy, 
notwithstanding the absence of a clear jurisdictional link. I am very grateful for the comments made by Dr Mark 
Chadwick on this point. 
26 Bosnia and Herzegovina v Serbia and Montenegro [2007] ICJ 2 
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through conflict intervention. Davidovic similarly argues that responsibility is greater 
where foreseeable displacement is caused in part by one’s own action.27 
In Spheres of Justice, Michael Walzer argues that although the interests of communal 
self- determination can limit obligations to refugees, there is a specific moral responsibil-
ity where displacement is caused by ones own actions. Such a responsibility should not 
be delimited by arguments concerning costs or numbers.28 He gives the example of 
Russians displaced in the West and forcibly repatriated after World War II.29
It is well established that an obligation to admit an asylum seeker for the purpose of 
examining the merits of the case arises at the border of the host state. This obligation 
is extended by Singer and Singer who argue that there is no obvious moral distinction 
between refusing someone at the border and failing to resettle a person from a refugee 
camp.30 They argue that the international community should take active steps to offer 
protection to refugees living in camps rather than waiting for refugees to arrive at their 
border. 
Leaving aside the difficulty in ascribing state responsibility in the latter situation, 
there is also a legal distinction between these two positions. Where an asylum seeker 
arrives at the border and seeks protection, international human rights and refugee law 
combine to require the state, de minimis, to admit them with a view to determining any 
risk of refoulement should they be returned.31
International refugee law is predicated on the surrogacy principle whereby the failure 
of one state to protect its citizens should be remedied by the actions of other states in 
the global community.32 The Refugee Convention itself does not guarantee a decent 
standard of living; rather it seeks primarily to protect refugees from refoulement i.e. 
serious threats to their life or freedom.33 It is therefore possible that a refugee camp 
could be compliant with this obligation. Other material rights listed in the Convention, 
including access to education, housing and employment, depend largely on existing 
conditions in the host state. Refugees should not receive ‘less favourable’ treatment, but 
where the host population is already impoverished this may not provide much comfort. 
For those Syrian refugees in neighbouring countries there is a slim chance of benefitting 
from a UNHCR resettlement programme. Faced with the insecurity and uncertainty of 
camp life, many have embarked on the long and dangerous journey to the relative peace 
and security of Europe. Seen in this light, the decision to migrate beyond the region 
is both understandable and foreseeable. Yet the response of the European institutions, 
many Member States and much of the media, suggests otherwise. 
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE POLICY FRAME 
Frames impose structure on political issues and policies. Winter argues that there is 
a symbiotic relationship between elite framing rhetoric and public opinion.34 Whilst 
27 Jovana Davidovic ‘What Do We Owe Refugees: Jus Ad Bellum, Duties To Refugees From Armed Conflict Zones And 
The Right To Asylum’ (2016) 12 Journal Of Global Ethics 3, 347–364.
28 Michael Walzer Spheres of Justice (New York Basic Books 1983), 51 
29 Joseph Carens ‘Refugees and the Limit of Obligations’ (1992) 6 Public Affairs Quarterly 1,31.
30 Peter Singer and Renata Singer ‘The Ethics of Refugee Policy’ in Mark Gibney (ed.) Open Borders? Closed Societies 
(Greenwood, New York 1988) 111–130.
31 See Article 33 Refugee Convention 1951. Comparable human rights obligations can be found in Article 3 of the ECHR 
as applied in Hirsi Jamaa v Italy and MSS v Belgium and Greece, and Article 3 of the International Convention Against 
Torture. 
32 Guy Goodwin- Gill and Jane McAdam The Refugee in International Law (OUP 2007, 3rd edition) 10.
33 Article 33(2) Refugee Convention 1951, Resolution 2198 (XXI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly.
34 Nicholas J G Winter Dangerous Frames: How Ideas About Race And Gender Shape Public Opinion (University of Chicago 
Press, 2008).
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the frame lends structure to issues, helping to develop a coherent narrative; cognitive 
schemas structure our understanding of social categories by linking together their vari-
ous attributes to produce a coherent story. When the frame and the cognitive schema 
align an analogy is created which drives public opinion.35 
The role of the media in establishing and maintaining frames in times of uncertainty 
is significant.36 Van Dijk goes further in arguing that whilst the mass media can be 
accused of disseminating potentially prejudiced ideology, it also constructs and recon-
structs public attitudes and ‘knowledges’.37 
In matters relating to migration the influence of both quality and tabloid media 
on public attitudes has been well- documented.38 The tendency to prefer stories that 
are accessible to readers results in an emphasis on ‘conventional understandings of 
a situation, on accounts that can be quickly and easily portrayed, and on the most 
plausible explanations’39. As a consequence, there is an editorial preference for stories 
that are proximate, large and contain an element of conflict.4 0 For stories involving 
refugees this translates as crisis coverage where the immediate narrative centres on 
security, costs and numbers rather than the positive contribution refugees can make to 
host societies.41
Although the exceptional nature of a crisis offers an opportunity to disrupt journal-
istic routines, providing a new frame, the coverage of the ‘refugee crisis’ was dominated 
by established narratives relating to terrorism, crime and vulnerability.42 When these 
frames are confounded by metaphors emphasising the vast scale and ‘elemental forces’ 
at play (waves, tides, swarms),43 the humanitarian needs of the refugee are subsumed 
within a discourse of high drama. It is surprising how often these metaphors find their 
way into scholarly analysis, thus reaffirming their legitimacy. In an otherwise well- 
informed analysis of national sovereignty, Dagi refers to a ‘new immigration wave’ and 
a ‘refugee influx’ that ‘paralyzed’ policy makers.4 4 Not only will this discourse act to 
prevent a sustainable, managed solution but it can serve to legitimise actions which 
would otherwise be regarded as deeply unpleasant. This is an argument advanced in 
the context of the ‘just war’ frame in US public discourse by Butler.45 
Media coverage of migratory movements also adopts a hierarchy of acceptance. With 
white, Christian, able- bodied immigrants at one end of the spectrum and racial minor-
ity, non- Christian, non- Anglophone/Francophone migrants at the other end46. 
35 Supra n34, at 146 
36 Elizabeth M Perse Media Effects and Society (London Routledge, 2001) 81; see also Andrea Lawlor ‘Framing Immigration 
in the Canadian and British News Media’ (2015) 48 Canadian Journal of Political Science 2, 329–355. 
37 Teun Van Dijk ’The Discourse and Knowledge Interface’ in G Weiss and R Wodak (eds.) Critical Discourse Analysis. 
Theory and Interdisciplinarity (Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 85–109 
38 See for example Teun Van Dijk Racism and the Press; Critical studies in Racism and Migration (Routledge 1991); 
Samantha Cooper, Erin Olejniczak, Caroline Lenette and Charlotte Smedley ‘Media Coverage Of Refugees And Asylum 
Seekers In Regional Australia; A Critical Discourse Analysis’ (2017) 162 Media International Australia 1, 78–89; Majid 
Khosravinik ‘The Representation Of Refugees, Asylum Seekers And Immigrants In British Newspapers. A Discourse 
Analysis’ (2010) 9 Journal of Language and Politics 1 
39 Andrea Lawlor and Erin Tolley ‘Deciding Who’s Legitimate: News Media Framing of Immigrants and Refugees’ (2017) 
11International Journal of Communication 969.
40 Ibid.,
41 Supra n38.
42 Esther Greussing and Hajo Boomgaarden ‘Shifting The Refugee Narrative? An Automated Frame Analysis Of Europe’s 
2015 Refugee Crisis’ (2017) 43 Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 11, 1750 
43 Paul Baker and Tony McEnery ‘A Corpus- Based Approach To Discourses Of Refugees And Asylum Seekers In UN 
And Newspaper Texts’ (2005) 4 Journal of Language and Politics 2, 197–226.
44 Dagi, supra n3.
45 Michael J Butler Selling a ‘ just’ war. Framing Legitimacy and US Intervention (Palgrave Macmillan 2012).
46 Robert Ford, ‘Acceptable And Unacceptable Immigrants. How Opposition To Immigration In Britain Is Affected By 
Migrants’ Regions Of Origin’ (2011) 37 Journal of Ethic and Migration Studies 7, 1017–1037 
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The research on media framing is evidenced in the public discourse on the Syrian 
displacement. Politicians of the Visegrad47 countries used the crisis frame very deliber-
ately to make the strengthening of national borders a priority, arguing ‘external border 
protection must remain the top priority if we are to prevent the 2015 scenario . . . a crisis 
that questions the very foundations of the European Union’.48
On some occasions however, public opinion appears to shift in response to a par-
ticular event, disrupting the normative frame and revealing problematic metaphors. 
Such an event occurred with the publication of images of Syrian toddler Aylan Kurdi, 
drowned and washed up on a Turkish beach 5km from Greece. The images posted on 
Twitter on the morning of 2nd September, quickly went viral having been published on 
the Guardian webpage that afternoon and reproduced in print media the following day. 
The emotional detachment that characterised the crisis/burden frames and the ‘pity’ 
response was suddenly shaken as the public put pressure on their Governments to take 
action to protect rather than prevent refugees. D’Orazio analysed social media immedi-
ately after the story broke and observed a clear change in tweeting content, from a focus 
on migrants towards an interest in the plight of refugees.49 Opinion polls in France simi-
larly showed a large shift in public opinion towards refugees after the publication of the 
image.50 In the UK the public outcry led Prime Minister David Cameron to change his 
policy on resettlement, significantly increasing the number of places offered to 20,000.51 
In Canada, where the extended Kurdi family were settled, the outcry is considered to 
have contributed to the defeat of the Conservative government in the October election.52
This was undoubtedly a time when the public mood shifted towards compassion 
and empathy and it provided an opportunity for European cooperation that would 
prioritise protection and fundamental rights. The opportunity was short- lived. As 
David Cameron stressed the UK’s moral credentials,53 a more conservative response 
soon followed which focussed on the economic costs, the behaviour of other European 
countries and more specifically, the ‘irresponsible’ behaviour of the boy’s father. Ten 
days after the photograph was published, the tabloid Daily Express tried to reclaim the 
established narrative, publishing an exposé claiming that the boy’s father was the ‘people 
smuggler’ responsible for the death of five people, including his two sons and wife.54 
This explanation, derived from the defence provided by the men charged with smuggling 
in Turkey, has never been proven and the case against Aylan’s father was dropped.
Winter accepts that explicit elements of a particular frame may be rejected but he 
argues, it can be more difficult to reject implicit elements on a cognitive level. This is 
particularly relevant to the ‘refugee crisis’ frame which has been accepted and repeated 
by scholars, commentators and policy- makers as an adequate description of the events 
of 2015–16. It does not appear immediately offensive or problematic but when com-
bined with pre- existing cognitive schema concerning social categories such as race and 
47 Czech Republic, Hungary Poland, Slovakia 
48 Cited in Henry Foy ‘Central Europe States Keep Migrant Heat On Athens’ Financial Times (Feb 15th 2016).
49 Francesco D’Orazio ‘Journey of an Image: From a Beach in Bodrum to Twenty Million Screens Across the World’ in 
Farida Vis and Olga Goriunova (eds.) ‘The Iconic Image on Social Media: A Rapid Research Response to the Death 
of Aylan Kurdi’ Visual Social media Lab 2015. Available at: https://research.gold.ac.uk/14624/1/KURDI%20REPORT.
pdf [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
50 Brian Love ‘French Opinion Rapidly Swings In Favor Of Refugees, Poll Shows Reuters (10th Sept 2015).
51 Nicholas Watt ‘David Cameron Says UK Will Take Thousands More Syrian Refugees’ The Guardian (4th Feb 2015).
52 Patrick Kingsley and Safak Timur ‘Stories Of 2015: How Alan Kurdi’s Death Changed The World’ Guardian Online 
(31st Dec 2015).
53 BBC News ‘Migrant Crisis: PM Sys UK Will Fulfil Moral Responsibilities’ BBC (3rd Sept 2015).
54 Adrian Lee ‘Tragic Aylan Kurdi’s Father Was The People Smuggler Driving Doomed Boat, Claimed Survivor’ Daily 
Express Sept 15th 2015. Whilst two men were subsequently convicted of trafficking offences in Turkey, the case against 
the boy’s father was dropped for lack of evidence. 
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religion, as well as public anxieties over security and crime, the impact of the crisis 
frame on public discourse and policy is far from innocuous.
EUROPE’S ASYLUM FRAMEWORK: MUTUAL TRUST AND DISTRUST
Pursuant to the EU’s Common European Asylum System (hereafter CEAS) there has 
been a number of Directives that aim to establish common standards across the EU 
28.55 Originally intended to establish minimum standards, the latest phase marked an 
upgrade to uniformity of protection. In theory an asylum applicant will be able to access 
equivalent asylum procedures and reception conditions whilst having a comparable 
opportunity to secure refugee status. As all Member States are deemed safe under the 
Aznar protocol56, there is an expectation, grounded in the Dublin Regulation, that the 
applicant will make their claim in the first state of arrival and will not thereafter engage 
in secondary movement. There are some exceptions to this principle, but it is clear 
that asylum seekers cannot choose their ultimate destination. The absence of choice is 
supported by Article 31 of the Refugee Convention which provides that states shall not 
impose penalties on refugees ‘coming directly’ who enter unlawfully where they have 
good cause for so doing. 
If the exceptions do not apply, the Dublin Regulation operates by transferring asy-
lum seekers who engage in secondary movement to the first European state of arrival. 
Geography dictates that this will be a country at the border of Europe. That country is 
then expected to process the application and comply with the obligations set out in the 
various Directives, the Charter of Fundamental Rights and the European Convention 
on Human Rights (hereafter ‘ECHR’).
Human rights obligations in the CEAS 
The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights57 is applicable to all actions of the European 
institutions and the actions of Member States when implementing European law, includ-
ing the Dublin Regulation. Unlike the ECHR it includes specific guarantees for asylum 
seekers, notably Article 18 the right to asylum58, and Article 19(2) which prohibits 
refoulement. In addition, Article 3 of the ECHR (which has its equivalent in Article 4 of 
the Charter) has been interpreted to include actions including expulsion or deportation, 
when there is a real risk that the individual will consequently experience treatment 
that is inhuman or degrading.59 Thus, the onus is on the sending state to ensure that 
conditions in the receiving state will not breach that threshold. The obligations under 
both instruments have been tested in cases concerning the operation of the CEAS with 
the resulting decisions pointing to flaws in the central assumption of European safety.
In MSS v Belgium and Greece60 both respondent states were responsible for breaches 
of Article 3 and 13 of the ECHR where an Afghan asylum seeker was returned to Greece 
under the Dublin II mechanism. The deficiencies in the Greek asylum system were 
significant and the applicant had already experienced ill- treatment and destitution in 
55 It should be noted that the UK, Denmark and Ireland are not bound by all instruments under the CEAS having 
negotiated particular opt- in positions (beyond the scope of this paper). All three are however bound by the Dublin 
Regulation. 
56 Consolidated version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union – Protocol (No 24) on Asylum For Nationals 
Of Member States Of The European Union OJ C 115, 9th May 2008, p. 305–30.
57 C 364/1 Official Journal Of The European Communities 18.12.2000.
58 It is interesting that the Charter has not adopted the ‘right to seek and enjoy’ asylum, as set out in Article 14 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. it could be argued that the right to asylum is broader in that it implies a 
corollary obligation on receiving states. 
59 See for example Chahal v UK (1996) 23 EHRR 413; and Soering v UK 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989) 
60 App. 30696/09.
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Greece before being transferred. The Belgium government’s reliance on the presumption 
of European safety, was not considered by the European Court to be a sufficient justifica-
tion given the extent of evidence concerning the failures of the Greek asylum system.61
The Court of Justice of the EU (hereafter ‘CJEU’) applied the EU’s Charter of 
Fundamental Rights in the case of NS v SSHD62 to a proposed Dublin transfer of 
another Afghan national to Greece. Although emphasising the principle of mutual 
trust and the presumption of compliance, the Court established that where substantial 
grounds existed for believing that there were ‘systemic failings’ in the asylum system of 
the receiving state, the transfer should not proceed.
Whilst a great deal of criticism was focussed on the Greek asylum system, cases such 
as Tarakhel v Switzerland suggest that the problems are not confined to Greece. The 
ECtHR questioned the Italian government’s ability to protect the family life of a family 
of asylum seekers and ruled that the Swiss government would be in breach of Article 
3 if they returned them without obtaining guarantees from the Italian authorities.63 
The requirement to obtain such guarantees appears to conflict with the presumption 
of mutual trust but as the number of Dublin challenges before the Strasbourg court 
increased it became incumbent on sending states to undertake such checks. 
In the British case EM (Eritrea) the Court of Appeal attempted to align the different 
European Court approaches by requiring that the applicants, who had experienced 
significant ill- treatment in Italy, produce evidence of systemic deficiencies in the Italian 
system. This approach was rejected by the Supreme Court which ruled that the correct 
legal test was whether there was a real risk of ill- treatment in Italy reaching the degree 
of severity required under Article 3.6 4 
In Mohamed v Austria65, the Court found a violation of the right to an effective rem-
edy (Article 13) concerning a proposed return to Hungary where the applicant sought 
to argue that their treatment in Hungary would violate Article 3. Although Mohamed 
was ultimately unsuccessful in the Article 3 challenge, the last two years have seen 
a notable deterioration in the conditions experienced by asylum seekers in Hungary. 
The Austrian Federal Administrative Court has ruled that there is no guarantee that 
a Dublin returnee to Hungary would not be subjected to chain refoulement. Similarly, 
the Council of State in the Netherlands has prevented return on the basis that there are 
severe doubts as to whether transfer to Hungary would breach Article 3 of the ECHR 
and, thus, whether mutual trust could be upheld.66 The use of detention in the absence 
of international requirements of proportionality and good faith has been criticised by 
NGO’s and recognised in the jurisprudence of several national judicial bodies.67 Given 
61 Maritime interception and automatic return to Greece was the focus In Sharifi And Others v Italy And Greece (App 
16643/09) where the court again ruled that the Greek system continued to suffer from multiple failings with a significant 
risk of onwards refoulement to the country of origin, thus it could not be presumed safe for the purposes of Article 3.
62 C 411/10.
63 App. 29217/12.
64 EM (Eritrea) v SSHD [2014] UKSC 12.
65 6th June 2013.
66 Federal Administrative Court, Decision Of 30 December 2015, W185 2110998–1.Council Of State, Judgment Of 26 
November 2015, 201507248/1; Council Of State, Judgment Of 26 November 2015, 201507322/1/V3, Available at: Http://
Bit.Ly/22zuhb6; Statements By The President Of The Administrative Jurisdiction Division Of The Council Of State 
(Department) On September 22 2015 (201506653/2 / V3) And September 23, 2015 (201507322/2 / V3). 
67 ECRE ‘Case Law Fact Sheet: Prevention Of Dublin Transfers To Hungary’ 2016 p 9 . Available at: http://statewatch.org/
news/2016/jan/eu- ecre- factsheet- dublin- transfers- to- hungary- 1–16.pdf [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019]; Human Rights 
Watch ‘Hungary: New Border Regime Threatens Asylum Seekers’, HRW Press Release (19th September 2015); Human 
Rights Watch ‘Hungary: Abysmal Conditions In Border Detention,’ Press Release (11th September 2015); Hungarian 
Helsinki Committee, Hungarian Government Reveals Plans To Breach Eu Asylum Law And To Subject Asylum- Seekers 
To Massive Detention And Immediate Deportation (4 March 2015); Amnesty International, Amnesty International 
Fenced Out: Hungary’s Violations Of The Rights Of Refugees And Migrants Press Release (October 2015) 
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the recent vote of censure in the European Parliament and the unwillingness of the 
Hungarian government to assist in the EU’s resettlement or relocation schemes, it seems 
unlikely that the fundamental rights of asylum seekers can be guaranteed in Hungary. 
Of particular concern is the asylum legislation introduced in autumn 2015. It created a 
legal basis for the construction of a fence on the border between Hungary and Serbia 
in conjunction with further legislative amendments criminalising irregular entry and 
damage to the fence.68 It has resulted in an extremely hostile environment, violating 
the international right to seek asylum, the right to effective access to procedures and 
the non- criminalisation of refugees. 
Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights has submitted that current asylum law 
and practice in Hungary does not comply with international or European human rights 
standards; concluding that, at the moment, ‘virtually nobody can access international 
protection in Hungary.’69 The designation of Serbia as safe meant that all entries 
through the Serbian border were considered ill- founded despite objections from the UN 
Committee Against Torture and the Hungarian Supreme Court which had determined 
the designation to breach the ECHR.70 The Hungarian government have stated that 
the implementation of the safe country designation will have retroactive effect, thereby 
applying to Dublin transfers.71 The European Commission has now recognised that this 
constitutes a clear and persistent breach of human rights and refugee law by the Orban 
government and finally referred Hungary to the CJEU in July 2018.72 The response of 
the Hungarian government continues to equate migration with a threat to European 
values and suggests there will be no easy resolution.73 
Institutional recognition that the underpinning mutual trust principle was not always 
appropriate came in the recast Article 3(2) of Dublin Regulation (III):74
where it is impossible to transfer an applicant to the Member State primarily designated as 
responsible because there are substantial grounds for believing that there are systemic flaws 
in the asylum procedure and in the reception conditions for applicants in that Member 
State . . . the determining Member State shall continue to examine the criteria set out 
in Chapter III in order to establish whether another Member State can be designated as 
responsible.
The CJEU has subsequently stressed the importance of mutual trust whilst acknowledg-
ing that exceptional circumstances, such as comparatively poor health care, (not just 
systemic deficiencies) could prevent a Dublin transfer.75 The above judgements give an 
insight into a system that is far from uniform and a judicial body that is anxious to stress 
68 Act CXXVII of 2015.
69 Third Party Intervention by The Council Of Europe Commissioner For Human Rights Under Article 36 Of The 
European Convention On Human Rights Applications No. 44825/15 And No. 44944/15, December 2015, COMMDH 
(2016) 3. In April 2017 all transfers of asylum seekers to Hungary from Germany were stopped due to these concerns.
70 Opinion No. 2/2012 (Xii.10) KMK Of The Supreme Court Of Hungary (Kúria) On certain questions related to the 
application of the safe third country concept, a policy which was followed by the OIN until august 2015. 
71 The jurisprudence across EU Member States is documented in the Statewatch factsheet Dublin transfers to Hungary 
2016. Available At: http://statewatch.org/news/2016/jan/eu- ecre- factsheet- dublin- transfers- to- hungary- 1–16.pdf [last 
accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
72 European Commission, Migration And Asylum: Commission Takes Further Steps In Infringement Procedures Against 
Hungary, Press Release Brussels, (19th July 2018).
73 EurActiv ‘Hungary slams EU legal action over asylum seekers’ 25th July 2018. Available at: https://www.euractiv.com/
section/future- eu/news/hungary- slams- eu- legal- action- over- asylum- seekers/ [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
74 Regulation (EU) No 604/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Establishing The Criteria 
And Mechanisms For Determining The Member State Responsible For Examining An Application For International 
Protection Lodged In One Of The Member States By A Third- Country National Or A Stateless Person OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, 
p. 31–59.
75 C.K. And Others, C- 578/16. For a commentary see Cecilia Rizcallah ‘The Dublin System: The ECJ Squares The Circle 
Between Mutual Trust And Human Rights Protection’ European Law Analysis (20th Feb 2017).
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solidarity and mutual trust notwithstanding repeated breaches of CEAS provisions on 
reception and asylum procedures. The EU’s Fundamental Rights Agency has recently 
raised concerns over restricted interpretations of refugee law where humanitarian 
protection is replaced with temporary residence orders (Italy), restrictions in accessing 
legal representation from detention centres (Croatia), welfare restrictions (Austria) and 
the classification of asylum files as secret, thereby preventing an effective judicial review 
(Poland).76 The realisation of the uniform, fair and efficient asylum system promised 
in the European Council’s Tampere summit in 1999, appears further away than ever. 
It may be suggested that the problems arising from over- stretched asylum systems 
in individual border states are no longer isolated. European cooperation in the field of 
asylum, such as it exists, has moved from a focus on protection to one of containment 
and deterrence. To understand how this shift has occurred it is necessary to consider the 
events of 2015–16 and the impact of the crisis frame. This has enabled the tacit endorse-
ment of an unchallenged narrative presenting those displaced as threats to European 
security, values and culture. 
THE APPLICATION AND IMPACT OF THE CRISIS FRAME 
The UNHCR labelled 2015 the year of Europe’s ‘refugee crisis’ as an estimated one 
million irregular migrants, 75% of whom were fleeing conflict or persecution in Syria, 
Afghanistan or Iraq and therefore had claims for protection, arrived at Europe’s bor-
ders.77 They further estimate that 3,550 lives had been lost at sea during this journey.
Some media sources were keen to dilute the humanitarian dimension of the descriptor, 
preferring to describe events as a ‘migrant’ rather than ‘refugee’ crisis.78 The following 
year was described in similar terms. Within the first 6 months of 2016, the death toll 
was approaching that of the previous year as thousands continued to drown in the 
Mediterranean and Aegean seas. It is impossible to be clear about the numbers who 
did not succeed in reaching Europe as many will have been intercepted, detained and 
otherwise prevented from travelling onwards by border guards.79 The situation was, 
and continues to remain, dire, despite a reduction in media interest and a relative fall 
in application numbers. 
The application of the crisis frame to describe events which were both foreseeable and 
manageable is deeply problematic. Frames have been defined as conceptual tools which 
are relied on by politicians, media and individuals to ‘convey, interpret and evaluate 
information’.80 Essentially, they assist people to make sense of events which they are 
unable to personally verify. 
When one thinks of a crisis one immediately conceives of a situation both unexpected 
and impossible to resolve (therefore out of control). Crisis framing in the migration 
context supports a security narrative through its characterisation of the situation as 
76 EU Fundamental Rights Agency ‘Migration: Key fundamental rights concerns’ 2019 Quarterly Bulletin 1.
77 UNHCR statistics, 2015. Available at: http://tracks.unhcr.org/2015/12/2015- the- year- of- europes- refugee- crisis/ [last 
accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
78 Daily Mail Online, Key developments in Europe’s migration crisis (n/d) Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/fb- 5866029/Key- developments- Europes- migration- crisis.html [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019]; Daily Mail Online, 
It’s time to set up migrant processing centres in Africa’ (15th June 2018). Available at: https://www.dailymail.co.uk/
news/article- 5847875/Macron- Italys- new- PM- meet- migrant- crisis- threatens- rip- Europes- political- order- apart.html 
[last accessed 22nd Feb 2019]; Macer Hall EU migrant crisis is ‘colossal’ British borders face threats from terrorists 
and smugglers’ Daily Express (3rd Aug 2016) 
79 Helen O’Nions, ‘Migrant containment at all costs: what is left of European humanity?’ The Globe Post (Feb 14th 2019).
80 W Russell Neuman, Marion R Just and Ann N Crigler Common Knowledge. News and the Construction of Political 
Meaning (Chicago Univ of Chicago Press 1992), 60 
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uncontrollable and intrinsically threatening, resulting in the dehumanisation of those 
seeking protection.81
Yet as has been noted, the scale of the internal displacement, the ongoing nature and 
severity of the conflict, and instability in regional countries, suggests that the onward 
migration to Europe was predictable and therefore potentially manageable. 
Whilst a proportion of the arrivals are from established countries of origin such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq and Eritrea, a considerable proportion of asylum seekers are now 
Syrian. The UN contends that well over half the pre- war population in Syria requires 
humanitarian assistance.82 More than 3.5 million Syrians currently reside in Turkey and 
1.2 million are in Lebanon. It cannot therefore be credibly argued that the reception 
and processing of one million Syrian asylum claims between 28 comparatively wealthy 
European countries is unmanageable. The European ‘refugee crisis’ if indeed it exists at 
all, is not a crisis that should be attributed to refugees. Rather, it is a crisis of European 
governance which has failed to deliver a workable and fair solution that protects those 
most in need. 
Lessons should have been learned from the significant increase in asylum claims 
resulting from the dissolution of Yugoslavia, when the political dimension of the 
European project was in its infancy. The lack of planning is even more alarming given 
the existence of a specific European directive that covers this very situation.
Lessons from Yugoslavia
The protracted dissolution of Yugoslavia which began in 1990 generated a comparable 
number of refugees in Europe. This was the first significant spike in asylum applications 
and, along with the collapse of the Berlin wall, led several governments in Western 
Europe to focus their attention on specific asylum policies. In the UK for example, the 
first appeals system was established in 1993 and was soon followed by a proliferation 
of asylum legislation that has continued to this day. Refugee movements were a foreign 
policy concern in Europe but the response to the protection demands of over two mil-
lion Yugoslav refugees was a matter of national competence. Similar arguments over 
cooperation and responsibility surfaced as Croatia closed its border to Bosnia due to 
the lack of support from European neighbours. A threat to repeat this decision was 
made in 2018.83 
On the whole the individual state response to the Yugoslav refugees was strikingly 
similar to that of 2015–16 with Germany taking responsibility for the majority of those 
displaced, granting protection to over 330,000.84 Sweden received 50,000 asylum claims 
whereas the UK, France and Belgium received less than 10,000 applications each.85 Not 
only are the responses comparable, the numbers are also broadly comparable, with only 
Germany taking significantly more Syrian than Yugoslav nationals.86 
The intervening years have seen significant developments in terms of European com-
petence with the establishment of a CEAS in 1999. Yet, surprisingly little has changed 
on the ground. The same arguments over integration, security and the allocation of 
responsibility continue to dominate political discussions, delaying effective and prompt 
response. The urgent humanitarian need for protection is relegated to a secondary 
81 UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 GA Resolution 217A, Article 14.
82 UN statistics are available at: http://www.unocha.org/syria [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
83 Zdravko Ljubas, ‘Bosnia Is Worried By EU Suggestions To Close Borders To Refugees Crossing The Balkans’ Deutsche 
Welle DW.Com (20th June 2018) 
84 Michael Barutciski ‘EU States And The Refugee Crisis In The Former Yugoslavia’ (1994) 14 Refuge 3 
85 Ibid. 
86 Eurostat statistics cited in Barutciski Ibid., compare 1991–1996 and 2011–2016 period.
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concern. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the EU- Turkey deal and the worrying 
signs that extra- territorial processing is back on the European agenda.
Justin Huynh argues that a model for a managed resettlement programme existed 
following the exodus of 1.6 million Vietnamese in the 1970’s. The orderly departure 
programme, which included an open shore policy in neighbouring countries and reset-
tlement in the US, could have served as a workable model and may well have prevented 
many of the deaths in the Mediterranean.87 Huynh argues that the willingness to accept 
Vietnamese nationals for resettlement in the US was motivated largely by guilt. By 
contrast there has been a ‘sense of compassionate distance for the plight of Syrian 
refugees’, notwithstanding the increasing globalisation of the conflict.88 
The Temporary Protection Directive8 9 
The need to respond quickly and effectively in cases of war, widespread violence and 
human rights violations, prompted the European institutions to enact a Directive in 
2001 with the purpose of providing immediate, temporary protection in cases of mass 
arrival. The Yugoslav displacement directly informs the preamble. In particular the 
Commission and Member States are reminded to ‘learn the lessons of their response 
to the Kosovo crisis in order to establish the measures in accordance with the 
Treaty’9 0.
The Syrian conflict is an obvious case for the implementation of the temporary protec-
tion mechanism. The principles it sets out are those that informed the Commission’s 
failed attempts to implement a mandatory quota system in 2016. Had the Council 
activated the Directive’s provisions as soon as the Syrian conflict began to generate a 
significant number of refugees, there could have been a managed approach grounded 
in existing obligations. When the number of arrivals increased significantly in 2015, 
Syrians could have been dispersed according to the responsibility sharing mechanism 
in a more orderly fashion. It would certainly have been more difficult for the Visegrad 
group of states to argue against the Commission’s competence when setting mandatory 
quotas.
Instead the European Council struggled to obtain support for its compulsory quota 
scheme. The CJEU dismissed a challenge by Slovakia and Hungary (supported by 
Poland) to the Council’s competence in setting mandatory quotas to assist with the 
relocation of Syrians from Greece and Italy.91 Both states argued that the use of Article 
78(3) TFEU was inappropriate as it constituted a binding exception to a legislative act 
and further they alleged several procedural irregularities, most notably the absence 
of a unanimous Council vote.92 Although the Court dismissed all the arguments, the 
efficacy of the scheme was seriously undermined. The Czech Republic admitted only 12 
of their target of 2691, whereas Slovakia admitted 16 from a quota of 902. Both Hungary 
and Poland resolutely refused to comply.93 Infringement action was commenced by the 
87 Justin Huynh ‘Tales Of The Boat People: Comparing Refugee Resettlement In The Vietnamese And Syrian Refugee 
Crises‘ (2016) 48 Columb Hr Law Review, Fall 198. This is also discussed as an example of cooperation by Suhrke supra 
n100, 405–6.
88 Ibid.
89 Council Directive 2001/55/EC Of 20 July 2001 On Minimum Standards For Giving Temporary Protection In The Event 
Of A Mass Influx Of Displaced Persons And On Measures Promoting A Balance Of Efforts Between Member States In 
Receiving Such Persons And Bearing The Consequences Thereof OJ L 212, 7.8.2001, p. 12–23.
90 Ibid., Para 6.
91 Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 Establishing Provisional Measures In The Area Of International 
Protection For The Benefit Of Italy And Greece OJ 2015 L 248, p. 80.
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United Against Mandatory Relocation Quotas’ EurActiv News (23rd July 2018).
40 Nottingham Law Journal
Commission in 2017 but by this time the mandatory scheme had been replaced with 
voluntary commitments.
The absence of effective European solidarity is deeply regrettable. It is possible, 
although admittedly not inevitable, that the use of an established provision in the 
Temporary Protection Directive might have attracted less objection. The provisions of 
the Directive are time- limited, both in terms of duration and the protection it offers, 
but it does provide for principles of family reunion and recognises that recipients may 
make a claim for refugee status at any point.94 
The lack of preparedness and crisis mentality left the European Commission on the 
back foot, appearing disorganised and reactive. Governments that had no intention 
of offering protection were provided with an excuse which could be used to appeal 
directly to their electorates. These appeals centred on national identity and security 
concerns with Viktor Orban stating that allowing entry for refugees means ‘importing 
terrorism, criminalism, anti- semitism and homophobia’. The Polish interior minister 
argued that the relocation of refugees was ineffective as it ‘simply attracted more waves 
of immigration to Europe’.95 
The Commission’s capacity to enforce compliance was further limited by a grow-
ing existential threat to the Union itself. Many of the leaders refusing to abide by 
humanitarian obligations were also espousing nationalist views and questioning the 
authority and foundations of the Union. The Italian interior Minister Matteo Salvini 
and Viktor Orban have now formed an anti- refugee alliance that is directly oppositional 
to European policies: 
Hungary has shown that we can stop migrants on land. Salvini has shown migrants can be 
stopped at sea. We thank him for protecting Europe’s borders . . . .We must send migrants 
back to their countries. Brussels says we cannot do it. They also had said it was impossible 
to stop migrants on land, but we did it.96
If their rhetoric is to be believed, the European Commission’s capacity to compel states 
in such a climate would be like Turkey’s voting for Christmas. 
The crisis frame has been welcomed by populist and extremist politicians and has 
helped facilitate and secure a path to power in national governments for previously 
marginalised far- right figures such as Matteo Salvini in Italy, Alice Weidel in Germany 
and Jimmie Akesson in Sweden. It has served to consolidate the power of Viktor Orban 
in Hungary and President Erdogan in Turkey. The fast- growing popularity of the far- 
right in Europe is, one could argue, the real crisis. It was not widely foreseen and its 
volatile, populist appeal certainly threatens the values of the European project. 
THE BURDEN OF CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON COOPERATION 
The depiction of the refugee as a burden is common in anti- migrant rhetoric. Yet it 
also dominates much of the policy pertaining to the CEAS which purports to provide 
a fair and efficient asylum procedure.97 Terms such as ‘venue- shopping’ and ‘burden- 
sharing’ frame the refugee as a problem to be managed, de- individualising the refugee 
experience. 
94 Temporary Protection Directive, Article 17 And 18 
95 Mariusz Blaszczak, Polish Interior Minister 2017 cited in Patrick Wintour ‘EU Takes Action Against Eastern States 
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The dissolution of Yugoslavia bought burden- sharing questions to the fore in dis-
cussions over how to manage external displacement. The German Presidency Draft 
Council Resolution on Burden- sharing in July 1994 attempted to allocate reception 
responsibility and institute a resettlement mechanism based on three equally weighted 
factors: population size, size of Member State territory and GDP.98 Thielemann notes 
that the proposal was watered down after objection from the British government and 
French concerns over the rights of refugees.99 The resulting agreement was based on 
soft law and non- binding commitments which were found wanting in the subsequent 
Kosovo crisis.10 0
There are obvious parallels with the Council’s decision to introduce a compulsory 
quota system. Despite continued resistance from the Visegrad group101, the Commission 
sought to create a more durable plan the following year, including a solidarity compen-
sation mechanism where those states taking higher number of asylum seekers were 
financially compensated.102 The idea of refugees being traded in this way may seem dis-
tasteful but this did not deter the Commission who recognised that an entirely voluntary 
scheme was not able to offer an effective solution for the numbers requiring protection. 
Burden- sharing also informs the transfer system under the Dublin Regulation which 
has been the subject of so much criticism. Even if one accepts that burden is a legitimate 
word to describe refugees, in practice the transfer is not a good example of burden shar-
ing. Many states located away from the borders of Europe, in particular the UK, have 
been far keener to maintain the Dublin system precisely for this reason. The transfer 
mechanism has actually constituted a burden in the full definitional sense for countries 
in South- Eastern Europe. Italy had 42,356 irregular border crossings in two months 
alone in 2016.103 The figures for Greece and Hungary were even greater with 137,000 
and 78,472 respectively for the same period.10 4 The European Commission commenced 
infringement proceedings against Hungary after the introduction of its new asylum laws 
in December 2015 and mounting evidence that refugee law was not being respected. 
Nevertheless some European states continued to transfer asylum seekers during this 
period with 1,338 successful transfers to Hungary between January and Nov 2015 (from 
39,299 requests).105
Until the decision of Germany in August 2015 to suspend the Dublin transfer 
mechanism for Syrian nationals, states of first arrival were expected to manage the 
overwhelming majority of irregular arrivals along with those transferred. This was less 
 98 Council Document 7773/94 Asim 124; Christina Boswell ‘Burden sharing in the EU: lessons from the German and UK 
Experience’ (2003) 16 Journal of Refugee Studies, 3.
 99 Eiko R Thielemann ‘Between Interests And Norms: Explaining Burden- Sharing In The European Union (2003) 16 
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Action’ (1998) 11 Journal Of Refugee Studies 4, 396–415; Thielemann Ibid, 261.
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about cooperation and sharing responsibility and more about shifting responsibility for 
refugee management by wealthier northern European states. 
Carrera argues that the resulting temporary reforms to the Dublin mechanism failed 
to fully appreciate that the situation was neither an emergency nor particularly excep-
tional.10 6 An opportunity to re- consider the premise and objectives of the Regulation 
was therefore missed. Even if one accepts the contested premise that people should 
remain in the first country of asylum, it is improbable that secondary movement will 
be prevented whilst asylum procedures and reception conditions in European states are 
not aligned.107
It is suggested that framing the refugee as a burden undermines the possibility of 
their positive contribution to society and contributes to the anti- migrant narrative which 
focuses exclusively on the threat to national identity, prosperity and safety. The Oxford 
English dictionary provides three definitions of the noun burden:
•	 A load, typically a heavy one.
•	 A duty or misfortune that causes worry, hardship, or distress.
•	 The main responsibility for achieving a specified aim or task.108
Whilst the final definition may be in the minds of policy- makers, it is reasonable for a 
burden to be interpreted using either of the first two definitions, stressing a negative, 
unwanted obligation that is unlikely to produce a particularly positive outcome.
Rather than emphasising the negative, it is submitted that ‘responsibility sharing’ 
would provide a more constructive platform for negotiations between states and the 
Commission. Whilst certain states may continue to prove reluctant to comply with their 
humanitarian obligations, it is arguably harder for them to justify reneging on shared 
responsibilities (when compared with shared burdens). 
THE EUROPEAN RESPONSE TO SYRIAN DISPLACEMENT
The crisis mentality that overtook the European Commission in 2015 characterised a 
fragmented and reactive response to the Syrian displacement. Its effects continue to be 
felt today by Syrians stranded in Turkey and Greece, not to mention those returned at 
European borders who have been denied an opportunity to exercise their right to seek 
asylum.
Resettlement
For many refugees the ultimate goal is to return home (an understanding typically lost 
in the anti- refugee narrative found in sections of the European media).109 The decision 
to leave is rarely taken lightly (this explains why the number of Syrian refugees remained 
fairly constant for the first four years of the conflict and why there are still millions of 
internally displaced Syrians. Yet it is difficult to conceive of return in the foreseeable 
future as a viable option for Syrians. President Assad has recently legislated to require 
10 6 Sergio Carrera and Karel Lannoo ’Treat The Root Causes Of The Asylum Crisis, Not The Symptoms’ (2015) Centre 
for Policy Studies, CEPS, Commentary Brussels.
107 Elspeth Guild, Sergio Carrera, Cathryn Costello, Madeline Garlick and Violeta Moreno- Lax ‘Enhancing the Common 
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109 UN News Interview with UNHCR spokesperson Melissa Fleming ‘All Refugees Want To Go Home Someday’ UN 
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owners of private property to register their interest within thirty days.110 Those unable 
or unwilling to do so, which will include millions of internally and externally displaced 
Syrians, will risk confiscation of their property. Such measures will prevent the return 
and reintegration of those in exile; suggesting continuing instability for decades to come. 
Given the impossibility of return in the short- medium term and the significant costs 
falling on comparatively poor neighbouring states, the best, durable solution will be 
resettlement. The scale of the resettlement required is considerable and cannot be 
achieved absent a global response. 
The EU has operated a voluntary resettlement scheme since 2011 and several Member 
States operate their own schemes which are typically managed by the UNHCR in the 
region. The UNHCR has urged the EU to increase commitments to receive refugees 
through sustainable resettlement programmes, endorsing the 2012 campaign led by the 
International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and five non- governmental organisa-
tions active in the field of refugee protection, to resettle 20,000 people every year by 2020. 
The need for European coordination in meeting this target seems obvious as recog-
nised by the Commission’s Agenda for Migration in 2015.111 Many Member States were 
not offering any resettlement places and surveys of voluntary programmes showed that 
few states fulfilled their own self- imposed resettlement quotas.112 There are a variety 
of reasons for this, including failures by the UNHCR to identify appropriate persons, 
unwillingness of municipalities to partake in resettlement initiatives and the imposition 
of suitability criteria, such as integration potential, which are potentially discriminatory 
and difficult for the UNHCR to assess.113 Additionally, one of the concerns surfacing 
in resettlement research is the emergence of a two tier asylum system in some European 
countries which distinguishes between asylum seekers arriving at the border and those 
resettled from the region of origin. This can prevent a holistic integration strategy which 
is essential to the sustainability of resettlement.114 
After three years of the conflict, the UK had resettled only 143 Syrians under its 
Vulnerable Persons Relocation Scheme.115 Whilst David Cameron increased the com-
mitment to resettle 20,000 within five years from 2015 there have been accusations that 
the scheme principally benefits the most vocal rather than the most vulnerable. There 
are also concerns that the significant resources devoted to Syrians under the scheme 
could be more equitably shared across the refugee community in the UK. Other reset-
tlement programmes such as the Gateway Protection Programme and the Mandate 
Refugee Scheme assist those formally identified as Convention refugees but the number 
of beneficiaries is comparatively small.
The US operates a temporary protected status to allow nationals of specific coun-
tries, including Syria, to remain and work for a fixed, renewable period. But the recent 
removal of several countries from the list and the anti- immigrant rhetoric of President 
Trump leaves the future of the policy in doubt. 
Compared to the UK and the US, Germany has been more active in resettlement with 
a private sponsorship programme introduced in 2013; a national humanitarian program 
which focussed on Syrians living in Lebanon and a scheme introduced in January 2017 
110 Arwa Ibrahim ‘Syria ‘Absentees Law’ Could See Millions Of Refugees Lose Lands’ AlJazeera.com (7t h April 2018).
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to resettle 500 persons each month from Turkey.116 Germany also contributes to the 
European Union resettlement scheme and has committed to 10,200 places over the next 
two years.
The schemes are to be welcomed but the lack of an effective European strategy has 
meant that there is a considerable mismatch between demand and response. Amnesty 
International has reported that many of the most vulnerable remain in neighbouring 
countries, unable to access essential medical treatment for life- limiting conditions.117 
Bokshi recommends EU coordination, the twinning of new and experienced resettle-
ment countries, the development of a media strategy to promote resettlement locally 
and a clearer focus on integration challenges:
For resettlement to fulfil its functions as a meaningful demonstration of solidarity with 
countries of 1st asylum and as a useful component of a comprehensive durable solution 
strategy, resettlement numbers need to be significant and proportional to Europe’s prosper-
ity relative to countries of 1st asylum.118 
When the number of irregular arrivals started to increase in 2015 the European 
Commission finally opted for concerted European action and the next two years saw 
the resettlement of over 25,000 Syrians from neighbouring countries.119 Given the small 
number and the Commission’s view that managed resettlement would help to reduce 
the number of people engaging in onward irregular migration, one might be forgiven 
for thinking that cooperation would be easy to secure. The proposed resettlement 
scheme covered all Member States and used distribution criteria that included GDP, 
size of population, unemployment rate and past numbers of asylum seekers/ resettled 
refugees.120 It also took account of any voluntary resettlement initiatives applied by 
Member States. An extra EUR 50 million in 2015/2016 was made available to support 
the scheme.121 An EU Regulation was proposed establishing a permanent resettlement 
framework with a unified procedure and common criteria in July 2016.122 
Although the voluntary resettlement scheme has been extended to other nationalities 
with a target of 50,000 places by October 2019, it is notable that several states have failed 
to provide any resettlement places and many continue to fall far short of achieving the 
resettlement target.123
Relocation 
In addition to resettlement from the region of origin, the Commission proposed an 
emergency relocation mechanism for those already present on EU soil to alleviate the 
116 The schemes are discussed on the German resettlement website: https://resettlement.de/en/current- admissions/ [last 
accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
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pressure on Southern border states.124 The proposed relocation mechanism activated 
the ‘emergency situation’ provision contained in Article 78(3) of the TFEU and consti-
tuted a derogation from the Dublin Regulation.125
The plan foresaw 160,000 relocation places to be implemented over a two- year period. 
66,400 places were for people to be relocated from Greece and 39,000 from Italy to other 
EU countries. The remaining 54,000 were to be relocated from Hungary but due to 
their continued rejection of the plan, they were to be allocated at a later stage.126 Those 
eligible needed to come from countries of origin from which there was a 75% asylum 
success rate.127 Whilst pragmatic, the collective assessment of an asylum claimants 
legitimacy based on nationality is very crude and inevitably leads to a two tier system 
as many nationalities are excluded from the benefits of relocation despite having credible 
claims (including Afghans, Iraqis and Eritreans ). 
Member States would receive 6,600 euros per person to assist with the transfer and 
could only reject the relocated person after undertaking an assessment, on national 
security or public order grounds. This was subsequently amended to allow states to 
notify the Commission and the council of temporary incapacity to participate in the 
relocation for up to 30% of the assigned applicants, for duly justified reasons.128 
Whilst devised as an emergency response, there was some consideration given to 
integration prospects in the subsequent Commission communication. Language factors 
and family networks should be considered when deciding on the most appropriate state 
for relocation and where there is additional need for support or specialist health care 
this factor should be taken into account. However, NGO’s and the European Asylum 
Support Office report that such factors are not regularly considered.129 Whilst the dura-
bility of the mechanism depends on such factors, it must be recognised that refugees are 
far more likely to struggle to build a new life in certain states. Interviews with relocated 
asylum seekers in Romania found that language barriers and low wages made it is 
almost impossible to obtain meaningful employment. Language courses are not readily 
accessible and refugees are expected to support themselves after 6–12 months of basic 
state support.130 This might help to explain why Romania had only settled 463 from a 
total of 6,205 during the first year of relocation. 
The lamentable resettlement rate and the considerable difficulties experienced by 
arrivals in some countries, demonstrate the weakness of leadership in the lack of 
planning and structured support resulting from the ‘crisis’ mentality that overtook the 
Commission in 2015. For any relocation mechanism to be sustainable it needs to better 
match the preferences of refugees with those of Member States. Whilst states can indi-
cate their preferences, they are accused of doing so with the intention of reducing rather 
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than enhancing their reception obligations.131 If refugees are going to be relocated to 
countries where they will struggle to integrate there needs to be much more financial 
support and training (perhaps mentoring by states with more successful schemes) for 
the receiving state to build reception and integration capacity.
A more immediate issue faces an estimated 50,000 migrants stranded in Greece. 
Some arrived before the EU- Turkey in March 2016 deal and are awaiting relocation 
under voluntary programmes, others arrived after the EU- Turkey deal took effect and 
their only way of leaving Greece is family reunion. Family reunion is provided for 
under the Dublin Regulation.132 The transfer should take place before the asylum claim 
has been assessed so that family life is facilitated with the best interests of the child 
being a primary consideration.133 Many have credible family reunion claims as fam-
ily members, including young children separated at borders, are themselves stranded 
in other EU states. The administrative process for assessing relocation and family 
reunion has been lengthy and convoluted. Those interviewed by Action Aid were not 
properly informed about their legal position or given information about the reunion 
process.134 Family reunion figures from 2015 suggested that around three quarters of 
applications resulted in transfer, but this figure had dropped markedly to 10% a year 
later.135
The reactive starting position of discussions on the Commission’s 2015 Agenda for 
Migration did not bode well. Not only were the Visegrad states vociferous in their 
opposition to compulsory resettlement, the Agenda itself lacked definitive priorities. 
This is evidenced by the attention paid to the prevention of smuggling over the need 
to explore legitimate options for regular migration.136 Apetroe argues that a focus 
on legal migration pathways would have enabled the EU to take some initiative, thus 
regaining leadership of the debate.137 Instead the Commission expended its energy and 
resources on promoting greater securitisation and interception of smuggling networks; 
essentially confirming a securitisation narrative that has shaped migration discourse 
whilst increasing public anxieties over security and terrorism.138 Not only are such pro-
grammes unlikely to yield significant impact whilst the root causes remain unaddressed, 
there is also ample evidence from Operation Sophia and Triton that they endanger lives 
by prioritising security over rescue.139 
The compulsory relocation mechanism ended in September 2017 falling well short of 
its target. A move to voluntary relocation resulted in slightly more than half the target 
being met as of October 2018. This was partly down to problems with registering those 
eligible, but it was also very apparent that some countries were either unwilling or inca-
pable of properly engaging with the mechanism. The relocation mechanism itself did 
little to deter irregular migrants. Over 3,000 drowned in the first six months of 2016 with 
three- quarters of the deaths occurring on the route between Libya and Italy. Conditions 
for all migrants in Libya are known to be dire. There is no established UNHCR presence 
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and many migrants are detained in overcrowded, insanitary conditions.14 0 One of the 
most harrowing reports related to a CNN investigation which uncovered migrants being 
sold in slave markets around Tripoli.141 Notwithstanding accusations from NGO’s and 
the UNHCR that the Libyan government are complicit in crimes against humanity, 
the EU has recently attempted to persuade the Libyan authorities to build EU funded, 
migrant processing centres. So far, the Libyan government have rejected the proposal.142 
Meanwhile the EU has assisted in supporting the Libyan coastguard as it continues to 
intercept and return migrants attempting to cross to Europe whilst actively preventing 
NGO vessels from engaging in rescue operations.143 
The Turkish solution 
As has been demonstrated, the emergency relocation mechanism had little effect in 
securing relocation or reducing the number of irregular arrivals in Greece and Italy. 
Of particular concern was the increasing number of arrivals coming from Turkey to 
the Greek islands. This led the Commission to devise its controversial ‘Plan B’, the 
EU- Turkey deal.14 4 
The deal saw the outsourcing of refugee protection from Europe to Turkey and con-
stitutes the clearest example to date of the commodification of asylum. The success of 
the deal depends entirely on perspective. It certainly reduced the number of daily arriv-
als in Greece from thousands to tens. After only four months, Christine Nikolaidou, 
from the International Organisation for Migration in Greece, explained that the threat 
of deportation and detention was working, ‘Flows have decreased not just because of 
the agreement but because of the closure of the borders – refugees and migrants have 
received the message that the borders are shut.’145 
This is a disturbing observation as it suggests that the obligation of non- refoulement 
is being routinely ignored. It is difficult to see any significant difference between closing 
borders and interdicting vessels at sea. In the Hirsi Jamaa judgement, the ECtHR ruled 
that the interception and return of a boat to Libya which contained irregular migrants, 
including asylum seekers, was a breach of the prohibition on inhuman treatment con-
trary to Article 3, and collective expulsion contrary to Protocol 4, Article 4 along with 
the right to an effective remedy in the European Convention146.
From a human rights perspective the Turkey deal is a truly bad deal. The closure of 
borders will never solve a humanitarian emergency. Whilst it may have an impact on 
the numbers of people migrating out of choice, the majority of irregular migrants come 
from countries where there are serious human rights abuses. It has been well established 
that absent a viable alternative of return, migrants will search for other, more dangerous 
routes.147 In this respect EU policy directly contributes to the unprecedented growth 
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141 CNN footage of Libyan migrant slave auctions, People for Sale https://edition.cnn.com/specials/africa/libya- slave- 
auctions [last accessed 23rd Feb 2019]; Human Rights Watch ‘No Escape From Hell. EU Policies Contribute To Abuse 
Of Migrants In Libya’ (HRW 2019). Available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/01/21/no- escape- hell/eu- policies- 
contribute- abuse- migrants- libya# [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019] 
142 Patrick Wintour ‘Libya Rejects EU Plan For Refugee And Migrant Centres’ The Guardian (20t h July 2018).
143 Human Rights Watch supra n141; O’Nions supra n79. 
14 4 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press- releases/2016/03/18/eu- turkey- statement/pdf [Last accessed 22nd 
Feb 2019] The statement of 18t h March 2016 formalised an earlier recommendation for a Voluntary Humanitarian 
Admission Scheme with Turkey to create solidarity and responsibility sharing with Turkey for the protection of persons 
displaced by the conflict in Syria to Turkey, 11097/15. 5 C (2015) 3560 final.
145 Lizzie Dearden ‘Refugee Crisis: 2016 On Course To Be Deadliest Year On Record As Thousands Of Asylum Seekers 
Drown In Mediterranean’ The Independent (30t h July 2016).
146 Hirsi Jamaa and Others v Italy 2012, App 27765/09.
147 Peter Andreas and Timothy Snyder The Wall around the West. State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America 
and Europe (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham 2000).
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in smuggling and trafficking.148 A recent analysis of Operation Sophia which operated 
off the coast of Libya found that irregular migration increased by 19% in the first half 
of 2017 compared to the same period in 2016. The number of arrivals from Libya and 
the number of deaths in the central Mediterranean has increased considerably since 
2015.149 Although many migrants taking the Libyan route will be from Sub- Saharan 
Africa, the UNHCR states that around 11% of arrivals from Libya in 2018 are Syrian 
nationals.150 From a geographical perspective this makes little sense. It therefore seems 
reasonable to conclude that the movement restrictions imposed by the EU- Turkey deal 
are at least contributory factors. 
Put simply the deal states that those whose claims are deemed inadmissible in Greece 
should be returned to Turkey. At the outset, as reported in several press releases, the 
deal stated that all irregular migrants will be returned, which would clearly breach 
the procedural requirements pursuant to the principle of non- refoulement, as well as 
the EU Charter and ECHR’s prohibition on collective expulsion. The subsequent clari-
fication and the use of the word inadmissible rather than unfounded is still significant 
as it suggests that the application has not be assessed on its merits. A claim could be 
considered inadmissible for example if the applicant had arrived via a safe 3rd country 
or if Turkey is considered to be a first country of asylum. Following the transfer, the 
Turkish government commits to relocate one Syrian refugee from Turkey to the EU 
according to the relocation quota. 
The deal was funded at a cost of 6 billion euros paid in instalments to various organi-
sations delivering education and other services on the ground. In return for Turkey’s 
cooperation, the EU promised to relax visa requirements for Turkish nationals and to 
reopen negotiations towards EU membership. The latter seems unlikely to progress 
anytime soon as only one of the 35 chapters required under the accession procedure 
has been successfully closed in a decade of negotiation. 
The programme commenced on 20t h March 2016 and resulted in a significant reduc-
tion in the number of arrivals in Greece. However, return procedures to Turkey have 
been slow and only 12,489 of an estimated 3.5 million Syrians in Turkey have been 
resettled in EU countries.151 
There are considerable concerns over the legality and morality of the deal.
The question of whether Turkey can be deemed a first country of asylum or a safe 
country under the Asylum Procedures Directives is crucial when assessing its legitimacy. 
The EU Asylum Procedures Directive defines a ‘safe third country’ as a country 
where: the people concerned do not have their life or liberty threatened on ground of 
‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opin-
ion’; there is ‘no risk of serious harm’ in the sense of the EU definition of subsidiary 
protection (death penalty, torture et al, civilian risk in wartime); the people concerned 
won’t be sent to another country which is unsafe (the non- refoulement rule); and ‘the 
148 This has been seen in Niger which was a smuggling hub for routes to North Africa. Since the EU pushed the Niger 
government to enact legislation to criminalise smuggling, many people’s livelihoods have been adversely affected 
leading to increased migratory pressure resulting in other networks opening up. European Council on Foreign relations 
‘Migration Through the Mediterranean: Mapping the EU Response’, 2017. Available at: https://www.ecfr.eu/specials/
mapping_migration [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
149 Italian Ministry of the Interior, Statistical dashboard of 30 June 2017. Available at: http://www.libertaciviliimmigrazione. 
dlci.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/allegati/cruscotto_statistico_ giornaliero_del_30_giugno_2017.pdf [last accessed 
22nd Feb 2019]; IOM, ‘Recorded deaths in the Mediterranean Sea by route, January 1–July 2, 2017’ Available at: https://
missingmigrants.iom.int/Mediterranean [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
150 UNHCR data. Available at: https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/mediterranean, July 2018 [last accessed 22nd Feb 
2019].
151 As of 2018, Germany took in 4,313, the Netherlands 2,608, France 1,401 and Finland 1,002 Syrian refugees. The EU 
member states Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Denmark did not accept any refugees at all. https://
www.dw.com/en/the- eu- turkey- refugee- agreement- a- review/a- 43028295 [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
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possibility exists to request refugee status and, if found to be a refugee, to receive protec-
tion in accordance with the Geneva Convention’.152 Turkey could also be considered a 
first country of asylum if the applicant had received refugee status in Turkey or would 
otherwise be guaranteed sufficient protection. 
Whichever descriptor is preferred, the Commission have unequivocally stated that 
‘Only asylum seekers that will be protected in accordance with the relevant interna-
tional standards and in respect of the principle of non- refoulement will be returned to 
Turkey’.153 The UNHCR has emphasised the importance of effective protection and the 
need to examine the practice of states and compliance with the relevant instruments.154 
Herein lies the problem. Turkey does not apply the Refugee Convention to non- 
European refugees, having not ratified the 1967 optional protocol, and there is little 
prospect of Syrian refugees in Turkey being able to formalise their temporary status 
and settle permanently. President Erdog˘an recently clarified his position, ‘We want 
our refugee brothers and sisters to return to their land, to their homes. We are not in the 
position to hide 3.5 million here forever.’155 Thus the fourth requirement for a country 
to be deemed ‘safe’ does not appear satisfied. 
There is also a considerable risk of onward refoulement which has been overlooked by 
the Commission. Recent reports from NGO’s on the ground suggest that nine provinces 
have stopped registering Syrian nationals with the result that they are unable to access 
healthcare and other basic services.156 In a letter to the Interior Ministry in February, 
Human Rights Watch alleged that Turkish border guards have been shooting at Syrians 
to prevent them crossing the border.157
As Peers has argued, although the general human rights situation in Turkey is not 
directly relevant to an assessment of effective protection when returning refugees, it 
is absolutely crucial to an assessment of whether Turkey can be described as a ‘safe 
country of origin’ for Turkish nationals; something that Peers describes as ‘utterly 
preposterous’.158 
The European Commission proposes to include Turkey on a common list of safe 
countries and plans to replace the Asylum Procedures Directive with a directly appli-
cable European Regulation. This is notwithstanding Eurostat figures indicating that 
23% of asylum applications from Turkish nationals are well- founded and the fact that 
Turkey currently appears on only one national safe country list (that of Bulgaria).159 
152 Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 On Common Procedures For 
Granting And Withdrawing International Protection, Art 27 OJ L 180, 29.6.2013, p. 60–95.
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(Lisbon Expert Roundtable, 9–10 December 2002), February 2003. Available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
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157 Human Rights Watch News ‘Turkey/Syria: Border Guards Shoot, Block Fleeing Syrians’ Human Rights Watch (Feb 3rd 
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The safe country designation allows an accelerated procedure, including border 
and transit zones, with no minimum time limit under Article 31(8)(b) of the Asylum 
Procedures Directive. The Commission has emphasised that the fast- track approach 
should not compromise the obligation to examine individual applications, but this 
appears more an act of faith than an enforceable commitment. Article 31(9) of the 
Asylum Procedures Directive requires Member States to set ‘reasonable’ time limits 
for the first instance decision to be reached, and Article 39(2) leaves Member States 
discretion to set time limits for applicants to exercise their right to an effective remedy. 
As expected, the degree of discretion has meant that time frames for accelerated first 
and second instance asylum procedures vary significantly160.
The move from a Directive, affording Member States some autonomy in implementa-
tion, to a directly applicable Regulation and the controversy concerning the inclusion 
of Turkey led the Council to suspend negotiations on the common safe country list in 
April 2017. 
For the EU- Turkey deal to stand up to its critics, Turkey must be considered a safe 
third country. It is not impossible, as Peers notes, for this to be satisfied even if it is not 
deemed a safe country of origin. However, there are significant arguments that Turkey 
is not safe in either sense. This illustrates how human rights are being side- lined in 
European politics.161 To blame this on the ‘refugee crisis’ is myopic and misguided. The 
marginalisation of human rights by European institutions was visible in the selective 
application of the political dimension of the Copenhagen criteria during the accession 
process.162 It is at least arguable that greater accountability on the political criteria 
would have required the Visegrad countries to improve their anti- discrimination and 
human rights legislation, better preparing them to fulfil their resettlement obligations. 
RE- FRAMING THE SYRIAN DISPLACEMENT
Strategic framing analysis has been applied in a variety of social policy contexts. Magner 
and Gerstein Pineau consider how to build support for progressive immigration reform 
in the United States, arguing that advocates must turn away from ‘us versus them’ 
framing, towards language that emphasises shared humanity, collective prosperity, and 
the country’s distinct identity as a ‘nation of immigrants’.163 This approach requires a 
departure from the vulnerable refugee trope which suggests dependency and a lack of 
agency. Hanafi laments the dominance of a politics of pity over compassion, empathy 
and justice16 4. Whilst vulnerability is used by the UNHCR to push for greater respon-
sibility, many writers argue that it leads to a particular ‘hopeless’ conception of the 
refugee. It then becomes more difficult for those not fitting this conception to acquire 
protection as they are dismissed as not deserving or credible.165 
Angela Merkel adopts a benefit perspective which goes beyond national borders, view-
ing refugee protection as intrinsic to the dignity of mankind, ‘The German constitution 
16 0 Marcelle Reneman ‘Speedy Asylum Procedures In The EU: Striking A Fair Balance Between The Need To Process 
Asylum Cases Efficiently And The Asylum Applicant’s EU Right To An Effective Remedy’ (2014) 25 International 
Journal Of Refugee Law 4, 717–748.
161 Ibid., European Commission, Communication Towards A Reform Of The Common European Asylum System And 
Enhancing Legal Avenues To Europe, COM (2016)0197.
162 Helen O’Nions ‘Some Europeans Are More Equal Than Others’ (2014) 8 People, Place and Policy 1, 4–18.
163 Highlighting Shared Humanity and Prosperity To Advance Immigration Solutions Stanford Social Innovation Review 
May 2018. Available At: Https://Ssir.Org/Articles/Entry/Highlighting_Shared_Humanity_And_Prosperity_To_
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16 4 Hanafi supra n21, 113.
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Asylum Seekers And Refugees’ (2010) Working Paper No 60, Refugee Studies Centre University of Oxford.
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and European values require the protection of people’s dignity. This means not only 
the dignity of the people in Germany but it also means the global understanding of the 
dignity of people’.166
The emphasis on shared experience and common humanity is an attempt to shape 
public perceptions. Whilst Merkel’s compassionate response is still applauded by refugee 
advocates, she was of course punished by sections of her electorate. This demonstrates 
both that changing the prevailing narrative is far from straightforward and that the mes-
sage needs to come from different respected sources to have sustained impact. Merkel’s 
lone voice of compassion became increasingly untenable as other countries closed their 
borders and sought to avoid any suggestion of moral responsibility. 
The domestic consequences of Merkel’s lone- voice compassion may be a consequence 
of the failings of intergovernmental cooperation on refugee protection. Shurke notes 
that when compared to defence and environmental cooperation, the benefits of refugee 
cooperation are not immediately obvious to states who may avoid costs by unilateral 
action.167 
Shurke applies a cost- benefit analysis to international cooperation and burden- 
sharing.168 She argues that refugee reception should be considered an international 
public good which benefits all states, irrespective of which country receives the protec-
tion seekers. A full analysis of the benefits are beyond the scope of this paper but 
she challenges the ‘threat’ rhetoric of Orban and Salvini, arguing that security is the 
principal benefit of refugee cooperation, as measures to accommodate and protect will 
reduce the risk of refugees fuelling and spreading the conflict they are fleeing.169 There 
is of course an inherent risk in emphasising the security benefit of cooperation as it may 
unintentionally reinforce an imperialist, anti- muslim narrative. Walzer’s recent essay 
‘The European Crisis’ argues that Europe must take more refugees to avoid waking up 
to a ‘grim day’ where liberalism is effectively over.170 
Shurke’s analysis further suggests that the security gain is not itself sufficient to 
encourage cooperation as any security threat to individual states could easily be man-
aged. But cooperation offers other benefits resulting from greater predictability, such as 
a reduction in costs for both states and refugees. The enormous sums of money spent 
on securitising Europe’s borders has not had any lasting impact on reducing migratory 
flows.171 The reactive nature of crisis decision- making, such as the decision to end the 
Mare Nostrum search and rescue mission in the Mediterranean, has wasted money and 
cost many lives.172 
CONCLUSION
The marginalisation of European values
The events of summer 2015 should never have been framed as a crisis. They were a 
foreseeable response to an unsustainable situation in the region of origin. It should not 
have been beyond the capability of the European institutions to provide an effective, 
166 Stefan Wagstyl ‘Angela Merkel’s Warm Migrant Rhetoric Belies A Colder Welcome’ Financial Times (May 12t h 2016) 
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durable solution.173 The legal mechanism to start this process already existed. The 
failure to apply the emergency measures of the Temporary Protection Directive is just 
one example of legal measures being side- lined. One could point to the failure of several 
states to comply with their reception obligations under the CEAS (deficiencies identified 
by the European courts going back eight years) and the refusal of some Member States 
to comply with the compulsory relocation quota. The underpinning values espoused 
in Article 2 of the Treaty of the EU – freedom, democracy, rule of law and respect for 
human rights (including those of minorities), are simply not taken seriously in the con-
text of refugee protection. They are, in effect, values reserved for the European citizen.
There is now an urgent need to reclaim these values and re- frame the refugee debate. 
It necessitates a departure from the ‘toxic narrative’ that has dictated much of European 
refugee policy.174 Cooperation centred on a frame of compassion and empathy would 
help to reinvigorate a European politics that has lost sight of the values underpinning 
European harmonisation. ‘Orbanisation’ is not confined to European asylum law and it 
needs to be contained before it dictates the next chapter of European history.175 
After mounting infringement proceedings in 2015 the Commission recently referred 
Hungary to the CJEU. Members of the European Parliament also voted to trigger 
Article 7 of the TEU on the basis that the policies and rhetoric of the Hungarian 
Government are threatening European values. The report prepared by MEP Judith 
Sargentini detailed many actions by Orban’s government with nine paragraphs devoted 
to the treatment of refugees and asylum seekers. In addition to the refusal to apply the 
mandatory quota and new laws on illegal migration and processing of asylum seekers in 
transit centres, the report refers to the case of Ahmed H, a Syrian national residing in 
Cyprus, who had tried to bring his family across the Serbia- Hungarian border and was 
sentenced to 7 years imprisonment for terrorism offences in March this year.176 Orban 
defended his record, arguing that the Parliament should have sent a fact- finding mission 
to Hungary, conveniently omitting to mention that his Fidesz party had previously voted 
against a proposed mission. This is the first time the Parliament has voted to trigger 
Article 7, although the Commission has now initiated a censure action against Poland. 
The European Parliament’s censure is an important step towards reclaiming the nar-
rative over European values but it remains to be seen whether the censure will have 
the desired effect. Fidesz MEP, Jozsef Szajer, a close advisor to Orban, has argued 
that Hungary is being punished by pro- immigration politicians; ‘Hungary and the 
Hungarian people are being condemned because they proved that migration can be 
stopped and there is no need for migration’.177 So far the other Visegrad governments 
have supported Hungary and it seems unlikely that Orban’s government will respond 
positively to any decision by the CJEU.
This is a watershed moment for European values. If the Council under the Austrian 
presidency fails to act following the motion, there will be no effective sanction when 
a state openly refuses to accept the core values of the Union. Other states are already 
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175 Steve Peers has described proposed reforms to the Common Asylum System as the Orbanisation of EU asylum law. 
‘The Orbanisation Of EU Asylum Law: The Latest EU Asylum Proposals’ EU Law Analysis, (6t h May 2016).
176 European Parliament On A Proposal Calling On The Council To Determine, Pursuant To Article 7(1) Of The Treaty On 
European Union, The Existence Of A Clear Risk Of A Serious Breach By Hungary Of The Values On Which The Union Is 
Founded (2017/2131(INL)). The full report is available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=- //
EP//TEXT+REPORT+A8- 2018–0250+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=en [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
177 Eszter Zalan, ‘EP Triggers Sanctions Procedure, Hungary Calls ‘Fraud’ EU Observer (12th Sept 2018). Available at: 
https://euobserver.com/political/142818 [last accessed 22nd Feb 2019].
53Crisis framing and the Syrian displacement: The ‘threat’ to European values
following Orban’s lead with right wing populists such as Nigel Farage and Matteo 
Salvini, praising his leadership.
Reclaiming the narrative for refugee protection 
It has been argued that framing the Syrian displacement as a crisis has enabled ill- 
conceived, reactive policies that present refugees as criminals and terrorists; undermin-
ing the protection that is their entitlement under international law. The consequences of 
this frame have reached beyond the refugee context and fed into an unprecedented rise 
in nationalist politics which threatens to unravel the Union. When democratic values are 
ringfenced for certain peoples to the exclusion of others, their universality is challenged 
and they cease to become core values in anything but name. 
Walzer argues that community cohesion depends, to a large extent, on the demarca-
tion of strangers from members.178 Soysal also acknowledges that a cohesive national 
identity can be more difficult to achieve when there is religious, ethnic and cultural 
plurality.179 Nevertheless, freedom of movement for European citizens and their family 
members has already increased the diversity of most European populations.180 The 
arrival of Syrian refugees, when managed with appropriate resources directed towards 
integration, should not significantly impact national identity in already diverse com-
munities.181 This is not the case for all European countries and allocation of European 
funds should reflect these additional challenges. A study of resettlement of Syrians in 
seven countries by the Rand corporation found that notwithstanding barriers, such 
as qualification alignment and language; integration was effective in countries where 
political commitment, community engagement and public support for refugees was 
strongest.182 This makes the framing of the debate about refugee protection crucial. 
The European project has challenged demarcation within its borders through a con-
ception of citizenship that allow freedom of movement for its citizens and their families. 
But the values that inform this project are now under threat, in part from the actions 
of some populist European governments, but also from the inability of the European 
institutions to coordinate an effective protection response to the Syrian displacement.
Whilst the European Commission has expended considerable energy and resources 
trying to belatedly contain and deflect those refugees that manage to reach Europe, 
they have been blind to a much bigger threat of their own making. The lives of millions 
of Syrian refugees are effectively suspended as Europe reinforces its borders and looks 
inward. 
The application of an alternative frame, based on European values, empathy and 
international humanitarian obligations may have enabled a very different approach that 
might have exposed and embarrassed, rather than emboldened nationalist politicians. 
But such an approach necessitates cooperation of Member States under the decisive 
leadership of the European institutions.
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Regrettably, the window for deployment of a humanitarian frame may have long 
since passed. Once the dust settled on the EU- Turkey deal, proposals concerning extra- 
territorial processing, effectively buried in 2003, resurfaced. Originally proposed by 
Tony Blair183, plans to process asylum claims in camps outside the EU were widely 
criticised by refugee scholars, human rights organisations and many European govern-
ments. Fekete summed up the criticisms: 
Britain is proposing a new network of refugee camps – designated areas where those inside 
have different rights from those outside. To envisage such a plan is to imagine ghettoes 
created by the world’s most peaceful and richest countries in some of the world’s poorest 
and most unstable regions.184
In the last five years, the creation of ‘ghettoes in the world’s poorest and most unstable 
regions’ has become a reality by stealth. A concerted effort is needed by European 
institutions, civil society and moderate political parties, to align refugee protection to 
the values proclaimed in the TEU; reframing the narrative. To paraphrase Vaclav Havel, 
when considering his country’s treatment of the Roma minority, the response to Syrian 
refugees is a litmus test for civil society.185 
183 The proposal is contained in a letter from Tony Blair to Costas Simitis. Available at: http://www.statewatch.org/
news/2003/apr/blair- simitis- asile.pdf [last accessed 20th February 2019].
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pEACEMAKING IN SYRIA: WHY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FAILS
NIGEL D. WHITE*
ABSTRACT
The failure of the Security Council to bring peace to Syria after seven years of brutal 
conflict is examined in terms of the structures and powers of the organ tasked with 
primary responsibility for international peace and security. The dependency of peace-
making on a body where the permanent members’ interests prevail over the threat 
to collective and human security caused by the Syrian conflict is explored is terms 
of the normative framework for peacemaking, which has remained undeveloped since 
the Charter was crafted in 1945 with inter- state disputes in mind. With only limited 
exceptions, peacemaking efforts within the Security Council are not based on principles 
of international law and justice, as prescribed in Article 1(1) of the UN Charter, rather 
on the basis of pragmatism, which has led to the permanent members intervening in 
Syria for their own purposes thereby preventing them from performing a collective 
and impartial peacemaking role. The clamour for military intervention – unilateral or 
UN authorised peace enforcement – as the solution is shown to be misplaced. Without 
effective peacemaking, which may be supported by peace enforcement or peacekeeping, 
there can be no lasting peace. 
INTRODUCTION
The recent airstrikes on Syria by the US, UK and France in April 2018, in response 
to an alleged use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, reflects a spiral of brutal, 
horrific and existential violence, death and destruction that seems to have excluded any 
possibility of bringing peace to the country by any other means than total victory for 
the very regime the airstrikes were directed against. 
The bloodbath that ended the long civil war in Sri Lanka in 2009 shows that military 
victory can bring an end to a civil war but at great cost and then only very rarely and 
arguably not in a sustainable way. In contrast, recent history shows that such conflicts 
are normally only ended by peaceful settlement, peace agreements, and a long road to 
building a stable country based on accountable government and the rule of law (some 
imperfect examples would be Mozambique and El Salvador in the early 1990s, Northern 
Ireland starting in 1998, and Columbia with the peace agreement in 2016). 
The Security Council’s response to the chemical weapons attacks in Douma on 7 April 
2018 illustrates the deadlock in that body, which has rendered it arguably complicit in 
the destruction of Syria, acting as a funnel that might drag outside states further into 
a globalised conflict.1 On 10 April three draft resolutions were introduced, one by the 
US and two by Russia, each with the aim of investigating the attack but none were 
adopted due to opposition or the veto.2 Bearing in mind that this would simply have 
attempted to establish the facts surrounding one atrocity amongst many, it can be seen 
*Professor of Public International Law, University of Nottingham.
1 Chemical weapons have been used on a number of occasions in the Syrian conflict, most of which have been attributed 
to forces under the control of the Assad regime – see R. Barber, “Uniting for Peace Not Aggression: Responding to 
Chemical Weapons in Syria Without Breaking the Law” (2019) 24 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 71.
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how far the international community is from bringing peace to Syria. Russia introduced 
a draft resolution on 14 April condemning the airstrikes by the US, UK and France, 
and this was predictably not adopted.3 The Council chamber is being used to reinforce 
the policies of the permanent members and not to achieve collective security in Syria 
and the wider region. 
Peacemaking, often followed by peacekeeping and peacebuilding, can work to pro-
duce a sustainable peace, as opposed to peace enforcement, which often does not (for 
example in Libya in 2011),4 or at least it only produces a temporary solution (for example 
Korea in 1953 and Iraq in 1991).5 The UN Security Council has a pivotal role in all of 
these functions as part of its primary responsibility for peace and security. It is certainly 
not the only security actor but it was placed the centre of the new world order instituted 
by the UN Charter in 1945 and it has sat there ever since, presiding over a shaky global 
peace, punctuated by many violent conflicts. 
THE MEANING OF PEACEMAKING
“Peacemaking” was defined by the UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros- Ghali in 
“An Agenda for Peace” (1992) as “action to bring hostile parties to agreement, essen-
tially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter VI of the Charter of 
the United Nations”.6 Consensual “peacemaking” can be distinguished from coercive 
“peace enforcement” under Chapter VII, or from newer consensual concepts such as 
“peacekeeping”, which originated in the first such UN force in 1956,7 and “peacebuild-
ing” given momentum by the UN’s Peacebuilding Commission created at the World 
Summit in 2005.8 Although conceptually distinct, there remains the possibility of using 
peacemaking, peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding either in conjunc-
tion or successively 
In many ways, in contrast to the resources put into the normative and practical 
development of peacekeeping, peacebuilding and, to a lesser extent peace enforcement, 
peacemaking seems to have remained firmly rooted in traditional concepts of interna-
tional law such as sovereign equality, consent and agreement, embodied in Chapter VI 
of the UN Charter. The lack of attention given to the development and strengthening of 
peacemaking within the UN system certainly would appear incongruous when peace-
making is arguably the main and most effective method of both preventing conflicts 
as well as ending them. It is axiomatic that without effective peacemaking there would 
be no peace, and that peace enforcement, peacekeeping and peacebuilding can only 
support effective peacemaking.
CHAPTER VI AND THE “PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES” 
A large part of the problem is the institutional design of the UN Security Council, 
which grants that body a key role in peacemaking, thereby giving the great powers 
control over peacemaking and also allowing the conceptual and practical conflation 
of peacemaking with peace enforcement, blurring the boundaries between Chapters 
VI and VII of the Charter. Chapter VI reinforces the obligation that member states 
3 UN Doc S/2018/855 (2018).
4 UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).
5 UN Doc S/RES/687 (1991).
6 UNSG, “An Agenda for Peace”, UN Doc A/47/277 (1992) para 20. 
7 UN Doc A/RES/1000 (1956).
8 UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005).
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have accepted in Article 2(3) of the Charter to “settle their international disputes by 
peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, 
are not endangered”. Article 33(1) requires states that are parties “to any dispute, the 
continuation of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and 
security” to, first of all, seek a solution using the traditional forms of peaceful settle-
ment: negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, or 
resort to regional organisations. 
Thereby, Chapter VI is demonstrably based on traditional forms of diplomacy and 
settlement.9 Article 33(2) brings the Security Council into the equation by requiring 
it, where necessary, to call upon the parties to settle their disputes by such means. 
Thereafter, Chapter VI emphasises the Security Council’s powers to: investigate the 
dispute (Article 34); recommend procedures or methods of adjustment to the disputants 
(Article 36); or, indeed, recommend terms of settlement to them (Article 37). Such pow-
ers were used in the immediate post- War period, for instance, to help achieve peaceful 
settlement in Indonesia,10 an early example of an armed struggle for independence (in 
that case from the Netherlands).
By tying the obligation to settle disputes placed on states to the powers of the Security 
Council, the idea was that the Security Council would, as a third party, help the parties 
towards a settlement agreement after they had tried and failed to sort out their dispute 
themselves, although in practice the Security Council has not necessarily waited for this 
to happen.11 The question remains whether peacemaking is enhanced by involving the 
Security Council in a function that traditionally, even in periods of institutionalisation 
under the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations, was within the realms of 
states. Might it rather be the case that an executive approach to peacemaking through 
the Security Council will reduce or curtail bilateral diplomacy between the disputants? 
Furthermore, peaceful settlement based on sovereign equality is modelled on settling 
disputes between states, not settling disputes within states, where only the government is 
normally the recognised international actor. There are exceptions in international law, 
for example when the armed group represents a people fighting for self- determination, 
but that is narrowly confined to colonial and similar situations, and does not clearly 
extend to a people struggling to overthrow an undemocratic regime.12 Thus two of the 
problems of peacemaking in Syria are the lack of legal parity between the parties to the 
conflict, the dependency of any effective peacemaking on the Security Council or the 
agreement of that body to any settlement proposal, and the practical mixture of these 
two issues with permanent members intervening on both sides. How can the Security 
Council be an impartial third party peacemaker when Russia, US, UK and France, each 
holding a veto, are parties to the conflict or conflicts raging inside Syria?
A FAILED EXECUTIVE APPROACH TO PEACEMAKING 
The League of Nations was constructed to address the type of diplomatic, political and 
legal blunders that led to the First World War, not the sort of deliberate, hegemonic 
aggression that led to the Second. As a consequence, the UN was borne out of the 
 9 See generally, J.G. Merrills, International Dispute Settlement (Cambridge University Press, 6th edn, 2017); L.M. 
Goodrich, ‘‘Pacific Settlement of Disputes’’ (1945) 39(5) The American Political Science Review 956.
10 UN Doc S/RES/27 (1947); UN Doc S/RES/30 (1947); UN Doc S/RES/31 (1947); UN Doc S/RES/36 (1947); UN Doc S/
RES/67 (1949). The latter resolution contained terms of settlement that were finally accepted by the parties, leading to 
Indonesian independence from the Netherlands in December 1949.
11 C. Tomuschat, “Article 33” in B. Simma et al (eds), The Charter of the United Nations; A Commentary (Oxford University 
Press, 3rd edn, 2012) 1072.
12 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University Press, 8th edn, 2012) 646–7.
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alliance that defeated the Axis powers, an executive model with a great deal of central-
ised peacemaking and sanctioning power put into the hands of the primary organ. The 
UN Charter appeared more constitutionally and institutionally developed and action- 
oriented than its predecessor. At San Francisco in 1945, the Soviet delegate stated that 
one of the characteristics of the Security Council “was that actions should be fast and 
effective”, pointing to the disastrous “effects of the suddenness of enemy action during 
the present war”.13 Smaller states agreed on the basis that the Council should protect 
them from aggression and, moreover, “that the interests of great and small powers in 
peace and security rested fundamentally upon the ability of the great powers to work 
together”.14
On 5 March 1945, the US on behalf of itself, China, the USSR and the UK, invited 
governments that had signed or adhered to the United Nations Declaration of 1 January 
1942 and had declared war against Germany or Japan to participate in the United Nations 
Conference on International Organisation (UNCIO) to be held in San Francisco, begin-
ning on 25 April 1945. At UNCIO, delegates of 50 nations worked on the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals agreed in 1944 by the USSR, US and UK to complete the UN Charter. 
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals embodied the idea of the five permanent members as 
the world’s police force, while immunising them from any such authority by the veto,15 
which was further refined at the Yalta Conference of February 1945. UNCIO debates 
included a discussion of the naming of the new organisation, and it was clear that 
states deliberately chose the name with the wartime alliance in mind.16 Kelsen wrote 
that the term “Charter” was more appropriate for the “constitution of the international 
community” than “Covenant”, which he described as referring to the “contractual form 
of the contents”.17
Writing at the beginning of the UN period, and also looking back to its predecessor, 
Brierly saw the move towards greater constitutionalisation and institutionalisation in 
the Charter as fraught with problems, not only by the presence of the veto but due to the 
concentration of all significant powers in the hands of the Security Council.18 Even in 
the peaceful settlement of disputes, where the Covenant of the League of Nations gave 
details on the procedures to be followed by member states contained in Articles 12–15, 
the Charter pushes a great deal of the responsibility on to the Security Council. The 
primary responsibility of the Security Council for peaceful settlement was much clearer 
under the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, but it was at San Francisco that amendments 
were made to re- assert the obligation of states to settle their disputes, so the resulting 
text was an uneasy compromise between the powers of the Council and the duties of 
states.19 
All the references in the Covenant were to the “members of the League” who under-
took to act in certain ways except for Article 11(1), which stated that the “League 
shall take any action that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of 
nations” – dismissed as a “mere slip in drafting” by Brierly.20 Sovereign equality for 
member states meant exactly that under the Covenant; while under the UN Charter, the 
13 2nd meeting of Committee III/1 (UNCIO Doc 130, III/1/3) 2.
14 Summary Report of the 5th meeting of Committee III/1 (UNCIO Doc 263, III1/11) 2.
15 For the text of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals see UNCIO, vol 3, 2–17.
16 Report of the Rapporteur, Subcommittee I/1/A, Section 3, to Committee I/1 (UNCIO Doc 785, I/1/27).
17 H. Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations: A Critical Analysis of Its Fundamental Problems (Praeger, 1950) 3.
18 J.L. Brierly, “The Covenant and the Charter” (1946) 23 British Yearbook of International Law 83 at 85.
19 R.B. Russell and J.E. Muther, A History of the United Nations Charter (Brookings Institute, 1958) 657; L.M. Goodrich, 
E. Hambro and P.S. Simons, The Charter of the United Nations (Columbia University Press, 2nd edn, 1969) 258.
20 Brierly, above note 18, 85.
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move was away from a cooperative model of international organisation towards a crude 
form of world government, which is one of the reasons why the Charter is so much longer 
than the Covenant (111 articles compared to 26). The Covenant contained the outlines 
of a constitution, enabling members to adjust the working of the Council and Assembly 
to suit, whilst the Charter contains details on the powers of each UN organ, in which 
the power to take action to preserve peace massively outweighs the power to create 
universal laws. Universal and, if necessary, overriding obligations were to be created by 
the Security Council under Articles 25 and 103 of the Charter, but with the purpose of 
tackling threats to or breaches of the peace. During the San Francisco conference the 
New York Times observed that the smaller countries, many of which were devastated 
by war and concerned with simple survival, “reluctantly accepted the idea of virtual 
world dictatorship by the great powers” in return for having a “world organization”.21 
Writing in 1947 Goodrich identified the main difference between the UN and the 
League as the exceptional powers of the Security Council under Chapter VII. Goodrich 
admitted that nothing could be done against one of the permanent members and there-
fore the UN would be no more effective in preventing the Second World War than the 
League.22 Those exceptional coercive powers operate outside the traditional framework 
of international law based on consent and cooperation. This is shown in Article 1 of the 
Charter, which references collective measures for the removal of threats to the peace 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes, but only the latter should be in “conformity 
with the principles of justice and international law”. Executive action under Chapter VII 
was to be untrammelled by international law. Even the limited reference to international 
law and justice was only inserted in Article 1 at the insistence of the US delegation, 
specifically Senator Arthur Vandenberg who wanted to leave his mark on the Charter 
at the San Francisco conference.23
The first version of the UN Charter – the Dumbarton Oaks proposals of 1944 – was 
essentially directed at Germany and Japan as continuing to pose the greatest threat, as 
they were still immensely powerful (at least outwardly) in 1944 – hence the idea of the 
world’s police forced based on the wartime alliance continued into the post- 1945 era. 
German and Japanese aggression had clearly been planned, rather than stumbled into 
and, therefore, required executive- style government to prevent it happening again. The 
consensus at Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco wrongly assumed that the “wartime 
unity of purpose among the Great Powers would be a permanent feature of their inter-
national relations”.24 Thus, according to Brierly, the “desire for a system of security 
ready always for immediate action, which was a leading motive behind the substitution 
of the Charter for the Covenant, has resulted in a system that can be jammed by the 
opposition of one single Great Power”.25 Further, “instead of limiting the sovereignty 
of states we have actually extended the sovereignty of the Great Powers, the only states 
whose sovereignty is a still a formidable reality in the modern world”.26 
The UN was built on prosecuting a war against powerful states by (even more) 
powerful states, but the Second World War had fundamentally changed the balance of 
military powers so that the enemy was no longer the defeated states but would come 
from within the alliance itself. To settle disputes between the new leviathans would 
require old fashioned diplomacy rather than executive action; settlements in which 
21 New York Times, 7 May 1945.
22 L.M. Goodrich, “From League of Nations to United Nations” (1947) 1 International Organization 3 at 10.
23 Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Westview Press, 2003) 161.
24 Brierly, above note 18, 91.
25 Ibid., 91.
26 Ibid., 93.
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international law would play little or no role. The focus on protecting the sovereignty 
of the great powers meant that disputes involving them would not be settled by law, 
only by power or by adjustments to the balance of power. The veto did not simply block 
“action”, it embodied the recognition that the basic tenets of international law could 
not be applied to those wielding it. For example, the rules of international law were 
not determinate in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, which by any objective analysis 
involved an illegal threat or use of force by the US in the form of the quarantine, while 
the Soviet supply of nuclear missiles was not a breach of any rule of international law at 
the time.27 Nevertheless, the situation was a “threat to the peace” (although there was 
inevitably no Security Council determination to that effect) that could only be solved 
peacefully between the superpowers by the withdrawal of those missiles from Cuba 
(and the reciprocal withdrawal of US missiles from Turkey). The UN Secretary- General 
facilitated this deal but the UN was shown to be a standing forum for diplomacy rather 
than an instrument of world governance.
The permanent members could, as envisaged by the UN Charter, control the agenda 
of the most powerful organ, and develop concepts such as threat to the peace in a dis-
cretionary way, so that selective enforcement fulfilled their common agenda in ways that 
could sometimes be categorised as the enforcement of universal laws. For example in 
the Korean War, the lack of centralisation of the US- led military effort did not prevent 
the relevant actors, including the Secretary- General from proclaiming the operation 
as a UN effort to combat lawlessness: “I am conscious of the nobility and surpassing 
significance of United Nations police action in Korea, in which sixteen Member nations 
actively have taken part. It has been the first determined stand against international 
lawlessness and aggression which peace- loving nations of the world have taken”.28 In 
fact the current consensus in the permanent five has been reduced to a crude ill- defined 
form of counter- terrorism and preservation of the nuclear hierarchy embodied in the 
Nuclear Non- Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, and enforcement action, whether in 
the form of sanctions or military measures, is largely taken against state and non- state 
actors (regimes and terrorists) that threaten their common interests.
Essentially collective security based on law was replaced in 1945 by collective security 
based on power and subjective interpretations on what constitutes a threat to the peace 
and, moreover, what should be done about such. In Syria, the violence started in 2011 
and the Security Council agreed in 2013 that the use of chemical weapons in Syria 
constituted a threat to the peace,29 but only determined that the general deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in Syria constituted a threat to international peace and security 
in the region in 2014.30 Making such determinations within the meaning of Article 39 
of the UN Charter opens up the potential for the Security Council to authorise enforce-
ment action under Chapter VII aimed at tackling the threat to the peace. The narrower 
determination in 2013 would only have enabled the authorisation of enforcement action 
to combat the use of chemical weapons, whereas the 2014 determination opened up the 
possibility of broader action to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. However, 
since 2014 the Council has only been able to agree on limited measures and, while it 
has also adopted resolutions that attempt peacemaking, the lack of real consensus in 
the permanent membership has meant that they represent common ground rather than 
collective purpose. 
27 Q. Wright, “The Cuban Quarantine” (1963) 57 American Journal of International Law 546.
28 T. Lie, In the Cause of Peace (Macmillan, 1954) 366.
29 UN Doc S/RES/2118 (2013).
30 UN Doc S/RES/2165 (2014).
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The move in 1945 towards executive- style government stymied both peacemaking 
and peace enforcement functions of the Security Council as the veto could be applied, 
and has been applied, indiscriminately to proposals under both Chapters VI and VII, 
despite the admonition in Article 27(3) that any party to a dispute must abstain from a 
vote under Chapter VI. Reflecting the precarious balance of power within the Security 
Council and globally, many conflicts and disputes originating in the Cold War have 
settled into ongoing stalemates – the Middle East, Korea, Cyprus for example – none 
of which are clearly inter- state in nature. This, combined with numerous intra- state 
conflicts breaking out since the end of the Cold War – for example, in Angola, Liberia, 
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Rwanda, the DR Congo, Darfur, South Sudan, the Central 
African Republic, and Mali – many of which are on- going, reveals the lack of effective 
peacemaking by the Security Council and, more broadly, the international community, 
despite the UN’s commitment to peace operations in all of these countries.31 
THE LACK OF NORMATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF CHAPTER VI
There was little development of peacemaking in the Cold War, beyond a re- iteration 
of the core obligations on states and the powers of the Security Council and General 
Assembly in a number of Assembly resolutions.32 A strengthening of the normative 
framework might have improved both the legitimacy and effectiveness of peacemaking, 
especially by developing the nexus between the obligations of states, the methods of 
peaceful settlement, and the powers of the Council. 
Meanwhile, the post- Cold War era has been characterised by a focus on unlocking 
the peace enforcement powers of the Security Council; leading examples are found in in 
An Agenda for Peace 1992, the High Level Panel Report of 2004; and the World Summit 
Outcome Document of 2005.33 These documents recognise the reality of the UN being 
faced with threats caused by civil wars, but they do not make any concrete recommenda-
tions as regards how to bring the parties to such conflicts to a peaceful solution. Chapter 
VI is predicated on disputes between states being the subject of recommendatory powers 
of the Security Council and, although the provisions of Chapter VI can be used by way 
of analogy to end civil wars and other violent or potentially violent internal disputes, 
there is the need to develop more expressly a set of peacemaking powers for intra- state 
conflicts, which now dominate the UN’s agenda. 
The lack of preparation by the UN for conflicts such as found in Syria is neatly 
encapsulated in a 2014 Resolution, in which the Security Council recognised that “some 
of the tools in Chapter VI  . . .  which can be used for conflict prevention, have not been 
fully utilized”, but then simply listed the methods that states should use under Article 
33, rather than asserting and developing the powers of the Security Council regarding 
peaceful settlement.34 The Office of Legal Affairs’ Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement 
of Disputes of 1992 is primarily confined to the methods and mechanisms available to 
states and, therefore, provided flesh on the bare bones of the methods listed in Article 
31 See list of current and past peacekeeping operations at: https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where- we- operate (accessed 19 
September 2018).
32 See, for example, UNGA, “Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co- 
operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations”, UN Doc A/RES/2625 (1970); “Manila 
Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes”, UN Doc A/RES/37/10 (1982) para II.4.
33 UNSG, “An Agenda for Peace”, UN Doc A/47/277 (1992) para 20; “A more secure world: our shared responsibility, 
Report of the High- level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Changes”, UN Doc A/59/565 (2004) para 84; 2005 World 
Summit Outcome, UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005) paras 73–76.
34 UN Doc S/RES/2171 (2014).
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33. The Handbook is stated to have been “prepared in strict conformity with the Charter 
of the United Nations; being descriptive in nature and not a legal instrument”. Further, 
it is confined to disputes between states, excluding any internal disputes.35 Settlement 
remains in the hands of the parties, and those parties are primarily states. 
THE DOMINANCE OF PRAGMATISM
Brierly’s analysis explains why there has been little development of peacemaking by or 
for the Security Council – its ability to act in an executive way has been confined to 
sporadic Chapter VII action, and an expansion of peacekeeping forces often ill- suited 
to the violent situations to which they are deployed. The link between the obligation 
of states to settle disputes and the powers of the Security Council under Chapter VI 
has not been deepened normatively by lawmaking resolutions or by any consistent 
practice. Thus, apart from one brief period of creativity in the immediate post- Cold 
War period, the Security Council’s diplomacy and peacemaking functions have been 
conducted on the basis of pragmatism. For the pragmatist, “no rules will work that do 
not reflect underlying geopolitical realities”, so that states will continue to judge for 
themselves what is required to defend their essential interests.36 For the pragmatist the 
“question is always, what are the probable costs and benefits – the long- and short- term 
consequences – of the proposed action?”37 
The aftermath of the Cold War, provided a brief period of creative peacemaking due 
to the massive shift in geopolitics allowing for a more normative approach to fleetingly 
come to the fore. This took the form of UN- supported elections within broader peace 
operations, producing some successes to bring an end to internationalised civil conflicts 
in Central America, Cambodia and Africa, as well as failures. This was not, as it turns 
out, neither the end of history,38 nor the emergence of a right to democracy,39 but a brief 
opportunity for the UN to fill the space vacated by the global confrontation between 
the superpowers. 
This period also saw the UN authorising peace enforcement to bring an end to an 
aggression by Iraq in 1991, and even to support democracy in Haiti in 1994. Some of 
the apparent quick fixes of this period turned out to be temporary in Iraq, Bosnia and 
Kosovo, even though each of these has been buttressed, at some point or another, by 
Chapter VII military enforcement action, and further by resolutions that attempt to 
impose terms on one or more of the parties to the dispute – 687 (Iraq), 1031 (Bosnia – re 
Dayton) 1244 (Kosovo). The failure to bring sustainable peace to Iraq, Bosnia or Kosovo 
demonstrated that even when Chapter VII is invoked, it does not guarantee peace.4 0
That post- Cold War period of frenetic activity was only possible because China was 
looking inward after Tiananmen 1989 and Russia was emerging as a smaller and much 
weaker power. The turn to democracy turned out to be a temporary one, so that by 
the time of the Arab Spring in 2010 it would largely go unsupported especially in the 
Security Council, where a return to pragmatism as the normal behaviour of the perma-
nent members was inevitable. However, whereas democracy is a contested and shrinking 
35 UN Doc OLA/COD/2394 (1992) 1, adopted pursuant to UN Doc A/RES/29/79 (1984), UN Doc A/RES/39/88 (1984).
36 M.J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law (Stanford University Press, 2010) 122–3.
37 Ibid, 124.
38 F. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (Penguin, 1993).
39 T.M. Franck, “Legitimacy and the Democratic Entitlement” in G.H. Fox and Brad R. Roth, Democratic Governance 
and International Law (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 25.
40 The UN had some success with this approach in East Timor – UN Doc S/RES/1264 (1999).
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space within the Security Council, there has been greater traction of more basic forms 
of human rights protection in the prosecution of peace, mainly in the form of protection 
of civilians, and the incorporation of gender into its peacemaking agenda.41 This shift 
to human rights may represent a more enduring conception of justice than the simple 
promotion of elections, but there is a danger that the pragmatic hard security agenda 
of the Security Council may skew the understanding of human rights in peacemaking. 
The evidence in peace agreements generally is that peace and security are prioritised 
over justice (including human rights, transitional justice and accountability), gender 
issues and children’s rights.42 
“Peace” and “security” are not simply factual concepts but are normative ones. The 
concept of peace itself can be conceptualised into a myriad of forms and types and, it 
is argued, the Security Council should be concerned as much with a normative concept 
of peace as well as achieving a factual condition that can be called peace (the absence 
of war). The Security Council has concerned itself with certain normative aspects of 
peace, for example in developing the Women, Peace and Security agenda,43 but it needs 
to develop this further,4 4 by not only stating that women are to be involved in peace 
processes and negotiations, but that the peace agreement itself should include strong 
anti- discrimination and equality provisions that are fundamental, institutionalised and 
enforceable. 
THE FAILURE OF PEACEMAKING IN SYRIA
The above has shown that justice and normative development can be funnelled through 
the Security Council’s peacemaking function – the brief post- Cold War honeymoon 
with democracy, and more enduringly the Women Peace and Security, and Protection 
of Civilians,45 agendas. However, the narrowing consensus amongst the permanent 
members that first emerged after 9/11 has led to consistent measures being taken 
mainly against terrorism. A further narrowing of the consensus occurred after the UN 
Security Council authorised intervention in Libya in 2011,46 which led to a push back 
against the idea of there being a Responsibility to Protect (R2P), at least one fulfilled 
by the invocation of Chapter VII of the Charter. Although peace enforcement in Libya 
was authorised by the Security Council, allegations by Russia and China of an over- 
interpretation of the mandate by NATO states to the effect that protection of civilians 
was used as a cover for regime change, meant that the likelihood of coalitions of the 
willing gaining such mandates in the future were reduced.47 This has meant that justice 
and normative development have again become secondary to pragmatism. There is no 
avoiding Inis Claude’s understanding of the most basic functions of the Security Council 
as a political peacemaking body;48 they continue as long as the UN survives but, as 
the Security Council’s response to Syria shows, they will not necessarily secure peace. 
41 UN Doc S/RES/1325 (2000). C. O’Rourke, “Feminist Strategy in International Law: Understanding its Legal, Normative 
and Political Dimensions” (2017) 28 European Journal of International Law 1019.
42 J.S. Easterday, “Peace Agreements as Framework for Jus Post Bellum” in C. Stahn, J.S. Easterday and J. Iverson (eds), 
Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Normative Foundations (Oxford University Press, 2014) 379 at 388–89.
43 UN Doc S/RES/1325 (2000).
44 Easterday, above note 42, 406.
45 UN Doc S/RES/1674 (2006).
46 UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).
47 N.D. White, “Libya and Lessons from Iraq: International Law and the Use of Force by the United Kingdom” (2011) 42 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 215.
48 Inis L. Claude Jr, “The Security Council” in E. Luard (ed), The Evolution of International Organizations (Thames and 
Hudson, 1966) 70.
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Despite having had the trust of the international community for over 65 years, the 
Security Council has shown itself unprepared for bringing peace to a conflict like Syria. 
Its past successes have been shown to be opportunistic, and did not provide any sort of 
normative framework within which peacemaking or peace enforcement or a combina-
tion of the two could succeed. A brief history of its response to the Syrian conflict shows 
how the best chances of peace have developed outside that body and even suggest that 
attempts to secure the endorsement of the Council have ended in a veto, as the perennial 
dispute about whether peace should be agreed between the parties, or enforced by the 
Security Council, splits the permanent members. 
The Arab Spring, involving popular uprisings against authoritarian rule in North 
Africa and the Middle East, spread to Syria when, on 26 January 2011, protests against 
the ruling regime of President Bashir Al- Assad started; by March 2011 security forces 
were repressing the uprising with force. The Security Council included Syria on its 
agenda and held a public debate on the situation on 27 April 2011.49 The UK, France, 
Germany and Portugal circulated a draft resolution in May 2011, but this was not put 
to the vote as some members thought it could imply that enforcement action could be 
taken under it.50 In August 2011, as the violence escalated, the UK circulated a draft 
resolution that would have imposed targeted sanctions,51 which was not voted upon, 
although earlier in the month a Presidential statement was adopted following a debate 
in which members condemned the widespread violations of human rights and the use 
of force against civilians by Syrian authorities. 
The failure to adopt measures under Chapter VII did not lead the Security Council 
to consider the situation to be one that required it to respond under Chapter VI of the 
UN Charter, given that the situation was essentially depicted as an internal one. A 
Presidential statement of 2011 contained the following paragraph:
The Security Council reaffirms its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, 
and territorial integrity of Syria. It stresses that the only solution to the current crisis in 
Syria is through an inclusive and Syrian- led political process, with the aim of effectively 
addressing the legitimate aspirations and concerns of the population which will allow the 
full exercise of fundamental freedoms for its entire population, including that of expression 
and peaceful assembly.52
The failure to fully engage diplomacy at this stage, due to antiquated ideas about the 
limited inter- state role of Chapter VI, was only a small factor in the descent of Syria into 
brutal warfare.53 However, the choice offered at this stage between Security Council 
“action” involving measures taken under Chapter VII, or inaction due to the certain 
veto of such measures or even proposals that advocated a process of political transition 
of power away from the existing regime,54 meant a corporate failure by the Security 
Council as well as a failure to invoke its fall- back function of providing a diplomatic 
49 UN Doc S/PV/6254 (2011).
50 Ibid.
51 BBC News, “Syria unrest: US and Europe push for UN sanctions”, 24 August 2011: http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world- 
middle- east- 14645641 (accessed 19 September 2018).
52 UN Doc S/PRST/2011/16.
53 See debate in the Security Council in UN Doc S/PV/6650 (2011).
54 The main examples: Russia’s veto of a draft, UN Doc S/2011/612, which condemned the regimes use of force against 
civilians, on the basis that the draft threatened further measures under Article 41 if the regime did not desist. Vetoes 
by Russia and China of draft resolution, UN Doc S/2012/77, which supported the Arab League’s decision to facilitate 
a Syrian- led political transition. Vetoes by China and Russia of a draft resolution, UN Doc S/2014/348, referring Syria 
to the ICC. Russia’s veto of a draft, UN Doc S/2016/846, demanding an end to military flights over Aleppo. Russia and 
China’s vetoes of a draft, UN Doc S/2016/1026, which called for a temporary end to all attacks on Aleppo. Russia and 
China’s vetoes of a draft, UN Doc S/2017/172, which would have imposed targeted sanctions. Russia’s veto of a draft, 
UN Doc S/2017/315, which would have condemned a chemical weapons attack at Khan Shaykhun.
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forum to search for a solution – one that might be embodied in a peace agreement, or 
a Chapter VI resolution, or both. 
The narrow consensus amongst the permanent membership led to the adoption of a 
number of resolutions aimed at: stopping the violence through the sending of envoys 
and the temporary deployment of military observers;55 requiring the verification and 
destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons arsenal;56 demanding that all parties allow 
humanitarian access across conflict lines;57 deciding under Article 25 of the Charter 
that the UN and its aid partners could cross Syrian borders without government 
consent;58 demanding a cease- fire;59 demanding compliance with international humani-
tarian law;60 facilitating the evacuation of civilians from eastern Aleppo;61 as well as 
counter- terrorist resolutions directed at ISIL and other non- state armed groups based 
in Syria.62 However, none of these resolutions could be said to represent peacemaking 
or peace enforcement except in a piecemeal and limited sense.
The resolutions that avoided the vetoes of China and Russia contained attempts 
to stop the fighting, end the use of chemical weapons, and to secure aid to civilians. 
These can be categorised only as limited peacemaking efforts by the Security Council 
that did not form part of a more general framework for a comprehensive peace plan 
endorsed by the permanent members as well as the parties to the conflict. Despite the 
adoption of a number of specific resolutions on Syria, the split between the permanent 
members, into those that support the regime (Russia and China), and those who want 
its removal (France, UK and US), signified that substantial peacemaking had little 
chance of gaining traction in the period 2011–15. Furthermore, the failure to engage the 
Syrian regime in sustained negotiations means that the conflict will not stop while that 
government, with direct military support from Russia from September 2015, believes 
it can defeat the opposition. That the opposition is divided into those groups regarded 
as acceptable to the US, UK, France and Saudi Arabia, and those against whom those 
states were militarily engaging as terrorists, principally ISIL, only served to strengthen 
this belief. 
In these circumstances effective peacemaking seemed unlikely, although in December 
2015 the Security Council did set out a framework for peacemaking in Syria, involving 
UN- mediated political talks, a national cease- fire, and a two year period to achieve a 
political transition.63 In a March 2017 press statement, in furtherance of this Resolution 
(2254), the Security Council: supported the Secretary General’s Special Envoy’s efforts 
to facilitate a lasting political settlement of the Syrian crisis “through an inclusive and 
Syrian- led political process that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people”; 
and welcomed the reopening of talks in Geneva, while reaffirming a commitment to the 
sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria.6 4 While the adoption 
of Resolution 2254 (2015), and the fact that the Security Council is persisting with 
55 UN Doc S/RES/2042 (2012); UN Doc S/RES/2043 (2012); UN Doc S/RES/2059 (2012). 
56 UN Doc S/RES/2118 (2013). See also UN Doc S/RES/2209 (2015); UN Doc S/RES/2235 (2015); UN Doc S/RES/2319 
(2016).
57 UN Doc S/RES/2139 (2014).
58 UN Doc S/RES/2165 (2014). See also UN Doc S/RES/2191 (2014); UN Doc S/RES/2258 (2015); UN Doc S/RES/2332 
(2016).
59 UN Doc S/RES/2268 (2016); UN Doc S/RES/2401 (2018).
60 UN Doc S/RES/2286 (2016); UN Doc S/RES/2393 (2017); UN Doc S/RES/2332 (2016).
61 UN Doc S/RES/2328 (2016).
62 UN Doc S/RES/2170 (2014); UN Doc S/RES/2199 (2015); UN Doc S/RES/2249 (2015).
63 UN Doc S/RES/2254 (2015). 
64 UN Doc SC/2749 (2017).
66 Nottingham Law Journal
it,65 is to be welcomed, the need for a peace agreement on Syria involving the par-
ties, their backers, and other guaranteeing states and organisations, remains all too 
apparent.66 
The UN- sponsored talks at Geneva have not progressed to face-to-face negotiations 
even though there have been eight rounds of talks between the government and opposi-
tion, due mainly it appears to the intransigence of the government. The Russian- backed 
talks held at Sochi in January 2018 did produce an agreement on a new constitution but 
suffered from the absence of much of the opposition including the Syrian Kurds who 
were excluded at the insistence of Turkey, as well as Western states.67 Fighting contin-
ued during these talks and subsequent efforts to bring peace within the framework of 
Resolution 2254.68
CONCLUSION: CAN THE SECURITY COUNCIL ‘MAKE’ PEACE?
The Security Council can only ‘make’ peace in a fully executive way in a limited set of 
circumstances, principally when it exerts governmental control over a territory. This 
has only occurred in East Timor and to a lesser degree Kosovo in 1999, which represent 
tiny pieces in the jig- saw of states, requiring the controversial exercise of sovereign- like 
powers under Chapter VII,69 not Chapter VI where the powers of the Security Council 
in peacemaking truly lie. The utilisation of Chapter VII to exercise sovereign powers 
does not produce truly consensual peace agreements, but imposed settlements that 
may not last without a constant paternalist UN mandated presence.70 There has to be 
effective peacemaking, involving intense negotiations with the various parties, leading 
to a genuine and inclusive peace process and agreement, which can be backed by peace-
keeping, or a more muscular form of peace enforcement, but only in a supportive role. 
The failure of the Security Council to develop the peacemaking functions entrusted to 
it in 1945, the constant push by the US, UK and France to invoke Chapter VII without 
any strategy to underpin any military action that may result, and the protection of a 
brutal, criminal regime by Russia (and to a lesser extent China), has led to a wholesale 
collapse in the Council chamber into pragmatism, which means that we cannot put our 
faith in the Security Council to end the Syrian conflict. 
Although the conflict seems to be heading towards a victory for the Russian- backed 
Assad regime, a lasting cease- fire remains crucial, behind which intense diplomacy and 
pressure is needed to create a window for meaningful negotiations. At best the Security 
Council can help establish a cease- fire, with outside states led by Russia and the US 
removing their military support from the parties. This is not happening – the most 
65 UN Doc S/RES/2236 (2016), welcoming mediation by Turkey and Russia. Russia, Turkey and Iran sponsored the 
“Astana” talks, involving the Syrian government and an opposition delegation, starting in January 2017, and said to 
be within the framework of Resolution 2254. Debated most recently in the Security Council on 11 September 2018, 
following a trilateral summit of the three “guarantor” states of the Astana process (Russia, Turkey and Iran) held on 
7 September 2018 – UN Doc S/PV.13495 (2018) against the background of the Syrian government’s assault on Idlib.
66 See the Geneva Peace talks of 2014, 2016, and 2017. R.S. Ford, “Keeping Out of Syria: The Least Bad Option” (2017) 
96(6) Foreign Affairs 16 at 18.
67 UN Special Envoy for Syria, Staffan de Mistura, attended Sochi as well as Geneva. Follow up talks were held in 
Geneva in June 2018 – https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/06/syria- constitution- turkey- russia- iran- start- geneva- 
talks- 180619080210924.html (accessed 19 September 2018). 
68 See also the continued fighting in Idlib province in September 2018 while the “Astana” process continued – above note 
65.
69 M.J. Matheson, “United Nations Governance in Postconflict Societies” (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 
76.
70 See generally R. Wilde, International Territorial Administration: How Trusteeship and the Civilizing Mission Never Went 
Away (Oxford University Press, 2008).
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recent call for a cease- fire coming from the Security Council in Resolution 2401 of 24 
February 2018 looked as if the Council was fulfilling its primary responsibility in that 
it was a binding decision demanding a cease- fire,71 but it was made at the same time 
that Russia continued to provide military support to the regime and the US and allies 
were continuing airstrikes in Syria. For a cease- fire to work, all those involved must 
immediately stop fighting and stop providing support to those fighting. That cease- fire 
should be enforced by a limited use of Chapter VII to authorise the enforcement of a 
no- fly zone over Syria, apart from agreed areas controlled by ISIL. The no- fly zone 
should be policed by members of the P5 only – Russia, US, France and the UK, bearing 
in mind that the no- fly zone authorised over Libya was the least controversial part of the 
mandate given to NATO members.72 It would prevent Syrian government planes from 
wreaking indiscriminate violence in their zero sum pursuit of those it labels “terror-
ists”, which fails to distinguish between armed opposition and civilians who oppose the 
regime, and it has a chance of forcing them to the table without that aerial domination 
and support from Russia. In so doing the Security Council will start to behave as 
an independent third party peacemaker, rather than being a loose collection of guns 
for hire. Targeted economic sanctions, against members of the regime or opposition 
who undermine peace talks, would help push the regime and the opposition towards 
negotiation.
It must not be forgotten that at the World Summit in 2005 the UN committed itself to 
protect civilian populations from the commission of international crimes if the govern-
ment of a state has failed to do so.73 Lawyers may doubt that R2P has a legal basis,74 
but it remains a moral duty that hinges upon the Security Council, and one that it has 
failed to fulfil even though a UN Human Rights Council Independent Commission of 
Inquiry on Syria found that crimes against humanity were being committed in Syria 
as early as 2011.75 
Lasting peace cannot be enforced in a brutal way that eventually leads to the extinction 
of any armed opposition, since that destroys the state itself. Effectively Syria, Russia, 
Turkey and Iran are engaged in a form of peace enforcement in Syria by systematically 
crushing the armed opposition but, in so doing, they are destroying Syria, committing 
international crimes, and thereby sowing the seeds of future cycles of violence. On 
the other hand, Libya shows that international intervention to remove a brutal regime 
produces a dystopian space filled with violence. Establishing and enforcing a cease- fire, 
and pressing for and facilitating a Syrian- led peace plan, should be the aims of the 
P5 and the Security Council. It may appear that the Assad regime is heading towards 
military victory but if this comes, in all probability, it will only mark a temporary halt 
in a cycle of violence that can only be broken by an inclusive peace settlement. 
However, given the Security Council, or at least its permanent members, currently 
acts to fan the flames rather than douse them through unilateral military measures that 
are escalatory and immensely dangerous (for world peace), initiatives outside that body, 
through the General Assembly (including the use of the Uniting for Peace Resolution),76 
the UN Secretary- General, the Arab League, or an ad hoc arrangements, should be 
71 Although the Resolution makes it clear that the cease- fire shall not apply to military operations against ISIL, Al Qaeda 
and the Al Nusra Front, 
72 UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011).
73 UN Doc A/RES/60/1 (2005) paras 138–9.
74 C. Focarelli, “The Responsibility to Protect Doctrine and Humanitarian Intervention: Too Many Ambiguities for a 
Working Doctrine” (2008) 13 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 191.
75 UN Doc A/HRC/S- 17/2/Add 1 (2011).
76 UN Doc A/RES/377 (1950). See Y. Nahlawi, ‘Overcoming Russian and Chinese Vetoes on Syria through Uniting for 
Peace’ (2019) 24 Journal of Conflict and Security Law 111. 
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supported. Resolution 2254 (2015) does provide some hope that the Security Council 
still has a peacemaking role, but any peace agreement coming from it or from other 
initiatives should not require the endorsement of the Security Council although it would 
be desirable. Agreement should come from representatives of the various groups in 
Syria, as well as those forced to leave.
Of all the functions of the Security Council, peacemaking is the most fundamen-
tal, yet it is the one legally least developed, and the most abused politically. The UN 
should heed the words of its most dynamic Secretary General, Dag Hammarskjold, 
who’s vision of the UN was of a “dynamic instrument of Governments through which 
they . . . should . . . try to develop forms of executive action, undertaken on behalf of all 
the Members and aiming at forestalling conflicts and resolving them . . . by appropriate 
diplomatic or political means in a spirit of objectivity and in implementation of the 
principles and purposes of the Charter”.77 That represents a good starting point for 
a normative framework to govern peacemaking by the Security Council in Syria and 
elsewhere. 
77 Dag Hammarskjold, “Introduction to the Annual Report of the Secretary- General on the Work of the Organization”, 
16 June 1960–15 June 1961, UN Doc A/4800/Add 1 (1961).
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AN ExAMINATION OF THE DISpARITY BETWEEN JUDICIAL 
ACTIVITY IN DEVELOpING THE LAW IN THE CONTExT OF NON- 
STATUTORY TERMS IN EMpLOYMENT CONTRACTS AND IN THE 
INTERpRETATION OF STATUTORY TERMS
KAY WHEAT*†
INTRODUCTION
Historically, employment contracts have not been differentiated from other commercial 
contracts which embrace the concept of “freedom of contract”. However, during the 
latter part of the 20t h century or so there has been considerable judicial activity in the 
construction of implied terms in the context of employment contacts.
This article will examine this development and its favourable effect upon employees 
(albeit that it can be used to good effect by employers in certain situations). In other 
words, this activity has had an overall beneficial effect upon employees. However, judi-
cial interpretation of statutory terms has had the opposite effect. The classic example of 
this is the approach to the interpretation of section 98(4) of the Employment Rights Act 
1996 (ERA), which favours “reasonableness” over “equity”. Essentially this has resulted 
in a hurdle that is difficult to clear.
In consequence the article will examine the concept of “reasonableness”. Interestingly 
the concept has not been embraced in a non- statutory context in the way in which it 
has in statutory interpretation. For example, judicial construction of express terms in 
the contract of employment has specifically rejected an evaluation on the basis of what 
is “reasonable”. The article will go on to point out the contradictions in this approach.
It will then argue that a different approach to contracts of employment could resolve 
this contradiction so that equity/fairness can prevail if social exchange theory and the 
concept of relational contracts is adopted.
THE CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT – COMMON LAW APPROACHES
Common law and equity
Historically, the common law was essentially a form of propositions and rules, devel-
oped through the power of the monarchy.1 However, as was said in the Earl of Oxford’s 
Case in 1615 ”it is impossible to make any general law which may aptly meet with every 
particular and not fail in some circumstances”.2 Although the relationship between com-
mon law and equity foundered in a procedural sense,3 we now treat them as functioning 
together as “the common law” whereby judges use and develop legal principles. The 
issue under consideration here is the disparity that arises when judges are examining 
the words of statutes (in our case, ERA). Dworkin’s account of legal principles is such 
that they apply equally to the common law and to legislation.4
*Reader in Law, Nottingham Trent University.
†The author would like to thank Graham Ferris, who read an earlier version of this article and Mark Thomas who helped 
with a technical problem with the footnotes.
1 J H Baker, An Introduction to Engish Legal History , (1971, Butterworths) at page 42.
2 1 Chancery Reports 1, 6.
3 Op. cit. FN 1 at page 43.
4 R.Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, (1977, Harvard University Press).
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Freedom of contract
This is the traditional view of contractual relationships i.e. the concept of “freedom of 
contract”.5 Adam Smith, is well known for his views on natural liberty. In consequence, 
he placed an emphasis on freedom to pursue one’s self- interested aims and to be free to 
trade. He also held that natural liberty would only prevail as long as it does not damage 
society as a whole (presumably by resulting in anarchy).6 This is closely related, of 
course, to the concept of “freedom of contract”.
As we know, there is legislation that restricts terms in employment contracts, for 
example the National Minimum Wage Act.7 However, there has been little legislative 
activity in the area of most contractual terms in the sense of determining their validity, 
scope and enforceability. The judiciary has, however, tempered the harsh effects of the 
invocation of some terms, not by saying that they are “unreasonable” which is regarded 
as outside the realm of judicial interference, but by applying the implied term of mutual 
trust and confidence.8 
However, at common law, “freedom of contract” has been rejected in the area of 
restraint of trade clauses, which is because there is a public interest in the ability to 
trade, and to earn one’s own living.9 The potential conflict with freedom of contract is 
dealt with by the “blue pencil” rule which does not permit a judicial rewriting of clauses, 
but only the striking out of severable parts.10 
Interestingly, there have been attempts to argue that the employment contract is a 
consumer contract under the Unfair Contract Terms 1977 (the content of this in relation 
of the provision of services is now contained in the Consumer Rights Act 2015)11 and 
the conclusion of the Court of Appeal in Commerzbank AG v Keen was to reject this 
argument.12 This is unsurprising, in that in order to succeed, under the terms of the 
Unfair Contract Terms Act (as were applicable prior to the 2015 Act) the terms of the 
contract would have had to be “reasonable”.13 In addition to this, by making employ-
ment contracts subject to the Act, it would also have imported the guidelines on what 
is reasonable.14 However under the Consumer Rights Act, employment contracts are 
specifically excluded from its ambit.15
Economic theories of law
Economic theories of law lend support to the view that reasonable behaviour is ultimately 
about self- interest. Legal economists believe in wealth maximisation, not because it is 
a morally right end, but because they believe, as a matter of fact, that it is the best way 
for each person to satisfy selfish needs. Further, the economic analysis develops on the 
basis that people as rational beings who will only take actions which will maximise 
their pleasures, and choices about the maximisation of pleasure will be decided by 
what they are willing to pay for it.16 This gets round the problem raised by traditional 
 5 Treital (as revised by E. Peel), The Law of Contract, (2011, Sweet and Maxwell) at 1–004.
 6 B Sandelin et al, A Short History of Economic Thought, (2002), SNS, Forlag, Sweden), at pp 28–33 citing the 1979 of An 
Enquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations edited by Campbell et al, Clarendon Press Oxford.
 7 1998.
 8 United Bank v Akhtar [1989] IRLR 507.
 9 Mason. V Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd [1913] AC 724, HL.
10 Ibid.
11 Chapter of Consumer Rights Act 2015.
12 [2007] IRLR 132 (CA), rejecting the approach taken in Bridgen v American Express Bank Ltd [2000] IRLR 94.
13 Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977 section 11.
14 Part 2, Consumer Rights Act 2015.
15 See sections 48 and 61 (2) of the Consumer Rights Act 2015.
16 R. Posner, The Problems of Jurisprudence (1990, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press) p 353.
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utilitarian approaches that one cannot measure advantages to one by disadvantages to 
others.17
Now it might be argued that a prudent self- interested individual (in our case, the 
prudent and self- interested employer), will make decisions, on the basis of treating 
employees fairly because in the long run that will satisfy its interests best, as the 
workforce will be more stable; will work harder; and will be more co- operative and 
receptive to change. Posner examines ‘employment at will’, the American expression 
for the common law convention that employment contracts embody provisions which 
allow both employer and employee to bring the contract to an end by notice, usually 
short notice. Posner states:
It might seem that this would leave the employee totally at the employer’s mercy, but this 
is not true. If the employer gets a reputation for arbitrarily discharging employees he will 
have to pay new employees a premium. Since the employer thus cannot gain in the long 
run from a policy of arbitrary discharges – it is not effective predatory behavior – he might 
as well treat the employee fairly.18
Posner criticises the US development of the tort of unjust termination on the basis 
that, in order to comply with it adds costs to the employer, and, if it were optimal 
then such protection against unjust dismissal would be negotiated voluntarily. If not 
so negotiated then the cost of dealing with such protection will just be passed on to 
employees by a reduction in wages. This view looks very much like the statement of 
Phillips J in Cook v Linnell: “It is important that the operation of the legislation in 
relation to unfair dismissal should not impede employers unreasonably in the efficient 
management of their business, which must be in the interests of all.”19 In fact much of 
the ideological underpinning of employment law policies over the past 25 years or so, 
has assumed that the erosion of workers’ rights makes industry more profitable and 
competitive.20 However, as a matter of fact, it is by no means clear that it is empirically 
the case, and without this being established as fact, then this assumption cannot be 
used to justify policies on the basis of prudential self- interest. Furthermore, the Posner 
position, if correct, means that protection from unfair dismissal is incompatible with 
what is reasonable i.e. morally neutral employer behaviour. Arguably the approach 
of the English courts has been to endorse this form of economic analysis by paying 
lip service to the notion of fairness by subsuming it under reasonableness. The other 
aspect of Posner’s view of the contract of employment is that it is rooted in the concept 
of “freedom of contract”.
THE DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE COMMON LAW
Employee status and mutuality of obligation
In order to qualify for a number of employment rights, including unfair dismissal, 
workers have to show that they are employees and not independent contractors. It is 
surprising therefore that there is little help from statute in deciding how the criteria 
should be formulated to decide whether someone satisfies the definition of an employee. 
17 See, for example, J L Mackie, Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, (1977, Pelican Books), pp 125–129.
18 R. Posner, The Economic Analysis of Law (1998, Aspen, New York), page 358. Arguably this analysis breaks down unless 
there is something approaching full employment. 
19 [1977] ICR 770 at 776.
20 Examples are the abolition of Wages Councils by the Trade Union Reform and Employment Rights Act 1993, the 
extension of the qualifying period for claiming unfair dismissal in 1979, and again in 1985,and the introduction of the 
Wages Act 1986 (now contained within Part II of the Employment Rights Act 1996), the purpose of which was to enable 
employers to make deductions from wages if they obtained the consent of the workers.
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ERA, at section 230, unhelpfully defines an employee as “an individual who has entered 
into or works under . . . a contract of employment”. 
There is a large body of case law on this topic, but for our purposes, it is contended 
that the development of the concept of mutuality of obligation is instructive as to the 
nature of the employment relationship.
The position of “home workers” illustrates the concept. In the case of Airfix Footwear 
Limited v Cope,21 Mrs Cope had worked from home for seven years and the company 
had trained her and provided materials and tools. She had worked five days a week but 
her pay was made without deduction of national insurance and tax. The EAT held that 
due to the length of the time she had done this work a relationship of employer/employee 
had developed. The court referred to there being sufficient “mutuality of obligation” 
where both parties feel obliged to one another, in the provision of work and the provision 
of labour and this was approved by the Court of Appeal in the case of Nethermere (Saint 
Neots) Limited v Gardiner.22 
Since then the House of Lords’ decision in Carmichael v National Power plc23 has 
endorsed the test, although, on the facts, there was no mutuality of obligation in the 
case of casual workers who had refused to work on a number of occasions. There 
was, therefore, no corresponding obligation on the part of the employer to create the 
irreducible minimum of available work. 
The mutuality of obligation test was considered by the EAT in Younis v TransGlobal 
Projects.24 The worker was engaged to generate sales for a three- year period. He was 
paid a small retainer, and would also receive commission on actual sales achieved. His 
contract could be terminated on 60 days’ notice. There was no obligation on him to 
actually do anything and he also worked for other organizations. However the EAT 
found that there was an ‘overriding contract’ which meant there was sufficient mutuality 
of obligation for him to be an employee.
Employee status and personal service
The case of Express and Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton25 concerned the right of an 
employee to provide a substitute. The Court of Appeal held that this right is “inherently 
inconsistent” with the employment relationship where the element of personal service 
is essential. There can be instances where a substitute can be provided, but they must 
be specific, and consistent with the element of personal service.26 In consequence, the 
concepts of mutuality of obligation and personal service indicate that the employment 
contract is not the same as other commercial contracts for the sale of goods and ser-
vices, where the identity of the parties is not significant. Again, this is important for the 
examination of the particularities of the contract of employment.
Implied Terms
Method of implication – the two tests:- 
The “officious bystander” test was formulated in the case of Shirlaw v Southern 
Foundries Ltd:27
“prima facie that which in any contract is left to be implied and need not be expressed is 
something so obvious that it goes without saying; so that, if, while the parties were making 
21 [1978] ICR 1210.
22 [1984] ICR 612.
23 [1999] WLR 2042.
24 [2005] UKEAT/0504/05.
25 [1999] IRLR 367.
26 MacFarlane v Glasgow City Council [2001] IRLR t.
27 [1939] 2 KB 206, CA, at 227, per McKinnon LJ.
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their bargain, an officious bystander were to suggest some express provision for it in their 
agreement, they would testily suppress him with a common “oh, of course!”. 
In the context of the employment contract, an example of this would be an obligation to 
pay the employee. No one would expect the employee to work for nothing, although it 
must be said that the level of pay (subject to any statutory minimums in force) is open 
to negotiation.
The second test provides for the implication of terms that are “necessary in the busi-
ness sense to give efficacy to the contract” – Reigate v Union Manufacturing Co Ltd.28 
Those are not terms that the parties themselves would necessarily have thought of, in 
contrast with the terms implied by the officious bystander test. 
An example of this is the mutual obligation of trust and confidence to which we will 
now turn. It is not immediately obvious that such an obligation should automatically 
be implied, but only on reflection is its importance realised.
Mutual trust and confidence
This implied term can be of some significance in the contractual relationship. Generally 
it means that neither employer nor employee will behave in such a way as to destroy the 
mutual trust and confidence which should exist within the employment relationship. An 
example of this is the case of United Bank Ltd v Akhtar29 where there was an express 
term in the contract which allowed the employer to move the employee to any branch 
of the bank in the UK. However, when the employer exercised its right pursuant to this 
express term and ordered the employee to move from Leeds to Birmingham on only six 
days notice and refused to give the employee more time when his personal circumstances 
were explained, the employer was found to have been in breach of this implied term of 
trust and respect:
“we take it as inherent that there may well be conduct which is either calculated or likely 
to destroy or seriously damage the relationship of trust and respect between employer 
and employee . . . we consider that in the field of employment law it is proper to imply an 
overriding obligation of trust and respect which is independent of, and in addition to, the 
literal interpretation of the actions which are permitted to the employer under the terms 
of the contact”30
It is interesting to consider here the notion of “reasonableness” and whether reason-
able behaviour should be implied. A number of cases illustrate the tension which has 
developed between two judicial approaches. The first is the strictly contractual approach 
adopted by (inter alia) Lord Denning in Western Excavating (ECC) Ltd v Sharp31 which 
approach was followed in the subsequent Court of Appeal case of Courtaulds Northern 
Spinning Ltd v Gibson.32 The second is the implication into the employment relationship 
of the concept of reasonableness. It must be stressed that the courts have not favoured 
this view, but have attempted to mitigate the harshness of the contractual approach by 
using the obligation of trust and confidence as exemplified in Akhtar above. Similarly, 
this had been used in the earlier case of Woods v W M Car Services (Peterborough) 
Ltd,33 where a series of attempts to change the terms of an employee’s contract were 
held to be in breach of the mutual obligation.
28 [1918] 1 KB 592.
29 op cit (FN 9). 
30 Ibid at 512 (Knox J).
31 [1978] QB 761.
32 [1988] ICR 451.
33 [1982] IRLR 413.
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The later case of White v Reflecting Roadstuds Ltd34 reflects the earlier view where it 
was held that an employer had no obligation to be “reasonable” but should not behave 
in such a way as to prevent the employee from carrying out his obligations under the 
contract.
In Malik v BCCI35 ex- employees of a bank which was associated with corrupt 
practices claimed ‘stigma damages’ as a result of not being able to find employment 
because of their former employer’s reputation. It was held by the House of Lords that 
the corruption on the part of the employer amounted to a breach of the employer’s 
obligation of trust and confidence. 
The related issue is how far it is possible for implied terms to ‘override” express 
terms. This was considered by the Court of Appeal as a preliminary point in Johnstone 
v Bloomsbury HA.36 The case considered a junior doctor whose contract stated that 
his working hours were 48 per week plus ‘up to’ another 40 hours overtime. He alleged 
that this term should be overridden by the implied term that an employer should care 
for employees’ health and safety. The application was a preliminary one to establish 
whether this was, in principle, a valid cause of action. The three Court of Appeal gave 
very different judgments, but for different reasons the majority said that the claim 
should not be struck out. The case never came to a full hearing so that issue remains 
unresolved. 
The Court of Appeal has held that the implied term of trust and confidence can also 
relate to the obligation to confer a positive benefit upon an employee, as opposed to 
merely not subjecting him/her to any detriment. In Transco (formerly BG) v O’Brien,37 it 
was held that “there may in law be a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence 
in a decision to refuse to offer an employee a new contract . . . just as in a decision to 
refuse to offer a variation . . . To single out an employee on capricious grounds and 
refuse to offer him the same terms as are offered to the rest of the workforce is in my 
judgment a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.”38 
Fidelity and good faith
There is an implied duty of fidelity on the part of the employee i.e. employees must not 
behave in such a way as to create a conflict of their own interests with the interests of 
their employers.39
There has also been some creative litigation on implied terms in relation to an implied 
duty of good faith, which is wider than the employees’ duty of fidelity and can apply to 
both employees and employers. This was raised in the cases of Clark v BET4 0 and Adin 
v Secco Forex.41 In the first case, Mr Clark’s contract contained provision for salary 
increases and bonuses to be paid ‘at the employer’s discretion’. After the termination 
of his employment he brought an action for damages, claiming (inter alia) sums to 
cover these. Despite the fact that contractually there was no express term imposing an 
obligation on the employer to pay, the court found that on the basis of the company’s 
performance and Mr Clark’s role in that, an employer acting in good faith would have 
awarded increases. In Adin it was held that dismissal of Mr Adin when he became sick 
34 [1991] 1CR 733. 
35 [1997] IRLR 462.
36 [1992] I QB 333. 
37 [2002] ICR 721,
38 Ibid at paralle, per Pill LJ. 
39 Eccles & Co v Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co [1912] IKB 135, CA.
40 [1997] IRLR 348.
41 [1997] IRLR 280.
75Judicial activity in the context of terms of employment contracts
was contrary to ‘good faith’ because it denied him the opportunity to take advantage 
of sickness benefits available to an employee in his position. This might be significant 
in the context of unfair dismissal.
As we have seen, restraint of trade clauses can be struck out, in whole or part, in the 
public interest Hanover Insurance Brokers Ltd v Schapiro42 concerned a clause prohibit-
ing solicitation of former colleagues. The Court of Appeal refused to uphold such a 
clause because, first, it applied to all employees regardless of skill or seniority and 
secondly, as a more general but obiter point, as a matter of principle, employees were not 
like stock in trade, as they were free to work for any employer of their choice. In Dawney, 
Day & Co Ltd v De Braconier D’Alphen43 the Court of Appeal upheld such a clause on 
the basis that an employer has a legitimate interest in maintaining a stable, trained 
workforce and therefore was entitled to protect it. However, the clause did prevent the 
poaching of ‘senior employees’, as to have included all employees would have been too 
wide, and not capable of being rewritten.
In consequence, it can be seen that within the context of contractual terms, there 
has been a judicial approach that has generally tried to reach a fair result. However, 
the judiciary’s approach in the interpretation of statutory terms has not been the same. 
This is well illustrated by the interpretation of aspects of the law relating to unfair 
dismissal.
THE STRUCTURE OF UNFAIR DISMISSAL
The current law is contained in the Part X of the Employment Rights Act 1996 (the 
“Act”). The claim proceeds in the following way. First of all there are eligibility require-
ments to be met e.g. length of service. If the requirements are satisfied, the employee 
has to show that there has been a dismissal, and if that is established the employer has 
to show the reason for dismissal. 
Once the reason is established then the tribunal has to decide whether the dismissal 
is fair and the criteria are set out in section 98(4) ERA. In summary this means that: in 
order for the dismissal to be fair the employer must have acted reasonably in treating the 
reason as a justification for dismissal and that this should be determined in accordance 
with equity and the substantial merits of the case.
With regard to the section 98(4) interpretation, in W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins, this 
was considered by Lord Simon:
. . . the employer must satisfy the tribunal that he acted reasonably in treating “it” . . . as a 
sufficient reason for the dismissal . . . The reference to “equity and the substantial merits 
of the case” merely shows that the word “reasonably” is to be widely construed; but they 
in no way affect the proposition that what must be shown to be reasonable and sufficient 
is the employer’s action in treating the reason shown by him (the employer) as the reason 
for dismissing the employee.’4 4
This is, perhaps, the origin of the deficiencies in judicial interpretation of section 98(4) 
of the Act.
42 [1994] IRLR 82, CA.
43 [1997] IRLR 442.
44 W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931, at 959.
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THE REASON FOR DISMISSAL
Although there are a number of automatically unfair/fair reasons for dismissal, here we 
are looking at the so- called ‘potentially fair’ reasons. Sub- sections 98 (1) and (2) Act 
1996 state that the potentially fair reasons are either the conduct or the capability of 
the employee; that the employee is redundant; that to continue to employ the employee 
would be in contravention of statute,45 or that there is some other substantial reason 
of a kind such as to justify the dismissal of an employee holding the position which the 
employee held.46 The classification, therefore, splits between reasons that are about the 
fault of the employee; and those that are not, such as a redundancy situation where 
the employee should at least in principle, be compensated, and some other substantial 
reason dismissals that are usually not ‘fault’ dismissals but nevertheless might not 
attract any form of compensation.47 In the latter case reasons that fall into this category 
are often due to “business reorganisations”, and it is instructive to examine these and 
redundancy dismissals i.e. both are “economic dismissals” as they are illustrative of 
aspects of what might be regarded as the epitome of “reasonable” decision- making in 
what we will describe as the prudential sense of reasonableness.
Economic dismissals
Economic dismissals are not about the fault of the employee.48 A redundancy takes 
place when the specific requirements of the Employment Rights Act 1996 are satisfied.49 
There has to be a diminishment in the need for workers to work in a particular place 
or to do work of a particular kind. There is financial compensation in the case of a 
redundancy, albeit of a modest nature.50 If the definition is satisfied then employees can 
lose the statutory redundancy payment if they unreasonably refuse suitable alternative 
employment. It is crucial to note that tribunals do not have to consider the reasonable-
ness of employers in deciding to make redundancies. In the early redundancy cases 
tribunals were touchingly keen on examining the employer’s motives51 but in Moon 
v Homeworthy Furniture52 the EAT held that it was not part of the tribunal’s remit to 
enquire into the management’s motives for closure of the factory: “There cannot be 
any investigation into the rights and wrongs of the declared redundancy.”53 Subject to 
the reason being “genuine” this was confirmed by the Court of Appeal.54 There must, 
however, be a consultation process and selection for redundancy must be on the basis of 
objective, and relevant criteria, otherwise there could be an unfair dismissal.55 However, 
45 This is essentially a form of frustration of the contract but is not an automatically fair reason because it may have been 
possible for the employee to have been given alternative employment.
46 For an examination in detail of the classification of potentially fair reasons see H Collins Justice in Dismissal (1992, 
Oxford: Clarendon Press), and for a critical analysis of this: G Pitt, ‘Justice in Dismissal: a Reply to Hugh Collins’ (1993) 
22 ILJ 251. Pitt’s view is that Collins’s analysis does not sufficiently differentiate between culpable and non- culpable 
behaviour.
47 See, for example, Hollister v National Farmers Union [1979] ICR 542.
48 Although selection for dismissal can sometimes raise this, see Williams v Compare Maxam Ltd [1982] ICR 156. 
49 Section 139(1) of the Employment Rights Act 1996 states that dismissal is for redundancy only if it is wholly or mainly 
attributable to cessation of the business or the part in which the employee is employed or to a diminution in the 
requirements of the business for the employee to carry out work of a particular kind.
50 Redundancy payments are calculated on the basis of age and length of service (section 162(1) ERA 1996) and are the 
equivalent of the basic award in unfair dismissal. Employees need to have been employed for at least two years and the 
maximum payment is £15,750 (2019).
51 E.g. Costello v United Asphalt Co Ltd [1975] IRLR 194.
52 [1977] IRLR ICR 117.
53 Ibid. 
54 James w Cook & Co (Wivenhoe) Ltd v Tipper [1990] ICR 716.
55 Williams v Compair Maxam Ltd [1982] IRLR 83.
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once that has been established then there is little scope for challenging the redundancy; 
procedural correctness is all.
However, in cases where the dismissal is due to business reasons that fall short of 
redundancies (where the reason will normally be “some other substantial reason”) the 
employer is not bound by the terms of the contract at all (save for complying with 
termination provisions). The employer’s case is that for business or efficiency reasons 
(unconnected with any personal characteristics of the employees), it is justified in bring-
ing the contract to an end. 
Non- redundancy economic dismissals can arise in one of two ways. The employer can 
present the employee with a revised contract, which contains revisions to the existing 
terms, for example, longer working hours, or less pay, or a change to shift working, and 
if the employee refuses to accept the changes, the employer dismisses. The other way is 
for the employer to implement change, and the employee leaves and claims constructive 
dismissal i.e. the employer has breached a fundamental term of the contract. For our 
purposes there is no difference between the two situations.56
One of the earliest cases was Hollister v National Farmers Union.57 Mr Hollister was 
a group secretary and received a wage and commission on insurance policies sold. 
The Union reorganised its activities so that insurance sales were no longer dealt with 
locally. Mr Hollister was given a new contract, excluding the insurance activity (thereby 
reducing his income) and when he refused to accept it he was dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal stated that this was dismissal for some other substantial reason, it was fair, and 
that there was no need to consult with the employee. In Catamaran Cruisers v Williams58 
the Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the employer’s appeal against the tribunal 
decision that dismissals were unfair when the employer made contractual changes which 
some of the employees refused to accept. The tribunal had compared the old and new 
terms of the contract and had concluded that the new terms were much less favourable 
to the employees and that the company’s financial position was not sufficiently serious 
to require the imposition of those terms. The EAT rejected this approach and stated that 
a tribunal should not look solely at the advantage or disadvantage of the new contracts 
from the employees’ point of view but should take into account the benefit to the employ-
ers in imposing the changes. The court also took the opportunity to examine a number 
of earlier cases. They rejected the view expressed in Evans v Elementa Holdings59 that 
if it was reasonable for the employee to refuse the new terms then it was unreasonable 
for the employers to dismiss him for such refusal, preferring the comment of Balcombe 
J. (as he then was) in Chubb Fire Security Ltd v Harper:
We must respectfully disagree with that conclusion. It may be perfectly reasonable for an 
employee to decline to work extra overtime, having regard to his family commitments. Yet 
from the employment point of view, having regard to his business commitments, it may be 
perfectly reasonable to require an employee to work overtime.6 0 
The EAT also approved ` the statement of Beldam J. (as he then was) in Richmond 
Precision Engineering Ltd v Pearce: “‘Merely because there are disadvantages to the 
employee, it does not, by any means, follow that the employer has acted unreasonably 
56 Interestingly, changes in contracts that might have one time resulted in a successful claim for breach of contract by the 
employees (e.g. Burdett- Coutts v Hertfordshire County Council [1984] IRLR 91) might now be dealt with on a ‘take it or 
leave’ basis, through a ‘some other substantial reason’ dismissal. 
57 [1979] ICR 542.
58 [1994] IRLR 386.
59 [1982] IRLR 143.
60 [1983] IRLR 311 at [9].
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in treating his failure to accept the terms which they have offered as a reason for 
dismissal.”61 
The other matter for concern is the unquestioning acceptance of ‘policy’ decisions 
adopted by the employer. In Banerjee v City and East London Area Health Authority, 
Arnold J said: “If an employer comes and says ‘We have evolved such and such a 
policy’ . . . it seems to us that it must inevitably follow that this enunciation by the 
employer of the policy is a matter of importance . . .”62 This line of reasoning was 
followed in Scott v Richardson where the EAT overturned a tribunal decision on the 
basis that it had erroneously expressed its own view as to the commercial decision 
leading to the business re- organisation.63 So can an employer reduce pay to make more 
profits, or to prevent a fall in profits? This, would not be an unreasonable course of 
action, particularly upon the traditional view of company law, where the interests of 
the shareholders are more important than the interests of the employees. Wedderburn6 4 
has argued that the role of employees should be as important as that of shareholders, 
stressing the point that as a company is independent of its shareholders, it is wrong that 
it should identify completely with their interests, citing the case of Parke v Daily News 
(No 2)65 where it was held that payments to ex- employees who were redundant were 
not in the best interests of the company. (It should be noted that this was before the 
introduction of statutory redundancy payments under the Redundancy Payments Act 
1965.) Sections 309 and 719 of the 1985 Companies Act provided for directors to have 
regard to the interests of employees (currently contained in sections 172 and 247 of the 
Companies Act 2006), but, as Wedderburn points out, this is superficial. The Company 
Law Review that had considered this proposed change had “proposed the “weakest 
possible provision” whilst stating that company directors should make decisions that 
“would be most to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members 
as a whole”.66
Further, there does not have to be any element of ‘reasonableness’ in the reason 
itself. In Willow Oak Developments Ltd (t/a Windsor Recruitment) v Silverwood & Ors67 
the Court of Appeal held that a dismissal for refusal to accept a restrictive covenant 
was a valid substantial reason despite the fact that the covenant itself was unreason-
able in the scope of its restriction. It was held that the issue of the unacceptability of 
the terms of the covenant should be looked at in relation to the reasonableness of the 
decision to dismiss for this reason.68 Finally, for the avoidance of doubt, it should 
be noted that a fair non- redundancy economic dismissal attracts no compensation 
whatsoever.69
61 [1985] IRLR 179 at [32]; and see, for example, Garside & Laycock v Borth [2011] IRLR 735.
62 [1979] IRLR 147. 
63 Appeal No. EATS/0074/04. Bowers and Clarke have argued that such dismissals are often treated as fair on the basis 
that the courts will accept the principle of ‘managerial prerogative’ (see J Bowers and A Clarke, ‘Unfair Dismissal and 
Managerial Prerogative: A Study of “Other Substantial Reason”’ (1981) 11 ILJ 34.).
64 Sections 309 and 719 of the 1985 Companies Act provided for directors to have regard to the interests of employees 
(currently contained in sections 172 and 247 of the Companies Act 2006). (Lord Wedderburn, ‘Employees, Partnerships 
and Company Law’ (2002) 3 ILJ 99, at 109.
65 [1962] Ch 927.
66 op.cit (FN 62).
67 [2006] IRLR 607.
68 The employee was successful nevertheless because of the way in which the covenant had been introduced. However, it is 
submitted, was not necessary, as there was no need to resort to provedure: if an employer tries to introduce a contractual 
term that is unreasonable (and we can use that term because it was in the context of restraint of trade), then it is not about 
procedure).
69 Pitt argues that all economic dismissals should be compensated as they are nothing to do with the fault of the employee 
(G Pitt, ‘Justice in Dismissal: A Reply to Hugh Collins’ (1993) 22 ILJ 251).
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Procedural Fairness
It is important to give an account of this inasmuch as we are concerned with fair decision- 
making. Procedural fairness is treated as an element of the general reasonableness 
requirement under section 98(4) ERA. There was an earlier attempt to put procedural 
fairness on to a statutory footing.70 However, the procedures were regarded as being 
overly technical and the DTI, as it then was, commissioned the Gibbons Report71 which 
concluded that they had been a failure and the scheme was repealed, so that the position 
returned to the earlier case law.
Early cases on procedural fairness, notably British Labour Pump Co Ltd v Byrne,72 
took the view that employers did not have to follow a fair, or any, procedure when 
dismissing if they could show that they would have dismissed the employee regardless of 
what might have been said or done in the course of the procedure. However, in Polkey 
v A. E. Dayton Services Ltd73 the House of Lords held that to argue thus was suspect 
because the question of whether it was reasonable to dismiss had to be answered in the 
light of what did take place and not what might have happened. Some attempt has been 
made to make inroads into Polkey, for example, Duffy v Yeomans and Partners Ltd74 
where the Court of Appeal stated that ‘reasonableness’ is the key, and that it might be 
reasonable not to go through a procedure such as consultation. In this case there was 
no deliberate decision not to consult, and on the facts available at the time it would 
have made no difference.75
This means that, in misconduct dismissals, if a fair procedure has been followed a 
dismissal can be fair, even though it transpires that the employee was entirely innocent 
of the misconduct alleged. It might be argued that an emphasis on procedural fair-
ness can work just as easily against the employer as against the employee i.e. if a fair 
procedure has not been followed the employee will succeed regardless of the substantive 
issues at stake.76 However, militating against this is the fact that a tribunal can make 
a notional finding of unfair dismissal and then reduce compensation by up to 100%.77 
Nevertheless, it remains self- evidently wrong that procedural fairness in dismissal may 
be nothing more than a triumph of form over substance.
In Ferodo Ltd v Barnes the EAT said that the tribunal should not have asked ‘are we 
satisfied that the employee committed the offence?’, but ‘had the employer reasonable 
grounds for believing that he did?’78 Blanket dismissals have been justified in this way, 
i.e. when an employer has been found to be reasonable in dismissing a group of employ-
ees when there is reasonable belief that one or more of them is guilty of misconduct but 
there are no grounds for believing precisely who the culprit(s) might be.79
It might be thought that procedural fairness ensues fairness on the basis that care-
ful decisions taken after formal process will be better than those taken peremptorily. 
However, there is no way of gauging actual carefulness, only of assessing whether a 
70 The regulations pursuant to the Employment Act 2002, were the Employment Act 2002 (Dispute Regulations) 2004. 
71 (Better Dispute Resolution (DTI, March 2007).
72 [1979] ICR 347.
73 [1988] AC 344.
74 [1994] IRLR 642.
75 M Wynn, ‘Unfair Dismissal: the Ghost of Byrne Resurrected’ (1995) ILJ 24 at 272.
76 This is also reflected in the rule in Devis (W) & Sons Ltd v Atkins [1977] AC 931 which states that after- discovered good 
reasons for dismissal cannot retrospectively make the earlier dismissal fair because according to statute the fairness of 
the dismissal must be established ‘having regard to the reason shown by the employer’ (now section 98(4) Employment 
Rights Act 1996), and, stated the House of Lords, that reason was the reason at the time of dismissal. 
77 See Devis v Atkins (Ibid) at 955 (Viscount Dilhorne) and see Shergill v NTL Group Ltd [2005] IRLR UKEAT 0036_05_1104.
78 [1976] ICR 439.
79 Monie v Coral Racing Ltd [1981] ICR 109.
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procedure has been followed. This formalistic procedural justice might be regarded 
as a tick box exercise, when fairness requires something else.80 In consequence for the 
purposes of an unfair dismissal claim, the employer has been given a set of rules to 
follow and if these are followed then there will be no procedural unfairness.
In the misconduct case of British Home Stores v Burchell81 the EAT held that the 
test is threefold: the employer must believe in the guilt of the employee; the belief must 
be based on reasonable grounds; the employer, in order to establish the first two must 
carry out as much investigation as is reasonable in all the circumstances. This test was 
approved by the Court of Appeal in Weddel and Co Ltd v Tepper,82 and in Perkin v St 
George’s Healthcare NHS Trust83 where it was stated by the Court of Appeal that it 
was not restricted to misconduct cases. The EAT in Boys and Girls Welfare Society v 
McDonald84 said that a simplistic application of the Burchell test increases the danger 
of a tribunal falling into error. It was held that even if the employer has failed to satisfy 
one of the three elements it would not necessarily mean that the dismissal is unfair 
because the ‘range of reasonable responses’ test85 still has to be satisfied. However, if 
the Burchell test is to have any credence then it cannot be put at the mercy of the range 
of reasonable responses test; to do so is to emasculate it to the point where it has no 
role to play at all.
An interesting twist on procedural fairness has been introduced by the EAT in Ezsias 
v North Glamorgan NHS Trust.86 It was held that where the dismissal is mainly because 
of a breakdown in trust and confidence caused by the employee, there is no obliga-
tion on the employer to follow its dismissal procedures. However, in such a case, if no 
consideration should be given to a fair procedure, how is the alleged breakdown in trust 
and confidence to be established?
The ‘reasonableness’ test
Arguably this is the most pernicious aspect of unfair dismissal law. Its statutory form 
is section 98(4) of the ERA which states:
Where the employer has fulfilled the requirements of subsection (1) the determination of 
the question whether the dismissal is fair or unfair (having regard to the reason shown by 
the employer)- 
(a) depends on whether in the circumstances (including the size and administrative 
resources of the employer’s undertaking) the employer acted reasonably or unreasonably 
in treating it as a sufficient reason for dismissing the employee and
(b) shall be determined in accordance with equity and the substantial merits of the case. 
A summary of the concern that this article addresses what is exemplified by the view of 
Lord Simon in the case of W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins, cited earlier,87 that the reference 
to “equity and the substantial merits of the case” must be widely construed so as to not 
impinge upon reasonableness.88
80 Theories of ‘interactional justice’, for example, which relate to the perceived fairness of interpersonal treatment, examine 
the role of things such as respect, see e.g. Mary D Stecher and Joseph G Rosse, ‘The distributive side of interactional 
justice: the effects of interpersonal treatment on emotional arousal’, Journal of Managerial Issues, summer 2005: http://
www.allbusiness.com/periodicals/article/464516–1.html.
81 [1978] IRLR 379.
82 [1980] IRLR 96.
83 [2005] IRLR 934.
84 [1996] IRLR 129.
85 See Post Office v Foley [2000] ICR 1283 and further below.
86 [2011] IRLR 550.
87 op cit (N 46).
88 Ibid.
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The development of the range of reasonable responses test as set out below is inex-
tricably linked to the way in which first level tribunal decisions can be appealed. All 
appeals from the Employment Appeal Tribunal and upwards are on a point of law only. 
This has been interpreted by the Court of Appeal as meaning that the only two grounds 
of appeal are cases where the tribunal has misdirected itself as to the applicable law or 
where the decision is perverse.89 When will a tribunal have misdirected itself? It may 
well be that in the earlier days of unfair dismissal there was a perceived need to keep 
down the number of appeals to the EAT9 0 and the Court of Appeal would have been 
keen to stem this tide.91 Two closely related conclusions emerged: first, that the tribunal 
should not substitute its own view as to whether the dismissal was unfair, and secondly, 
almost by way of explanation of the first, that, in order to be fair, the dismissal only has 
to fall within what has been described as the range of ‘reasonable’ responses that an 
employer might make. A tribunal might therefore decide that many employers would not 
have dismissed the employee in these circumstances, but that, nevertheless, the decision 
to dismiss fell within the band of reasonable responses.
However, this approach fails to provide for a consideration of alternative responses to 
the situation, and such responses do not figure largely in the deliberations of tribunals. 
These are actions short of a dismissal that an employer might take, such as warnings, a 
condition that the employee undertake training and that failure to do so without good 
reason may result in dismissal. This points up another flawed aspect of the law of unfair 
dismissal and is illustrated by the fact that employees who are disciplined without good 
cause (falling short of dismissal) do not have any recourse against their employer unless 
they treat it as a breach of the implied duty of mutual trust and confidence92 and resign 
and claim it was an unfair constructive dismissal. 
The tribunal’s view and the range of reasonable responses test
What has been described as a ‘mantra’93 the contention that the tribunal must not 
substitute its own view is nothing more than the fairly obvious principle that the tribunal 
must view objectively, the dismissal, its circumstances and potential alternatives. 
This was considered by the EAT in Iceland Frozen Foods Ltd v Jones where the infa-
mous ‘band of reasonable responses’ test was formulated thus: 
[I]n judging the reasonableness of the employer’s conduct an industrial tribunal must not 
substitute its decision as to what was the right course to adopt for that of the employer; . . . 
in many (though not all) cases there is a band of reasonable responses to the employee’s 
conduct within which one employer might reasonably take one view, another quite reason-
ably take another.94
The concept of reasonableness, of course, is also central to the law of judicial review. 
A decision of an administrative body is amenable to judicial review if it falls into the 
category of unlawfulness described by Lord Diplock as illegal, irrational or lacking 
89 See British Telecommunications plc v Sheridan [1990] IRLR 27.
90 For example in 1983 the number of appeals to the EAT was 953 compared with 327 in 1976 (Judicial statistics). See also 
The Hon Mr Justice Browne- Wilkinson, ‘The Role of the Employment Appeal Tribunal in the 1980s’ (1982) 11 ILJ 69.
91 For example, Retarded Children’s Aid Society Ltd v Day [1978] ICR 437 CA and O’Kelly v Trusthouse Forte plc [1983] ICR 
728 (the latter being a particularly bad example of a case which had been decided by the EAT on a perfectly respectable 
point of law which, nevertheless the CA decision was that there was no justification in interfering with the industrial 
tribunal decision).
92 See e.g. White v Reflecting Roadstuds Ltd [1991 ICR 733.
93 Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd [1999] IRLR 672, at XXX (XXX).
94 [1983] ICR 17 at 24.
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in procedural propriety.95 The decision in Associated Provincial Picture Houses v 
Wednesbury Corporation96 set out the definition of reasonableness which (inter alia) 
stated that a decision would not be amenable to judicial review, unless the conclusion 
reached was one which no reasonable authority could reach. It will be recalled that in 
W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins, Lord Simon stated that the word “reasonably” is to be 
widely construed.97
The resemblance between the view of Lord Simon and the statement in Vickers Ltd 
v Smith is remarkable:
. . . not only was it necessary to arrive at the conclusion that the decision of the manage-
ment was wrong, but that it was necessary to go a stage further, if they thought that the 
management’s decision was wrong, and to ask themselves the question whether it was 
so wrong, that no sensible or reasonable management could have arrived at the decision 
reached by the management.98 
However, in Iceland Frozen Foods, it was held that although, as stated, this was entirely 
accurate in law, it was said to be:
capable of being misunderstood so as to require such a high degree of unreasonable-
ness to be shown that nothing short of a perverse decision to dismiss can be held to be 
unfair within the section . . . That is not the law. The question in each case is whether the 
industrial tribunal considers the employer’s conduct to fall within the band of reasonable 
responses . . .99
In the context of unfair dismissal, therefore, the notion that unreasonableness equals 
perversity has been rejected. How far is this really the case? Freer maintains that, 
despite protestations to the contrary, the test is still akin to the public law test on the 
basis that, rightly, the distinction is one of semantics, not of law.10 0 Freer represented 
Mr Haddon in the notorious case of Haddon v Van Den Bergh Foods Ltd,101 when at 
long last the EAT called into question the ‘range of reasonable responses test’. Mr 
Justice Morison (then outgoing President of the EAT) said that this ‘range’ of responses 
suggested that a very broad band of decisions would be fair and he concluded that 
whenever a tribunal finds in favour of the employee it is effectively substituting its own 
view of what would have been reasonable, or, more accurately, what was unreasonable. 
He went on to say: ‘It is likely however that what the tribunal itself would have done 
will often coincide with its judgment as to what a reasonable employer would have 
done.’102
It was argued by Freer in his article, and no doubt before the EAT in Haddon that 
the real test is ‘fairness’. The facts in Haddon illustrate the point well. Mr Haddon was 
invited to a celebration of his 15 years good service which was due to take place half way 
through his shift and after which he would be expected to return to work. He attended 
to receive his award, where alcohol was available and left 1.5 hours before his shift was 
to end. He decided not to go back to work (the company had a policy that stated that 
no one could work after consumption of alcohol) and was dismissed. The tribunal that 
heard his complaint had a great deal of sympathy for the applicant but decided the 
95 See Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1984] AC 374 at 410.
96 [1948] 1 KB 223 at 233.
97 op.cit (N 46).
 98 [1977] IRLR] 11 at.
 99 [1983] ICR17, at 25.
 10 0 A Freer, ‘The Range of Reasonable Responses Test – From Guidelines to Statute’ (1998) ILJ 27 335.
 101 [1999] IRLR 672.
102 Ibid at para 24.
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decision to dismiss was within the ‘range of reasonable responses’. The EAT reversed 
this, but found the applicant 25% contributorily to blame for his dismissal.103
The Scottish EAT endorsed the Haddon view that the focus should be on ‘fairness’ 
in the case of Wilson v Ethican Ltd.10 4 However, in Madden v Midland Bank plc105 a 
differently constituted EAT stated that the range of reasonable responses test could only 
be abandoned by the Court of Appeal. Nevertheless the EAT went on to frame a cogent 
argument against the licence to dismiss which the test had provided. The arguments 
related to whether the band of reasonable responses test is subjective or objective. It 
seems to permit subjectivity on the part of employers because different employers can 
disagree about the decision to dismiss on exactly the same facts, and is only objective 
in the sense that a tribunal is able to regard a decision as objectively perverse. However, 
the threefold BHS v Burchell10 6 test implies objectivity in what the reasonable employer 
should have done prior to taking the decision to dismiss. In the Madden case, it was 
said that the three- fold test of BHS v Burchell should be used to establish the reason 
for the dismissal rather than reasonableness. Because the test is objective the tribunal 
is free to substitute its own view for the employer in each element of the test (belief in 
the employee’s wrong- doing, reasonable grounds, reasonable investigation). This neatly 
avoids the problem of precedent by avoiding section 98 (4) and concentrating on sections 
98 (1) and (2) instead i.e. what was the reason for the dismissal. The EAT in Madden 
suggested that, on its approach, Mr Haddon would still have been unfairly dismissed 
because, by giving him alcohol the employer was revoking (or making unreasonable) the 
earlier instruction about returning to work because of the ‘no alcohol’ company policy. 
The reason for his dismissal could not, therefore, have been established as misconduct. 
This is an interesting approach because it would probably have meant that, on this 
analysis, Mr Haddon would not have been found to have contributed to his dismissal, 
as the employer would simply have failed to establish the reason, and any ’contribu-
tion’ to the dismissal by the employee would not have fallen to be considered. The 
less conservative approach could have also rectified the situation where the employer 
now has the upper hand in the application of sections 98 (1) and (2) illustrated by the 
fact that the employee can dismissed even though there is no breach of contract107 
and the reason for the dismissal is refusal to agree to the imposition of unreasonable 
terms.108
The case of Madden went to the Court of Appeal where it was heard together with 
another case on the same point: HSBC (formerly Midland Bank) v Madden and Post 
Office v Foley.109 The Court of Appeal restored the earlier position by repeating that 
the band of reasonable responses test is the correct test, and that tribunals must not 
substitute their own views. Mummery LJ commented upon the range of reasonable 
responses by citing extreme cases at both ends of the spectrum:
There will be cases in which there is no band or range to consider. If, for example, an 
employee, without good cause, deliberately sets fire to his employer’s factory and it is 
burnt to the ground, dismissal is the only reasonable response. If an employee is dismissed 
103 Although the criticism of the range of reasonable responses test was welcome, as Smith and Baker state, the EAT could 
have allowed the appeal purely on the ‘perversity’ test (I Smith and A Baker, Employment Law (12th edn, 2015 OUP) 
at 460).
10 4 [2000] IRLR 4.
105 [2000] IRLR 288.
10 6 BHS (N 85).
107 Farrant v The Woodroffe School [1998] ICR 184.
108 Willow Oak Developments Ltd (t/a Windsor Recruitment) v Silverwood & Ors [2006] IRLR 607.
109 [2000] IRLR 827.
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for politely saying “Good morning” to his line manager, that would be an unreasonable 
response.110
However, the argument is that in between those extreme cases there will be cases 
where there is room for reasonable disagreement among reasonable employers as to 
whether dismissal for the particular misconduct is a reasonable or an unreasonable 
response. In those cases it is helpful for the tribunal to consider “the range of reasonable 
responses.”
The fact that the example of an unreasonable employer’s response given by Mummery 
LJ is so ludicrous, and so unhelpful, speaks volumes, indicating the huge latitude that 
this test gives to employers.
Furthermore, the Court of Appeal in Madden stated that the EAT had erred in con-
sidering the adequacy of the evidence against Mr Madden, rather than deciding whether 
the employer had carried out a reasonable investigation: “The tribunal focused on the 
insufficiency of the evidence to prove to its satisfaction that Mr Madden was guilty of 
misconduct rather than on whether the Bank’s investigation into his alleged misconduct 
was a reasonable investigation.”111 However if the evidence was inadequate, then it is 
irrelevant whether a reasonable investigation has been carried out; it has not elicited 
sufficient evidence to show on the balance of probabilities that the employee is guilty 
of the misconduct concerned.
It is hard to reconcile the two parts of the Iceland/Foley decisions with the composi-
tion of employment tribunals so as to form a sort of ‘industrial jury’.112 First it states 
that the ‘industrial jury’ must not substitute its own view, and secondly it states that 
there is little opportunity for appeal as long as the tribunal finds that the decision to 
dismiss fits into that band of reasonable responses. This effectively gives the industrial 
jury very little to do. The experience of the wing members is not needed, and the legally 
qualified chair should be well able to spot a perverse decision to dismiss. 
An interesting observation has been made by Patrick Elias to the effect that the 
band of reasonable responses is a standard- reflecting test rather than a standard- setting 
test.113 Parallels can be drawn between this and the infamous ‘Bolam test’,114 where the 
standard of care in medical treatment is measured by reference to ‘accepted practices’ 
amongst fellow medical practitioners. Indeed in the employment case of Beedell v West 
Ferry Printers the EAT stated:
It seems to us, when formulating the band of reasonable responses test in British Leyland 
UK Ltd v Swift [1981] IRLR 91, Lord Denning MR may have had regard to the Bolam 
test. Just as the question of a doctor’s negligence will depend upon whether a reasonable 
body of medical practitioners would have accepted the practice which he followed, even if 
another body of equally reasonable practitioners would have acted differently (a band or 
range of reasonable responses), so it may be said that the question of whether an employer 
has acted reasonably in dismissing his employee will depend upon the range of reasonable 
employers. Some might dismiss; others might not. It is not necessary for the applicant’s 
110 Ibid at para. 50.
111 [2001] ICR 1283 at 1295.
112 The Chairman is legally qualified but the wing members are recruited from employers’ associations and trade unions 
respectively.
113 Elias P, ‘Fairness in Unfair Dismissal: Trends and Tensions’ [1981] 10 ILJ 201 at 213: “Instead of setting its own standard 
of fairness the tribunal sought to hide behind the commonly held opinions of some employers, and the appellate courts 
would not say they were wrong to do so. This is a dangerous development, for if this kind of argument becomes widely 
accepted it will result in reasonableness being defined by the attitudes of the most prejudiced body of employers rather 
than by the tribunal’s perception of how an enlightened employer might behave.”
114 Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582. The test was slightly modified by the House of 
Lords in Bolitho v City and Hackney Health Authority [1998] AC 232 in that the treatment decision must stand up to 
logical analysis.
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complaint to succeed that the employment tribunal concludes that reasonable employer 
would have dismissed.115
It is arguable that the purpose of the band of reasonable responses test is to achieve 
consistency. This could be the case, in the sense that all tribunal decisions will confirm 
whether the decision to dismiss fell within the band of reasonable responses, but not 
in the sense that the formulation gives guidance on what is fair i.e consistency is only 
achieved in form and not in substance. Furthermore, there needs to be a distinction 
made between internal and external consistency. If the employer’s decision to dismiss is 
consistent with its other decisions this does not mean that the decision is fair; it might 
be consistently unfair. External consistency means that it is consistent with an objective 
benchmark; the possibility of this is excluded by the band of reasonable responses test. 
THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS – THE GODFATHER WAS A 
REASONABLE MAN116
Reasonableness and prudence
The case of Secretary of State for Education v Tameside Metropolitan Borough Council 
provides a particularly telling view of the concept of reasonableness.117 Lord Russell 
stated: ‘It is quite unacceptable . . . to proceed from “wrong” to “unreasonable” . . . 
History is replete with genuine accusations of unreasonableness when all that is involved 
is disagreement, perhaps passionate, between reasonable people. In summary, my Lords, 
“unreasonably” is a very strong word indeed . . .118
It follows from this that instances of unreasonableness will be rare, at least in a 
commercial context. Hume said that reason tells us how to attain our desires, not 
what is right or wrong to seek to attain. As he famously said: “Tis not contrary to 
reason to prefer the destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger”.119 
Another way of describing the Humean view is that we decide what is right and then 
go on to decide how to achieve it i.e. prudential reasonableness.120 In deciding on what 
is right, reasonableness only plays a part in the sense that the arguments as to what 
is right must have some coherence and that they must be able to withstand logical 
analysis. In the case of deciding how to achieve one’s end, it is entirely about what is 
reasonable.
Thus, to say that someone is behaving reasonably is not the same as saying that they 
are doing the right thing. Although there might be an assumption that to describe 
someone as reasonable is to say something good about them, that is only the case insofar 
as someone who was unreasonable would often have difficulty in doing the right thing 
because of lack of ability to reach a decision validly based upon facts. The distinction 
can be drawn between logically good reasons which explain a decision, and morally 
good reasons. An employer who stated that he dismissed a worker because he did not 
like him and no longer wished to keep him on the workforce could not be questioned 
115 [2000] ICR 1263 at para. 81.
116 “The Don could always persuade anybody, there was never anyone who could stand up to his reasonableness.” Mario 
Puzo, The Godfather (1969 Arrow Book 1998), at 535.
117 [1977] AC 1014.
118 Ibid at 1974.
119 D Hume, A Treatise on Human Nature, Book II, Section 3, (Oxford, OUP, 2000 edition, Eds: D F Norton and M J 
Norton).
12 0 This is the traditional view of Hume, but there are those who believe it to be a flawed interpretation. See, for example, 
Hampton,J, Does Hume have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason? (1995) HUME STUDIES, Volume 
XXL No 1, 57–74. 
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further about the logic of this decision. However, if an employer stated that he dismissed 
the worker because it was fair to do so, that employer would be met with the question 
as to why it was fair, why did it matter whether it was fair and so on.
The concept of self- interest is of relevance here and relates to our earlier discussion 
of freedom of contract and economic theories of law. In the context of reasonableness, 
the concept of self- interest might be regarded as the morally neutral aspect of prudential 
reasonableness, distinguishing between our desires (self- interest) and deciding what 
should be done to attain them. However, Dewey, who was part of the movement that 
took a pragmatic approach to law and philosophy known as American Realism,121 
made a distinction between egoism (self- interest) and altruism, and regarded them as a 
false dichotomy.122 Dewey developed a theory of ”self interest” that entailed an end goal 
of something of worth that was not dependent upon the “self”. This could be a way of 
developing the rather out- dated and, perhaps, unsophisticated view of “reasonableness”. 
He concluded that it was wrong to regard them as distinct entities as the concept of 
“self” is more complex. He posed the question in terms of trying to identify the motive 
for carrying on a business. If it is altruistic i.e. looking after the welfare of others, 
both the self- interest and the altruistic reasons are there from the outset but there is no 
adequate moral criterion within the business itself. This is interesting in the context of 
the early case of Moon v Homeworthy Furniture123 and the decision that there could be 
no looking behind the decision to make redundancies.
McMahon has undertaken a comprehensive examination of the concepts of reasona-
bleness and fairness.124 He surveyed the history of the morality of reciprocal concern, 
that avoids engaging “direct concern” which he describes as concern about the well- being 
of each individual as a reason for action, and which takes no account of the mechanics 
of a process which must necessarily be of “reciprocal concern”, as this should try and 
avoid conflict between the players, as it is rooted in what is mutual, co- operative, and 
beneficial.125 This echoes the contention of McNeil below126 that there is a gap between 
the players in the contractual relationship.
Rationality
Perhaps it would be more helpful, when considering fairness in dismissals to emphasise 
rationality127 rather than the somewhat tainted concept of reasonableness. Fairness 
requires rationality in the sense that it will ensure that like cases will be treated alike, 
and it relates to respect for the individual in the sense that the way in which cases differ 
between individuals is part of what we think of as fairness However, this view of justice 
has its limitations as far as unfair dismissal is concerned as it is reflected in procedural 
fairness, but not elsewhere. Certainly, tribunals will regard it as unreasonable if like 
employees are not treated alike (say, for example, a dismissal when history shows that 
very similar employees in very similar circumstances had not been dismissed),128 but 
if the policy is to dismiss all employees for a trivial offence then a tribunal may be 
reluctant to intervene to declare this unreasonable. There is an asymmetry here: if it 
is reasonable for an employer to dismiss for refusal to agree to significant changes in 
121 See, for example, N E Simmonds, Central Issues in Jurisprudnce (1986, Sweet and Maxwell) pp 86–88).
122 J Dewey, Lectures on Psychological and Political Ethics (1898) Chapter 6, section 2.
123 op.cit (N 54).
124 C M McMahon, Reasonableness and Fairness: A Historical Theory (2016 Cambridge University Press).
125 Ibid. Part II, sections 4 and 5.
126 R McNeil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (1980, Yale University Press).
127 J Bennett, Rationality (1964, Routledge & Kegan Paul), at p. 6.
128 But note MBNA Ltd v Jones [2015] UKEAT/0120/15/MC where inconsistency of treatment was found to be fair.
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the job then any dismissal will be fair; if it is reasonable for the employee to refuse to 
agree such changes then, again, any dismissal will be fair. The interests of the employer 
and employee are not treated equally. It can be reasonable of the employer to seek to 
make more profits by reorganisation, and it can be reasonable of the employee in the 
context of that reorganisation, to refuse to accept a different job, a wage cut or whatever. 
However, as there is no need to focus on whether there has been injustice then in those 
circumstances it is fair to dismiss the employee.129
SOCIAL EXCHANGE THEORY AND RELATIONAL CONTRACTS
Social Exchange Theory
It has been argued that freedom of contract presupposes an equality of bargaining 
power, which rarely applies in an employment case. Although a contract of employment 
is a commercial contract, it is more complicated than a contract for the sale of goods or 
the provision of services because there is a personal element to the contract.130 
Social Exchange Theory dates from the 1920s, for example in the work of Mauss131 
and in the 1950s the theory was applied to employment relationships, but there was 
still concentration on the financial side of the exchange.132 However, further develop-
ments saw arguments constructed, where, it was it was said that the exchange goes 
beyond things such as work and remuneration, and include non- tangible qualities 
such as trust.133 Pattnaik and Tripathy state: “In short, in an economic exchange the 
mechanisms of reciprocity are specified formally and have a limited time frame. Social 
exchange involves unspecified obligations where one party trusts the other and have no 
predefined time frame.”134
Relational Contracts
In the jurisprudential field, there has been an approach to the categorisation of the 
employment contracts by developing the notion of a “relational contract”. This dates 
back to the 1970s and the publications of Ian Macneil. He constructed the basis of the 
contractual theory, concluding that the law should reflect “contracting behaviour” and 
this is based on social exchange theory.135 The relational contract theory describes 
a continuum from the traditional “contract” theory which encompasses such things 
as market exchanges, and, relations at the other end of the spectrum, such as marital 
relations. Employment contracts are close to that other end of the spectrum. It acknowl-
edges the different perspectives of employers and employees and the wider relationships 
within the undertaking e.g. supervisor and employee, and the social aspects of these 
relationships in terms of “give and take”.136
McNeil also referred to “discrete contracts” which are normally of short duration, 
and the exchange is confined to easily ascertainable measures such as an agreed price 
129 W Devis (N 46) at 953.
130 As we have seen, one of the key distinguishing factors of a contract of employment is the element of personal service. 
See Express & Echo Publications Ltd v Tanton [1999] ICR 693 and Montgomery v Johnson Underwood Ltd [2001] IRLR 
367.
131 See N Elias, The History of Manners: The Civilising Process, Vol 1, (1978: New York, Pantheon Books).
132 See, for example, G Homans, Social Behvior as Exchange, American Journal of Sociology, (1958) Vol 63, pp 507–606.
133 J A M Coyle- Shapiro and N Conway, The employment relationship through the lens of social exchange (2004, Oxford 
University Press).
134 L Pattnaik and S K Tripathy, The Influence of Perceived Organisatonal Support on Organisaion Commitment: an 
eEmpirical Study, ASBM Journal of Management, July 2014.
135 op.cit N124.
136 op.cit N131.
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and that the goods to be provided should comply with a specifiable standard. On the 
other hand, relational contracts are of “significant duration”. This is, perhaps, not 
a very helpful as it might be regarded as being a contract enduring for a long time, 
whereas “significant” is better interpreted as enduring in terms of commitment, which 
brings into play the objects of the social exchange, such as loyalty, discretion and 
initiative.137
Section 98(4) – do ‘equity and the substantial merits of the case’ help?
To return to the wording of section 98(4), much has been said about the question as 
to whether it was reasonable to dismiss, but that is only half of the section’s wording. 
However, as we have seen, section 98(4) of the ERA requires the tribunal to decide 
whether the decision to dismiss was reasonable and to determine this in accordance 
with equity and the substantial merits of the case. In W Devis & Sons Ltd v Atkins, with 
regard to considerations of equity, Viscount Dilhorne stated that: “Paragraph 6(8), (as 
it then was)138 appears to me to direct the tribunal to focus its attention on the conduct 
of the employer and not on whether the employee in fact suffered any injustice.”139 If 
the purpose of the legislation was to encourage fair procedures in dismissals then case 
law has followed this. However, if the purpose was to promote fair treatment then it has 
failed. An employer who dismisses an employer for an established reason (e.g. because 
it wishes to reorganise his business in some way), and who follows a fair procedure, 
does not, according to Viscount Dilhorne, have to focus his attention on whether the 
employee suffers any injustice. However, there have been instances where a balancing of 
the interests of both parties has been advocated, and it is particularly applicable in cases 
of economic dismissals.14 0 Raphael looks at two ways of approaching justice : merit and 
desert, and equality and need.141 Merit and desert are concepts that might be relevant 
to e.g. selection for redundancy, but they play no part in deciding whether to dismiss 
at all i.e. in economic dismissals a tribunal will not want to know how meritorious the 
employee(s) are, and, as far as equality and need are concerned equality will only have 
a general role to play (e.g. all employees were considered), but need will play no part 
at all. Consider deterrence dismissals such as in the Court of Appeal case of British 
Leyland UK Ltd v Swift where Lord Ackner stated:
An employer might reasonably take the view, if the circumstances so justified, that his 
attitude must be a firm and definite one and must involve dismissal in order to deter other 
employees from like conduct. Another employer might quite reasonably on compassionate 
grounds treat the case as a special case.142
This is interesting in connection with the ‘moral neutrality’ of reasonableness. The 
deterrence point is clearly reasonable, but it is nothing to do with justice or fairness to 
the employee.
In section 98(4), the language refers to “equity” which we can regard as “fairness”. 
This is surely a compelling way of looking at the employment relationship because it 
entails so much that is about the nuances of behaviour. Furthermore, as we have seen, 
the House of Lords has endorsed the concept of “mutuality of obligation” as being 
137 op. Cit N 133.
138 The same wording was then contained within paragraph 6(8) of Schedule 1 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Act 1974.
139 W Devis (N 46), at 952. 
14 0 See Catamaran Cruisers Ltd v Williams [1994] IRLR 386.
141 Raphael, D., Justice and Liberty (London: The Athlone Press 1980), Chapter 1.
142 [1981] IRLR 91 at [17].
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an essential ingredient in the employment relationship.143 Indeed, the long- standing 
implied term of fidelity and more recently of good faith, reflect precisely the same “rela-
tional contract”. These obligations go beyond “reasonable behaviour” in the prudential 
sense, and beyond the emphasis upon freedom of contract.
SUMMARY
Common Law
In order for a contract of employment to exist there has to be mutuality of obligation 
between the parties, and the element of personal service is crucial.
The implied term of trust and confidence necessarily implies co- operation; indeed, 
it is expressed as being a mutual term. Generally, express terms cannot be removed or 
rewritten. Historically this has meant that only terms that were illegal or constituted an 
unlawful restraint of trade could be examined by the courts. However, as has been seen, 
more recently, when considering non- solicitation restrictive covenants, it was held by the 
Court of Appeal14 4 that employees are not like stock in trade, echoing the International 
Labour Organisation Declaration, in its founding documentation, that “labour is not 
a commodity”.145
Further, the courts have been resistant to the view that express terms have to be 
reasonable, but have dealt with cases where the application of terms such as mobility 
clauses has to be considered in the light of the principle that neither party to the contract 
should behave in such a way so as to prevent the other party from carrying out their 
part of the contract.
The statutory provisions in the Employment Rights Act relating to relating to unfair 
dismissal
In arriving at the present position, the courts have been influenced by a number of fac-
tors: first, the tradition of freedom of contract, and, save for the case of restraint of trade 
clauses, courts will not re- write contractual terms; secondly, and this is really a part 
of the first factor and is what appears to be an emphasis on “managerial prerogative”; 
thirdly the exporting into interpretation of section 98(4) of public law approaches as in 
the law of judicial review, and finally, the influence of policy considerations, in terms 
of restricting opportunities for appealing against the decision of a first- level tribunal.
CONCLUSION 
So to go back to our original question: how do we reconcile the respective approaches 
to the common law and to the requirements of ERA? It could be argued that this is 
about the use and development of the common law as part of the role of the judiciary, 
and statutory provisions are created by Parliament, and in that context, the judiciary 
seems to be reluctant to take a bold approach.
However, given that we are faced with a statutory provision that actually requires the 
decision as to reasonableness to be decided in accordance with fairness, then it might 
be said that the answer is contained within the statutory provision itself. However, the 
judiciary adopted a public law view that is largely concerned with reasonableness, and, 
143 Carmichael and Anor v National Power plc [1999] ICR 1226.
14 4 Hanover Insurance Brokers v Shapiro [1994] IRLE 82 CA.
145 Internation Labour Organisation, Preamble to the Declaration of Philadelpia.
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as we have seen, reasonableness is essentially morally neutral. It is only marginally 
concerned with substantive fairness, as the issue of fairness appears to be dealt with 
by the emphasis upon procedural fairness, and to take just the example of economic 
dismissals, these cannot be saved from being unfair by mere procedural issues.
Therefore, we need a different approach to the issue. A fresh look at the nature of the 
employment contractual relationship is required. If we take an approach based upon 
social exchange and the relational nature of the employment contract, then this should 
result in a different perspective for employment tribunals when making decisions based 
upon fairness, which, after all, and ironically, is the whole point of the statute. If we take a 
relational view of the contract of employment itself, then an emphasis on fairness should 
resonate with the players in the relationship. If we take a social exchange approach then 
we should permit employment tribunals to examine the substantial fairness of a decision 
to dismiss not least because of the common law developments that we have discussed. 
Furthermore, rather than take a market/reasonableness approach, a social exchange 
approach recognises that markets are constituted by law and that private interest can 
be used abusively by private actors. Employers (including those in the public sector), are 
private actors, not public officials granted power to make decisions, and the legislative 
process decided that private power actors should be prevented from abusing private 
power. Indeed, the legislative intervention that attempts to reconstitute the employment 
contract goes back to the Industrial Relations Act of 1971146 which was the first iteration 
of the right not to be unfairly dismissed, and a reflection of the need to restrain the 
abuse of the position of power held by employers.
146 Royal Commission on Trade Unions and Employers’ Associations was an inquiry into collective UK employment 
law and its 1968 Report (Cmnd 36 23) is commonly known as the “Donovan Report”, as Lord Donovan chaired the 
inquiry.
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INTRODUCTION
The Politics of Data Transfer: Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Over Data 
Privacy by Yuko Suda provides a unique insight into the transfer of personal data from 
the European Union (EU) to the United States. This book concentrates primarily on 
comparing the Safe Harbor Principles with the Privacy Shield Principles, interpreting the 
passenger name record (PNR) dispute, and analyzing the Society for Worldwide Interbank 
Financial Transactions (SWIFT) affair. Despite the fact that it is a slim volume, it is 
creatively completed and largely satisfied scholars’ requirements on their related research. 
This value includes two sides. On one side, Suda applies the concept of extraterritoriality 
to elucidating issues over politics of global data flows. This paradigm opens up a fascinat-
ing new way to shed light on the relationship between data flow and data privacy. On the 
other side, Suda offers some useful solutions to specific controversy between the EU and 
other jurisdictions, prominently the US. These two sides will attract anyone who wishes 
to access data transfer (data privacy) both academically and practically.
CONTENT
The book has nine chapters:
•	 The Politics of Data Privacy
•	 The Politics of Extraterritorial Regulation
•	 The EU Data Protection Directive
•	 From Safe Harbor to Privacy Shield
•	 The PNR Dispute
•	 The EU PNR Directive
•	 The SWIFT Affair
•	 Data Privacy and Free Trade Agreement
•	 Conclusion
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Chapter 1 indicates that in the era of digitalization, where a plethora of data, including 
personal data and other types of data, is collected and used both domestically and 
internationally, data privacy is exposed to the external environment. Nevertheless, the 
essence of data privacy is the intricate task of balancing this concern against other needs.1 
Chapter 2 traces back the logic of extraterritoriality and counter- extraterritoriality. 
The key point it reveals that in reality it is difficult for one government to harness 
or regulate transborder flows, especially because the reach of national regulation is 
incongruent with the scope of what is being regulated.2 Chapter 3 focuses on some 
specific provisions in the EU Data Protection Directive and the General Data Protection 
Regulation(GDPR).3 The latter is regarded as an advanced version, updating and mod-
ernizing the former.4 Chapter 4 involves several rounds of EU- US data talks, uncovering 
how the EU regulates in terms of the Safe Harbor arrangement. Meanwhile, it also 
addresses the transition from the Safe Harbor to the Privacy Shield under which personal 
data could legally be transferred from EU territory to the US for commercial purpose, 
as long as complying with the requirements of EU data protection laws.5 Chapter 5 
explains why and how the US uses data on air passengers, generating the passenger 
name record (PNR) agreements.6 In contrast to the US, the EU highlights data privacy 
and firmly adheres to the human rights through the whole disputes. Chapter 6 accounts 
for the development of the EU’s PNR policy and discoveries the differences in the EU 
PNR Directive, such as the scope of its application and the period of data retention 
and depersonalization.7 Chapter 7 refers to financial transactions records held by the 
Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Transactions (SWIFT) stemmed from the 
US government’s response to the events of September 11, 2001.8 It examines what role 
the Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) in the US play (or could play) related 
to the EU data protection regime, along with EU’s reaction to the over- the- border effect 
of US counterterrorism. Chapter 8 discusses what would be in the controversial whirl-
pool in relation to data protection and privacy, intertwining in Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs), such as Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans- 
Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, and the Trade in Services Agreement (TiSA).9 
Chapter 9 draws the conclusion that the disputes covering a series of cases represent 
the politics of extraterritoriality as well as the politics of data privacy.10 
One of the most impressive aspects of the work are the intricate and relevant discus-
sions of the GDPR. As readers familiar with the topic will be aware, these went through 
several phases until their final application on May 25, 2018. The GDPR captured 
widespread attention by going further than almost any other EU regulatory regime, 
particularly in specifying a maximum fine of significant magnitude.11 In many respects, 
this paradigm highlights the frictions between EU- US data transfer typically when they 
 1 Yuko Suda, The Politics of Data Transfer: Transatlantic Conflict and Cooperation Over Data Privacy(Routledge 2018), 
16. 
 2 Ibid 19.
 3 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC.
 4 Ibid 34. 
 5 Ibid 38.
 6 Ibid 55.
 7 Ibid 76–77.
 8 Ibid 81.
 9 Ibid 94.
10 Ibid 109.
11 Christopher Hodges, ‘Delivering Data Protection: Trust and Ethical Culture’ (2018) Vol. 4, Issue 1 European Data 
Protection Law Review 66.
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are engaged in cross- border financial transactions. On one hand, if a business entity in 
the US violates the critical principles of using data, for example, failing to comply with 
specified, explicit and legitimate purposes, the appropriate scale of restriction on data 
use will be adopted by the EU authority, depending on the context. In terms of this 
logic, if the US regime and accompanying practices are deemed “improper” according 
to EU data protection standards, then business entities in the US will be confronted with 
serious obstacles when using data from the EU. On the other hand, the extreme empha-
sis on data protection to some degree does not facilitate the development of the EU’s 
international trade. Hence, the strategy for striking a balance between data protection 
and commercial interests is one of the most crucial elements for EU- US data transfer.
Indeed, the intrinsic reason behind the data protection in the US may be rooted in a 
cultural context in which Americans are far more concerned than most Europeans with 
limiting the government’s attempts to invade individual privacy.12 According to this 
interpretation, the US data protection at the federal level in particular attaches impor-
tance to the protection of personal data in specific sectors. Since 1970 in the US, there 
have been a large number of data protection laws applying only to specific sectors.13 
Most of them are vital components of regulating and promoting the US international 
trade, whilst the EU has kept them in a reasonable orbit. But one fundamental question 
still arises: what measures are available to the EU and the US that would best achieve 
the goal of reciprocity in trade? It would be worthwhile carrying out more research on 
this topic, by both theoretical or empirical means. Because the inherent issue of the 
EU- US trade is not whether, but how, multi- stakeholder data should be transferred to 
the US territory in the light of the GDPR.
CONCLUSION
As set out in this work, the potential adverse side effects of the over- the border reach 
of the EU data protection principles and the US counterterrorism project would both 
be alleviated by the implementation of the Safe Harbor, PNR and SWIFT agreements. 
Yet against this understanding, the core theoretical lexicon of the book is the concept of 
extraterritoriality. Developing this idea, as influenced by the article of Miles Kahler and 
David A. Lake, the book explicitly illustrates possible responses to the real challenge of 
striking a balance between data privacy and other interests, as well as finding a strategy 
for reconciling between the EU data protection and the US counterterrorism. More 
importantly, it creates a new landscape for researching in the realm of transatlantic 
conflict and cooperation over data privacy. 
If the flaw of this book can be found, it is that it generally neglects the considera-
tion that data is gradually being applied to digital forensics over the EU- US judicial 
assistance. The volume and scope of data transfer may be dependent upon the course 
which EU- US cooperation ultimately takes. Nonetheless, this potential gap does not 
exert a negative impact on the author Suda’s commitment to this book. The volume is 
highly recommended to anyone intending to gain more knowledge about data transfer 
(data privacy) between the EU and the US. 
QIAN LI*
12 Shawn Marie Boyne, ‘Data Protection in the United States’ (2018) Vol. 66, Supplement, American Journal of Comparative 
Law 343.
13 The most well- known laws are summarized as the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), Financial Services Modernization 
Act (Gramm- Leach- Bliley(GLB) Act), Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), The Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRA), Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA) and The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA), etc.
*Ph.D. Candidate, Nanjing Normal University Law School, visiting scholar at William & Mary Law School.
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THE REGENCY VILLAS CASE COMMENT1
ABSTRACT
The Regency Villas deals with a very novel application of the principle of easements 
to recreational activities. As observed by Lord Carnwath, none of the cases previously 
considered by the Supreme Court dealt with recreational activities. The balance of 
principles underpinning the extension of the law of easements to recreational activities, 
in particular, the burden involved and the potentially dangerous nature of this burden, 
is evidence that there should be no such extension. 
SUMMARY OF FACTS
In the transfer dated 11 November 1981 (the Facilities Grant), Gulf Investment trans-
ferred Elham House to an associated company and created an easement for Elham 
House to use the recreational facilities in Mansion House. 
The background to the case was that in 1979 Mansion House and Elham House 
were acquired by Gulf Investments Ltd and a number of timeshare apartments were 
created within. However, since the Facilities Grant, the owners of Mansion House had 
not found the facilities it housed as profitable as before. Eventually, the swimming 
pool fell into disuse and by 2000 it had been filled in although a new swimming pool 
was in fact opened subsequently. From time to time, beginning in about 1983, Regency 
Villas Owners Club that was constituted by the purchasers of timeshare units within the 
Regency Villas development made voluntary payments on behalf of timeshare owners 
within the Regency Villas development to the owners and operators of the Mansion 
Park towards the cost, including upkeep, of the facilities. Although these payments 
were made under a reservation of rights, they were usually in agreed amounts, at least 
until the end of 2011. 
FIRST INSTANCE
The matter was ruled on by HHJ Purle QC. Regency Villas succeeded in its claims, 
apart from the recovery of payments for the use of the facilities before 2012. 
1 Regency Villas Title Ltd and others (Respondents/ Cross- Appellants( v Dimond Resorts (Europe) Ltd and others 
(Appellants/ Cross- Respondents) [2018] UKSC 57. 
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THE COURT OF APPEAL 
Regency Villas was successful in that the Court of Appeal agreed that the Facilities 
Grant amounted to a grant of an easement. However, the decision by HHJ Purle was 
reversed as the rights of Regency Villas regarding a new swimming pool constructed in 
the basement of Mansion House were not covered by an easement which reduced the 
amount due. The Appellants succeeded in part in their counterclaim for quantum meruit. 
THE APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
In the Supreme Court, the Appellants sought dismissal of all claims and the Respondents 
sought restoration of the judge’s original order. 
JUDGMENT
A majority of the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and allowed a cross- appeal. 
Accordingly, the judge’s consequential orders, including an order for monetary compen-
sation for the payment under protest for use of facilities in and after 2012, were restored. 
The majority judgment was given by Lord Briggs – Lady Hale, Lord Kerr and Lord 
Sumption agreed with it. Lord Carnwath gave a dissenting judgment. 
COMMENT
This comment largely supports Lord Carnwath’s dissenting judgment. 
Both the majority and Lord Carnwath acknowledged the rather unfortunate con-
veyancing solution devised in this case. Lord Briggs called it at para 31“a conveyancing 
mistake which the court should do nothing to correct, and certainly not by the use of 
the validating principle of construction.” Lord Carnwath at para 94 states that “no- one 
suggests that the conveyancing technique used in this case is a suitable model for future 
time- share arrangements of this kind.” It was argued that the unusual circumstances 
of the present case, and the fact that such a conveyancing mistake was unlikely to be 
replicated, called for moderation and restraint. 
The extension of the law governing easements does not have a precedent which would 
mean that the law had to be extended the recreational activities. This is supported by 
Lord Carnwath where at para 96 he states that: 
“Neither principle, nor any of the 70 or so authorities which have been cited to us, ranging 
over 350 years, and from common law jurisdiction, come near to supporting the submission 
that a right of that kind can take effect as an easement.”
Lord Carnwath lists certain policy reasons why the principle should not be extended 
to recreational activities. It is my contention that this is against the logical progression 
of the law as such a course could lead to very onerous and even dangerous situations. 
As observed by Lord Carnwath, any enjoyment is qualified further by the dominant 
owner’s obligation to contribute to the cost of maintenance. This is also acknowledged 
by Lord Briggs at para 80. In the same para Lord Briggs comments that “there is no 
way in which enforceable obligations of that kind may be imposed upon the servient owners 
so that the burden of them runs with the servient tenement.” The majority judgment is 
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rather vague about what might happen in the event of failure to maintain the property. 
Lord Carnwath gives an example of similar time- share apartments being built on a 
theme park, thus offering free access to the various rides in the park. Lord Carnwath 
comments at para 107 that it is: 
“quite clear that the rides and other attractions could not be sensibly and safely enjoyed 
without active management and supervision of their owner. In theory, no doubt, if the owner 
defaulted, the dominant tenants could form their own management company and take over 
the running of the park.”
This to a large extent undermined Lord Briggs’ contention that “the common law 
should, as far as possible, accommodate itself to new type of property ownership and 
new ways of enjoying the use of land” [para 76]. The law as envisaged by Lord Briggs 
could lead to some preposterous results which could be dangerous in terms of health 
and safety. Equally, the theme park argument does not support the Law Commission’s 
stance from 2011 that the scope of easements in English law should not be lightly put 
aside [Lord Briggs at para 1].
The argument by Lord Briggs at para 77 that recreational easements have been widely 
recognised in the common law world is not a compelling one. Lord Carnwath observed 
at para 96 that this is a novel application and the examples cited by Lord Briggs are not 
any more recreational than the garden as given in In re Ellenborugh Park [1956] Ch 131. 
CONCLUSIONS
The case in question deals with a very novel application of the principle of easements 
to recreational activities. As observed by Lord Carnwath, none of the cases previously 
considered by the Supreme Court dealt with recreational activities. The balance of 
principles underpinning the extension of the law of easements to recreational activities, 
in particular, the burden involved and the potentially dangerous nature of this burden, 
is evidence that there should be no such extension. 
